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The history of utopian literature since the late nineteenth century has been marked by 
generic ebbs and flows. Kenneth Roemer observes that “Between 1888 and the early years of the 
twentieth century, at least 200 literary utopias appeared in the United States alone” (93). This 
profusion of optimistic visions of a better future was relatively short lived. The subsequent 
decades saw a generic reversal in response to the Great Depression, World War I, and the rise of 
authoritarian regimes that professed utopian aspirations. The literary turn from utopia to 
dystopia—part of the broader cultural phenomenon called Modernism—produced nightmare 
visions of futures in which human thought and action were controlled by combinations of 
physical coercion, psychological conditioning, and eugenic manipulation. The hegemony of 
dystopia in the early and mid-twentieth century eventually gave way to a brief renaissance of 
utopian thought in the 1960s and 1970s, as authors—in tandem with the rise of second-wave 
feminism, the Civil Rights movement, and so on—began once more to imagine better futures. 
These literary texts—authored primarily by women, such as Ursula K. Le Guin and Marge 
Piercy—are what Tom Moylan has called the “critical utopias,” texts that “reject utopia as 
blueprint while preserving it as dream” (Demand 10). The fading of the revolutionary 
possibilities of the 1960s, the onset of neoliberalism in the 1980s, and the consolidation of the 
globe under late capitalism after the end of the Cold War resulted in a cultural shift back to 
dystopia. Raffaella Baccolini, among other critics, has described this as “a ‘dystopian turn’ in 





For the purposes of this dissertation, the dystopian turn of the 1980s marked the 
beginning of a period of speculative fiction production that continues to the present day. This is 
the period that I define as “contemporary,” and it is characterized by a profusion of dystopian 
and post-apocalyptic texts in every narrative medium.1 If we take this generic distribution at 
face-value, it seems symptomatic of the utopian idea’s retreat from cultural production since the 
end of the Cold War. This raises questions regarding how we should interpret the relatively 
uncontroversial genre history I have outlined above. Is the oscillation between utopia and 
dystopia symptomatic of broader cultural shifts between optimism and pessimism, hope and 
despair? 
This interpretation is implicitly present in a great deal of criticism, but there are reasons 
to be skeptical of it. The most important reason, for the purposes of this dissertation, is that 
utopian and dystopian narratives cannot be correlated in any straightforward, one-to-one manner 
with a prevailing cultural mood. Conditions of poverty, precarity, ecological breakdown, or 
political oppression may very well result in a profusion of dystopian narratives, but this is not 
always the case. Degrading conditions may lead just as easily to compensatory visions of a world 
in which those conditions have been ameliorated. As Roemer writes of the utopian narratives of 
the 1890s, “The destructive effects of the industrial revolution undermined belief in the 
inevitability of progress. But this dystopian challenge to progress also set up a tension that 
 
1 At the time of this writing, Lyman Tower Sargent’s online annotated bibliography of utopian literature lists 126 
publications in 2019 (Utopian Literature). Sargent provides a brief annotation for each entry but does not 
systematically classify all of the entries by genre. His annotations explicitly label only 72 (57%) of the 126 texts as 
dystopias, but most of the other texts are also dystopias that are simply not labelled as such. Sargent’s bibliography 
also only includes novels and short stories, omitting films and television series, so it is a limited source of statistics 





created fertile grounds for utopian theory and literature” (82). The prevailing material and 
ideological conditions in any historical moment will become sedimented in that moment’s 
cultural productions, and it is certainly worthwhile to consider the generic oscillation described 
above in that context. The primary danger of such readings, however, is that they may lead to 
reductive definitions of the political functions of utopian and dystopian narratives.  
These genre distinctions sort texts into different categories based on the nature of the 
dominant social order they describe. These labels should not be understood as describing the 
text’s politics or the position of the utopian idea within it. As we will see below, a number of 
critics drew attention to this in the 1990s and early 2000s; their valuable responses to this insight 
generally involved revising the traditional genre categories to accommodate a greater degree of 
political complexity within them. This included redefining the dystopian narrative to 
acknowledge the possibility for these bleak and frightening narratives to contain utopian hope. 
These projects nonetheless retain an investment in traditional genre categories that, I argue, are 
decreasingly useful in understanding the politics of contemporary speculative fiction. 
I argue that to grapple with the political and generic complexity of contemporary 
speculative fiction, it is useful to deemphasize the traditional genre categories organizing utopian 
literary studies and to approach utopianism as a discourse. I define utopian discourse as a body 
of thematic concerns, procedures of representation, and patterns of formal organization traceable 
through a wide range of speculative fiction texts that are invested in the politics of radical social 
betterment. This body of textual practices is informed by the basic problematic of utopian 
representation: that, as the “good place” that is “no place,” utopia cannot be represented. Works 





society. They instead explore utopia’s conditions of possibility, lending conceptual content to the 
utopian idea, embodying that content in the text, and then orienting it toward unrepresented 
horizons of utopian possibility. This understanding of literary utopianism disengages it from the 
genre of utopian narrative, allowing us to track it through contemporary works of dystopian and 
post-apocalyptic fiction, science fiction, and fantasy that otherwise may be illegible as utopian 
texts. Doing so reveals that hope is a major structure of feeling in speculative fiction today, 
despite the paucity of recent texts depicting “good” societies. 
Utopian Genre and Utopian Discourse 
Identifying the place of the utopian idea in recent speculative fiction is difficult because 
the traditional genre taxonomies posited by critics cannot readily be projected onto the generic 
hybridity of much of this literature. Compounding the problem is the absence of any general 
agreement among critics as to how the various genres descending from Sir Thomas More’s 
Utopia (1516) should be taxonomized in the first place. As Lyman Tower Sargent writes, there is 
disagreement regarding “what belongs within the constellation of ideas, concepts, and literary 
genres that hover around utopia, but there is something like a consensus that there is such a 
constellation” (“The Three” 2). For the purposes of literary studies, the three most important 
points in this constellation are the genres of utopian, anti-utopian, and dystopian narrative. 
Moylan provides the most useful and nuanced elucidation of these genres in his 
monograph Scraps of the Untainted Sky (2000), where he argues that the tendency among some 
critics to use the terms dystopia and anti-utopia interchangeably is an error that leads to the 
misconception that dystopia is utopia’s antithesis. This faulty opposition, he suggests, can lead to 





betterment and dystopian narratives as pessimistic ruminations on the social ills that invalidate 
such hopes. Moylan’s insight—shared by Baccolini, Sargent, and others—that dystopian 
narratives often include spaces for hope, leads him to reconfigure the utopia/dystopia dichotomy 
by prying apart the terms anti-utopia and dystopia, insisting that only the former is necessarily 
adversarial toward the utopian idea. Anti-utopian narratives are generally dystopian insofar as 
they imagine violent, frightening, or degraded futures, but not all dystopian narratives are anti-
utopian. According to Moylan, dystopias often 
affiliate with a utopian tendency as they maintain a horizon of hope (or at least 
invite readings that do), while others […] retain an anti-utopian disposition that 
forecloses all transformative possibility, and yet others negotiate a more 
strategically ambiguous position somewhere along the antinomic continuum. 
(Scraps 147) 
 
Anti-utopia thus becomes utopia’s antithesis, and dystopia is shifted onto the fraught and 
contested generic terrain between them. A dystopian narrative’s position on the continuum is 
decided by its stance toward the politics of social betterment. If the narrative contains in its 
narrative form, plot, or world-building articulations of positive social alternatives, and if its 
conclusion is open-ended enough to allow for the possibility that these alternatives may be 
realized in some unrepresented future, then it has a utopian dimension. If it lacks these things, 
instead framing its oppressive future society as closed, totalizing, and unchangeable, then it falls 
nearer the anti-utopian end of the continuum. 
 Moylan, therefore, simultaneously critiques and reinforces the traditional genre 
taxonomies that group texts according to the political texture of the dominant society they 
represent. This project was not the only one in the 1990s and early 2000s that complicated earlier 





critics” and that major recent texts “undermine[d] all neat classification schemes” (“The Three” 
7). Baccolini argued for the increasing prominence of “a new oppositional and resisting form of 
writing, one that maintains a utopian horizon in the pages of dystopian science fiction” (518). 
These critics were responding to the traditional genre triad’s inadequacy when applied to the 
complex utopian and dystopian production of the later decades of the twentieth century and to 
the neglect of dystopian literature within utopian studies up to that point.  
The strength of these projects is that they stress that the politics of a text’s dominant 
society do not necessarily correspond to the politics of the text. This important insight is limited, 
however, when it is informed by an investment in the traditional genre categories, and when it 
thus leads to some reconfiguration or multiplication of those categories.2 Projects such as 
Moylan’s can spotlight important lines of difference within and between genres, but I will argue 
that the attempt to contain all this complexity within an improved genre schema speaks to the 
decreasing applicability of such schemas to the speculative fiction of recent decades. Fewer and 
fewer texts that engage with the utopian idea are amenable to such classification. This is further 
complicated by the fact that some of the most compelling of these texts resist classification along 
other generic axes as well, such as the opposition between science fiction and fantasy. N. K. 
Jemisin’s Broken Earth Trilogy, for instance, which I discuss in Chapter One, explores processes 
of social transformation through a generic hybridity that draws on the conventions of utopia, 
anti-utopia, dystopia, fantasy, science fiction, climate fiction, and post-apocalyptic narrative. 
 
2 The clearest example of this is Moylan’s penchant for appending the modifier “critical” to a traditional genre 





All of this returns us to the basic problem of identifying what utopian literature is in a 
period in which traditional utopian narratives are rarely written. I argue that this problem is best 
dealt with by conceptualizing literary utopianism in discursive rather than generic terms. 
Previous critics have also approached utopianism as a discourse while deemphasizing the 
traditional genre categories outlined above. Fredric Jameson, for instance, beginning with his 
1977 article “Of Islands and Trenches,” has defined utopian discourse as a type of praxis based 
on textual procedures that negate and neutralize the contradictions inhering in some “real world” 
social referent. Ruth Levitas, while not using the term “discourse,” has similarly defined 
utopianism as “the expression of the desire for a better way of living” (“Looking” 291). These 
definitions have the strength of defining utopianism in terms of process, seeking to elucidate the 
political functions of the utopian text rather than dwelling on the content of its representations. 
My approach to utopian discourse differs from these by placing a heightened emphasis on the 
specifically textual elements of the work, the ways in which utopian content is instantiated and 
organized within a codifiable discursive logic. I draw here on Michel Foucault’s definition of 
discourse, according to which “whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or 
thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, 
transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive 
formation” (38). A discourse, or discursive formation, is a system of concepts, thematic 
concerns, representations, formal arrangements, and so on organized around a particular subject-
matter. 
Probably the most famous example of discourse analysis is Edward Said’s Orientalism 





different from those of utopian discourse, such that any comparison between the two must be 
very limited, there are some basic homologies and discontinuities that I will point out here to 
clarify my approach. Said uses the term “Orientalism” to designate the body of knowledge 
generated out of the centuries-long process by which Western writers have textually constructed 
“the Orient.” Orientalism, however, is not reducible to any particular subset of texts. It is instead 
an internally coherent system of representations, images, associations, forms, and concepts that 
are woven into the Western cultural imagination. Orientalist discourse may thoroughly permeate 
one cultural production while making brief and intermittent forays into another, cutting across 
genre distinctions in the process. Said’s project, therefore, is not only applicable to texts that 
explicitly represent the Near and Middle East: it equips us to detect Orientalist discourse in its 
subtler manifestations, such that we begin to see it in unexpected places and thereby arrive at a 
more critical awareness of Western culture’s constitutive antagonisms, assumptions, and 
exclusions. My approach to utopian discourse is roughly analogous insofar as it involves 
articulating patterns that can be disengaged from the traditional genre of utopian narrative and 
traced through a much broader field of cultural production. 
This comparison to Orientalist discourse is only helpful up to a point. One of the defining 
features of Orientalism is the conceptual content that it projects onto the Near and Middle East. 
Said writes, for instance, that “The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ‘different’; 
thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, ‘normal’” (40). Said makes two interrelated 
claims here about representations of “the Oriental”; the first claim has to do with the conceptual 
content invested in these representations (irrationality, depravity, juvenility, and difference) and 





representations (the binary positioning of “the Oriental” relative to “the European”). This latter 
claim is about the formal relationships between figures in works of Orientalist discourse, the 
ways in which characters, images, and concepts are organized in service of a certain ideological 
function.  
It is the second type of claim that is applicable to analysis of utopian discourse. Utopia—
the object of utopian discourse—has no stable content. The term utopia, derived from Greek, 
compresses the dual meanings of “no place” and “good place” into a verbal and conceptual unity. 
As a good place that can never actually exist, utopia functions as an empty signifier, a vessel that 
we fill with our individual and collective dreams for social betterment that, by definition, will 
always be nonidentical with the utopian idea. Because of this, utopian discourse may construct 
utopia as egalitarian or hierarchical, anarchic or ordered, decentralized or centralized, feminist or 
patriarchal, pastoral or urban, technophobic or technophilic.3 This indeterminacy is one of the 
conditions of utopian discourse, which is informed by the problematic nature of reifying the 
utopian idea through representation. Utopian discourse, therefore, is defined not by the nature of 
the content that it projects onto the utopian idea, but by the ways in which it instantiates and 
organizes that content. 
Utopian content, for the purposes of this project, is whatever set of political theories, 
ethical or moral values, or principles of social organization an individual text affiliates with the 
utopian idea. This content, I argue, can be embodied and explored in the text’s storyworld, its 
narrative structures, and its aesthetic patterns. My readings are therefore just as concerned with 
 
3 Some critics would disagree with this. Russell Jacoby argues, for instance, that for any political project to qualify 





patterns of figuration, narrative perspective, narrative time, and sentence-level stylistics as they 
are with represented social groups: cities, cults, families, tribes, syndicates, and so on. Each of 
my chapters elucidates a part of the discursive logic through which texts project content onto the 
utopian idea, instantiate that content in the text, and organize it within temporalities structured by 
deferral and anticipation. Chapters One and Two argue, respectively, that utopian discourse is 
anticipatory and dialectical. They track the patterns of deferral through which texts frame their 
utopian content as inchoate, unfinished, and in process, ultimately projecting its fulfillment into 
unrepresented futures beyond the closure of the narrative. These chapters are primarily 
concerned with the formal consequences of utopia’s identity as “no place.” Chapters Three and 
Four focus on utopia as “good place,” tracking the processes through which texts offer 
affirmative embodiments and representations of utopian content and processes of social change. 
These chapters argue, respectively, that utopian discourse is constructive and recursive.   
My chapters will frequently reference older texts, and I do think that the contemporary 
texts I focus on are part of a discursive genealogy that reaches back to More’s Utopia. It is 
beyond the scope of this project, however, to suggest that these chapters collectively offer a 
transhistorical account of how utopian discourse has functioned in all times and places. This is an 
engagement with speculative fiction in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and its 
primary aim is to demonstrate the endurance of the utopian idea in recent speculative fictional 
texts that may seem generically distinct from the older tradition of utopian narrative.4 This 
contributes to efforts within utopian studies to reframe the proliferation of bleak visions of 
 






futurity in recent decades, allowing us to understand these texts as being, very often, vehicles for 
utopian hope. This period, according to the narrative of the dystopian turn, commenced in the 
1980s with the onset of neoliberalism and capitalist globalization. While I want to deemphasize 
the genre distinctions this periodization is based on and stress the vibrant presence of utopian 
discourse in literature throughout this period, it is undeniable that the speculative fiction of these 
decades has a dystopian inclination and that this says important things about contemporary 
culture. My first two chapters, therefore, focus on utopian discourse in post-apocalyptic and 
dystopian narratives, respectively. In the last two chapters, I move on to texts that are more 
generically ambiguous and that engage in more ambitious projects of utopian representation. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One argues that contemporary utopian discourse is anticipatory. In other words, 
anticipation is a discursive principle that conditions structures of narrative closure, 
representations of historical time, and the development of utopian content. Works containing 
utopian discourse always associate specific values or concepts with the possibility of social 
betterment, but they frame this content as inchoate and provisional. They then defer the 
fulfillment of this content into unrepresented futures, so that utopia is never actually represented 
in the text and subjected to the reification that such representation entails. Utopia therefore 
functions in the text as an absent presence, generating hope for social betterment that the text 
never codifies into a prescriptive blueprint.  
This ethos of deferral can be traced back at least to the critical utopian narratives of the 
1960s and 1970s, but my readings in this chapter focus on a specific subset of contemporary 





disposed to the patterns of deferral and avoidance described above. This is the post-apocalyptic 
narrative. Many of these narratives use the apocalyptic end of civilization as a device that 
enables characters to workshop alternative value systems and modes of social organization. The 
chapter culminates in readings of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006) and N. K. Jemisin’s 
Broken Earth Trilogy (2014-7), both of which use apocalyptic catastrophes to explore the 
material and epistemological conditions that could enable the development of fundamentally 
different configurations of the social. Importantly, however, these narratives stop short of 
fulfilling those projects. Their ambiguous and open-ended structures of narrative closure 
generate hope while refusing to reify that hope into a prescriptive image of a better future.   
Chapter Two argues that utopian discourse is dialectical, that its figuration of utopian 
possibility unfolds through the procession of oppositions within the text. My readings in this 
chapter focus on recent dystopian narratives to demonstrate that the utopian function of these 
texts often hinges on how they stage conceptual, social, and formal oppositions. Here, too, the 
contemporary texts continue a discursive genealogy that reaches back to previous periods of 
cultural production. A common trope in the modernist dystopian narratives, for instance, is the 
conflict between the dystopian regime and some oppositional entity contained within it. In some 
of these texts, such as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), this opposition is static and 
closed, or it is undone through the defeat of the oppositional entity. In dystopias organized by 
utopian discourse, such as Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1924), the opposition is dialectical: it is 
dynamic and processual, and its movement through the text’s conclusion signals that the text’s 
dystopian storyworld is subject to historical change. The utopian dialectic stops short of 





trajectories within the text that move toward utopian horizons. The contemporary texts I focus on 
in this chapter are Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam Trilogy (2003-13) and Chang-rae Lee’s On 
Such a Full Sea (2014). 
Dialectical structures facilitate the deferral of utopia’s fulfillment in the text, but they are 
also devices for attributing content to the utopian idea. The dialectic demarcates a space of 
ideological contestation within the text, and this is the conceptual space within which the process 
of articulating utopia commences. Chapter Three builds on Chapter Two by considering utopian 
discourse’s constructive tendencies, the various means through which texts instantiate positive 
political content and then thematize that content as utopian. The pre-twentieth century utopian 
narratives that sought earnestly to offer visions of a better society are early examples of this—
what differentiates recent texts is their heightened awareness of the pitfalls of representation, 
their emphasis on process and incompletion as fundamental qualities of the utopian idea, and 
their use of aesthetic and narrative forms as textual locations where utopian values can be 
abstracted from their imperfect social embodiments. I focus in this chapter on China Miéville’s 
Bas-Lag Trilogy because of the scope, ambition, and variety of its procedures of utopian 
construction. These procedures, I argue, are characterized by an aesthetic of excess, a regime of 
compulsive description and creation that determines everything in the trilogy from its sentence-
level stylistics to its metaphorical relations to its world-building. 
Informing my project is the principle that utopia’s status as “no place” renders its 
representation problematic. Jameson has theorized this condition in terms of epistemological 
constraint, according to which the author’s embeddedness within a certain historical moment 





condition informs the patterns of deferral that I discuss in my first two chapters. As Chapter 
Three indicates, however, utopian discourse only becomes legible as such through the projection 
of some kind of political content onto the utopian idea. In Chapter Four, I seek to reframe the 
text’s position within ideology in more positive and affirmational terms than those offered by 
Jameson. The reliance of a utopian vision on extant political theories, ethical and moral value 
systems, and so on is what I describe as the recursive form of utopian discourse. Utopian 
discourse is recursive in at least two senses: 1) the author’s compositional process necessarily 
involves a dialogue with the past that brings it to bear on the present, and 2) this condition is 
projected onto the utopian processes that unfold within the text, as characters engage in similar 
dialogues with the past in service of projects oriented toward social transformation.  
My readings in this chapter focus on Ursula K. Le Guin’s critical utopias, which, in the 
societies they imagine, their representations of political praxis and historical time, and their 
structures of narrative temporality, present an ongoing dialogue between the present and past as 
the route toward a better future. Le Guin also actively theorizes this principle in her non-fiction. 
Le Guin’s commentaries on the relationship between utopian discourse and the historical past are 
both descriptive and prescriptive. She identifies a condition that all utopian authors are subject 
to—enclosure within and reliance on history—but she reframes this as a positive condition that 
authors should embrace. Turning to the past can be a countermeasure against the troublesome 
alignment between utopian discourse and other cultural logics that valorize progress, growth, 












“EVERY SECOND OF TIME”: ANTICIPATION AND CATASTROPHE 
IN POST-APOCALYPTIC FICTION1 
This chapter is about the patterns of deferral through which texts position their utopian 
content within open-ended, processual temporalities that project its fulfillment into an 
unrepresented future. Utopia thus manifests as a potential that is never fully activated within the 
text. This is what I describe as the anticipatory form of utopian discourse. This principle is 
informed by the ethos of unsayability that characterizes utopian thought. There are two major 
bases for this ethos: the first of these is transhistorical and has to do with the conceptual and 
linguistic origins of the utopian idea; the other is historically specific and rooted in the 
ideological conditions of the post-Cold War era. When Sir Thomas More coined the term utopia, 
he compressed the dual meanings of “no place” and “good place” into a conceptual unity. Utopia 
is the good place that is no place. This contradiction has generated a body of theory, sometimes 
called negative utopianism, that meditates on the paradoxical task of imagining utopian social 
organization when such imaginings by definition fail to embody their object.2 
 
1 Part of this chapter has been published in my article “Negative Utopianism and Catastrophe in Margaret Atwood’s 
MaddAddam Trilogy.” Utopian Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, 2019, pp. 486-504. Copyright © 2019. The Pennsylvania 
State University, University Park, PA. This article is used by permission of the Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Another part of this chapter has been published in my article “‘In what direction did lost men veer?’: Late 
Capitalism and Utopia in The Road.” The Cormac McCarthy Journal, vol. 14, no. 1, 2016, pp. 117-132. Copyright 
© 2016. The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. This article is used by permission of the 
Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
2 For a useful overview of the history of negative utopian thought, see Russell Jacoby’s chapter “An Anarchic 





This is a condition of utopian cultural production in any historical moment, but I argue 
that speculative fiction texts since the end of the Cold War are marked by a heightened 
awareness of it. The association between utopianism and some of the most devastating political 
projects of the twentieth century, the post-Cold War consolidation of the globe under neoliberal 
capitalism, and the plurality of existential threats looming over the globalized world are a few of 
the possible reasons why traditional utopian narratives are rarely written today while dystopian 
and post-apocalyptic narratives have soared in popularity.3 In this chapter, I focus on recent texts 
that partake of the cultural mood that Mark Fisher has described as “‘capitalist realism’: the 
widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but 
also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it” (2). According to this 
line of thought, the impossibility of imagining utopia is less a consequence of Sir Thomas 
More’s semantic choices than it is a symptom of the epistemological constraints placed around 
human thought and action by the ideologically homogeneous world in which we live. Utopia, in 
the texts discussed below, is not a social condition that can be known and embodied; it can only 
exist as a latent potentiality in the storyworld, animated by the barest minimum of utopian 
content and positioned by the text’s conclusion as a sign of hope. 
I focus in this chapter on a specific subset of contemporary speculative fiction texts in 
which these dynamics are especially pronounced: post-apocalyptic narratives. Post-apocalyptic 
narratives are extremely popular today, seemingly validating Fredric Jameson’s frequently cited 
insistence that “it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism” 
 
3 Ruth Levitas writes that “There is a strong anti-utopian strand in contemporary politics […] The discourse of the 
Cold War, revived at the end of the 1980s, contained two implicit equations: ‘Utopia = Totalitarianism = 





(Archaeologies 199). I argue that while these narratives imagine bleak futures of entropy, 
decline, and catastrophe, they also have a stubborn tendency to gesture toward their negation: the 
emancipated society. The texts that I discuss below frame the end of civilization as the 
precondition for a utopian futurity, situating utopian possibilities not in the potentials of reform 
or revolution, which are easily coopted by or contained within ideology, but in the indeterminate 
aftermath of catastrophe. While catastrophe facilitates within the text the epistemological break 
on which utopian construction is predicated, utopia cannot be visualized without its reabsorption 
into the quotidian and compromised realm of the author’s imagination, hemmed in on all sides 
by ideology.4 The texts below therefore array utopia’s predicates by clearing conceptual and 
geographic space in the storyworld for workshopping new configurations of the social, but they 
only embody those alternatives tentatively and on small scales. Their conclusions then project 
the possibility of a better future into the space beyond the end of the text. Post-apocalyptic 
narratives undoubtedly serve critical and cautionary functions through their frightening 
extrapolations into the future, but a more holistic understanding of the range of political positions 
available to these texts needs to include the ways that they can venture beyond critique and 
gesture toward utopian horizons. I will begin this chapter with a discussion of negative utopian 
thought and the theoretical basis for the anticipatory form of utopian discourse. I will follow this 
discussion with readings of novels by Cormac McCarthy and N. K. Jemisin that model this logic. 
 
4 Some criticism uses the terms positive/negative as markers of value (synonymous to good/bad), such that “negative 
utopia” means something approximating dystopia or anti-utopia, and “positive utopia” refers to a “good” utopia in 
the vein of More’s founding narrative. In this chapter, the terms positive/negative designate approaches to 
representation rather than the desirability of a given society. These two alternate meanings of the term are, however, 
imbricated. As demonstrated below, “bad” utopias (dystopias or anti-utopias) are often the starting point for negative 







One of the starting points for my argument is the seemingly counterintuitive insight that 
dystopian and post-apocalyptic narratives often have utopian valences. This insight is not 
particularly controversial in utopian studies today; Tom Moylan influentially suggests in Scraps 
of the Untainted Sky (2000) that dystopias are scattered along the generic continuum between the 
dialectically opposed cultural impulses of utopia and anti-utopia: some falling near one pole or 
the other, while “yet others negotiate a more strategically ambiguous position somewhere along 
the antinomic continuum” (147). Dystopian narratives, Moylan argues, can be just as hospitable 
to utopian hope as they are to anti-utopian pessimism. Attempting a statement of the range of 
political expression allowed by the genre’s conventions, Moylan writes 
The dystopia that works with an open, epical strategy maintains a possibility for 
change or identifies a site for an alternative position in some enclave or other 
marker of difference, or in some way in its content or form manages to establish 
an estranged relationship with the historical situation that does not capitulate; 
whereas the anti-utopia-as-dystopia that recycles a closed, mythic strategy 
produces a social paradigm that remains static because no serious challenge or 
change is desired or seen as possible. (Scraps 157)   
 
The distinction here between an “open, epical strategy” and a “closed, mythic strategy” refers to 
Darko Suvin’s work on narrative closure as a determinant of textual politics.5 Suvin and Moylan, 
importantly, position utopian hope in textual structures that generate indeterminacy and 
irresolution. The openness of a narrative’s conclusion can indicate a potential for utopian social 
change, but that potential is not realized within the narrative. Lucy Sargisson similarly notes that 
while closure and perfection are qualities regularly attributed to utopianism, they are 
 
5 For Suvin, the utopianism of a narrative is largely dependent on the success or defeat of the storyworld’s “novum,” 
a term he draws from Ernst Bloch. The novum is “a totalizing phenomenon or relationship deviating from the 





conspicuously absent in most utopian narratives—especially those informed by feminist 
discourses, in which she finds an “absence or redundance of the concept of perfection” (2). 
There is an important difference between this structural allowance of utopian hope, the 
fulfillment of which is perpetually deferred, and existent utopian social groups instantiated in a 
narrative’s storyworld—a distinction between “utopian enclaves of resistance or horizons of 
hope beyond the pages of the text” (Moylan 180-1, emphasis added). By identifying these as the 
primary utopia-facilitating devices in dystopian fiction, Moylan iterates a major point of 
contention in utopian criticism and theory—the value of positive descriptions of utopian content 
relative to textual structures and patterns that evoke utopia while avoiding its representation. 
Utopian enclaves are common features of dystopian and post-apocalyptic texts.6 Many 
narratives that depict frightening or degraded future worlds embed within them spaces that resist 
their logic and testify to the possibility for things to be different. Margaret Atwood uses the term 
ustopia to describe this genre convention; in an essay reflecting on the principles that inform her 
novels, she writes “Ustopia is a word I made up by combining utopia and dystopia—the 
imagined perfect society and its opposite—because, in my view, each contains a latent version of 
the other” (In Other Worlds 66). What is the nature of this latency, however? The examples of 
ustopia that Atwood subsequently offers, drawn from her own novels, are dystopian landscapes 
perforated by small utopian enclaves, or they are utopian communities established after the 
collapse of a dystopian order. Ustopia codifies the kinship between utopia and dystopia that 
 
6 Jameson writes that in many post-apocalyptic texts “the end of the world may simply be the cover for a very 
different and more properly Utopian wish-fulfillment: as when (in John Wyndam’s [sic] novels, for example) the 
protagonist and a small band of other survivors of the catastrophe go on to found some smaller and more livable 





Moylan and others have noted; inhering in Atwood’s definition, however, is a contradiction 
between positive and negative articulations of the utopian component of the ustopian totality. It 
is odd to refer to an existent utopian community, however small and undeveloped, as “latent.” 
Latency suggests potential that has not yet been activated, that remains dormant, waiting for 
realization—a presence that has yet to fill the space of its absence. This is the language of 
negative utopianism. All of the novels discussed in this chapter describe conflicts between better 
and worse modes of social organization, but the better alternatives are always framed as 
prefiguring some condition that waits, in Moylan’s words, “beyond the pages of the text.” 
This tendency speaks to an acute awareness of the problems of utopian representation. 
The concern with utopia’s unsayability is, again, arguably endemic to utopian discourse across 
historical periods, but it is also differentially articulated across those periods. Jameson has 
offered some of the most influential formulations of the difficulty of imagining utopia “in the 
windless closure of late capitalism” (“Of Islands” 2). Jameson’s theories of utopian discourse, 
worked out over the course of the last few decades, are informed by the principle that no author 
can break out of the constraints thrown by history around human thought and action. He writes in 
Archaeologies that any representation of utopia will be hemmed in by the author’s “inescapable 
situatedness: situatedness in class, race and gender, in nationality, in history—in short, in all 
kinds of determinations, which no biological individual can evade” (170). The vocation of 
utopian discourse is, therefore, not to imagine the new, but to negate and neutralize the 
contradictions of some pre-existing “real world” social referent. That the images generated from 
this process are inevitably derived from pre-existing material is a symptom of the author’s 





the salutary effect of raising the reader to a more critical awareness of that shared condition of 
containment.7 
The novels discussed below are informed by a similar concern with the constraints 
hindering the representation of utopian social organization, and their response is to imagine a 
situation in which those constraints have been undone, liberating the human imagination to think 
beyond them. To theorize this pattern in recent post-apocalyptic fiction, it is useful to return to 
the work of one of Jameson’s predecessors—Walter Benjamin. Russell Jacoby’s genealogy of 
negative utopian thought traces it to “The prohibition against ‘graven images’ found in the Old 
Testament” (84), and he dwells on the work of a group of thinkers whom he refers to as “the 
Weimar utopian Jews—intellectuals such as Ernst Bloch, Gershom Scholem, T. W. Adorno, and 
Walter Benjamin” (92). Benjamin provides concepts that are useful in understanding how certain 
post-apocalyptic narratives today seek to navigate a milieu that is uniquely unaccommodating to 
utopian hope. 
Treating Benjamin as a utopian thinker is somewhat counterintuitive given how 
insistently his work is oriented toward interpreting the past: his historical materialism calls for 
analyses of history that spotlight the utopian potentials lying dormant within it.8 History is full of 
human subjects, events, and cultural productions that are incorporated into dominant historical 
 
7 See Archaeologies (170-81). I provide a more detailed analysis of Jameson’s theory in Chapter Two. 
 
8 Benjamin’s work is indebted to Ernst Bloch’s eccentric hybridization of Marxist historical materialism and 
theological thought. Ruth Levitas’s commentary on Bloch is also relatable to Benjamin’s project: “Not only a 
broader field of literature, but also architecture and music may be important vehicles of utopia […] All of it ventures 
beyond the present reality, and reaches forward to a transformed future” (“Educated Hope” 14). The elucidation of 
such utopian impulses does not leave one with any coherent vision of a better society, but rather with evidence of 






narratives in ways that tend to elide or suppress their subversive elements.9 Benjamin codifies 
this insight in his claim that “even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins” 
(“Theses” 255); according to this view, dominant histories omit, domesticate, or demonize all 
that is adversarial to the status quo in order to tell a story that confers legitimacy on that status 
quo. The historical materialist must liberate these moments from their instrumentalization by the 
powerful, identifying in the precarious edifice of the past those dissonant parts that, removed and 
held under the light of day, cause the whole to tremble. 
Benjamin describes these dissonant elements of history as “dialectical images”: images in 
which complex social and symbolic relations converge, testifying to a relation between present 
and past that gives the lie to the dominant narrative. The image makes the chasm between 
narrative history and material history legible, and in this image the historical materialist 
“recognizes the sign of a Messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, a revolutionary 
chance in the fight for the oppressed past” (“Theses” 263). In this “Messianic cessation of 
happening,” the dominant historical narrative goes silent for the beholding subject, enabling her 
or him to re-narrativize the historical moment in oppositional terms. This, importantly, is a 
narrative procedure in which a disruptive intervention in the unfolding of the dominant historical 
narrative unveils some kind of utopian content in the past that can be repurposed in the present.  
Benjamin’s ideas about social change turn on the possibility that an analogous process 
can occur in the material world—that a “Messianic cessation of happening” can arrest a 
collective, rather than just individual, consciousness. This is what Benjamin anticipates when he 
 
9 Susan Buck-Morss describes the basic premise underlying Benjamin’s thought when she states, simply, that “it 





concludes his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (1940) with one of the most well-known 
expressions of negative utopian thought: 
We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future […] This 
does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogeneous, 
empty time. For every second of time was the strait gate through which the 
Messiah might enter. (264) 
 
Jameson writes that messianic time “is the notion of the non-announced, the turning of a corner 
in which an altogether different present happens, which was not foreseen” (Valences 176–77). 
How does “an altogether different present” arrive? Spurning the deterministic tendencies of more 
orthodox forms of Marxism, Benjamin places utopian hopes in the possibility that the contingent 
and unpredictable movement of history will periodically cause ideology to falter.  
In one of the notes compiled in The Arcades Project (c. 1940), Benjamin briefly defines 
three “basic historical concepts: Catastrophe—to have missed the opportunity. Critical 
moment—the status quo threatens to be preserved. Progress—the first revolutionary measure 
taken” (474). One of the theoretical undertakings of The Arcades Project is the redefinition of 
catastrophe. The dominant order will always characterize events that damage or destabilize its 
hegemony as catastrophic. Benjamin reverses this, claiming that “The concept of progress must 
be grounded in the idea of catastrophe. That things are ‘status quo’ is the catastrophe” (473). The 
catastrophe Benjamin refers to above, therefore, is not the moment when history stops and 
ideology falters. Rather, it is the moment when the window of opportunity forced open by that 
interruption slams shut, when ideology is reinscribed and the status quo is reconstituted.  
 These moments of interference carry radical possibilities. The story told by the powerful 
stalls midsentence, and the silence that ensues may continue unabated, or it may end as the old 





new aesthetic, spoken by new speakers. This Messianic cessation is difficult to conceptualize or 
describe, and what may follow from it if the destructive preservation of the status quo is averted 
is utterly unthinkable. Benjamin insists on the possibility of utopia—on the need for utopia—
while avoiding the reification that would attend its naming. We must think utopia and not think 
utopia at the same time. The anticipatory form of utopian discourse is the narrative corollary to 
Benjamin’s negative utopian logic. If traditional utopian narratives seek to imagine better 
societies only to arrive in disappointingly familiar locales, texts structured by anticipation orient 
themselves toward some unthinkable destination outside of ideology and then decline to 
represent it. 
The texts below project utopian hope into the radical indeterminacy that follows from the 
end of civilization, when the remnants of humanity can begin anew without the conceptual and 
political constraints thrown around human thought and action by ideology. These texts contain 
utopian content, but this content is characterized by a wary minimalism, and it is written into 
anticipatory temporalities that defer its fulfillment. In the context of the globalized world, where 
geographical or conceptual spaces immune to commodification and cooptation seem nonexistent, 
these texts seek to maintain the possibility of utopia by declining to name it. 
Anticipating Utopia in the Twenty-First Century: The Road and The Broken Earth Trilogy 
My argument in this chapter works, again, with two genealogies of negative utopian 
thought—the transhistorical and the contemporary—that are imbricated in complicated ways. 
Politically ambivalent post-apocalyptic narratives are certainly not unique to the twenty-first 





intensely ambiguous position on Moylan’s continuum of utopian and anti-utopian persuasions.10 
The novel describes a human race seemingly condemned by its innate proclivity for self-
destruction. The Cold War ended in a nuclear holocaust that killed off most of the world’s 
population; the novel follows the monastic Albertian Order of Saint Leibowitz—named for a 
scientist who survived the apocalypse and founded the order—which maintains and safeguards a 
collection of documents, called the “Memorabilia,” saved from the fall of civilization. In a 
narrative that spans centuries, Miller describes the reconstruction of civilization and, along with 
it, the redevelopment of the nation-state and the reinvention of potentially destructive 
technologies. In the novel’s closing section, one of Miller’s monastic protagonists contemplates 
the probability that humanity is on the verge of annihilating itself once more:  
When the world was in darkness and wretchedness, it could believe in perfection 
and yearn for it. But when the world became bright with reason and riches, it 
began to sense the narrowness of the needle’s eye, and that rankled for a world no 
longer willing to believe or yearn. Well, they were going to destroy it again, were 
they—this garden Earth, civilized and knowing, to be torn apart again that Man 
might hope again in wretched darkness. (285) 
 
Humanity does, indeed, “destroy it again,” but in the novel’s closing lines, a group including a 
number of Leibowitzian monks blasts off from Earth in a starship, bound for a colony in the 
Alpha Centauri system, taking the Memorabilia with them. Humanity knowingly flings itself 
back into “wretched darkness,” but the novel’s lack of closure preserves the possibility that next 
time, perhaps, humanity will avoid this fate, and maybe even construct a better world. The novel 
thus instantiates in its narrative structure both the epical and mythic narrative modes formulated 
 
10 Suvin prefigures Moylan’s implicit privileging of such ambiguous texts when he writes that “the deadly earnest 
blueprint and the totally closed horizons of ‘new maps of hell’ both lack aesthetic wisdom” (Metamorphoses 55). 
“New maps of hell” is a reference to Kingsley Amis’s 1960 book of the same name, which deals with dystopian 





by Suvin; it authorizes readings that treat it as a pessimistic rumination on humanity’s essential 
irrationality and the cycles of destruction to which this leads, but there are elements of the novel 
that complicate this anti-utopian reading. The abbey is a utopian enclave that in each historical 
period resists the logic of the surrounding society, and the escape of the starship at the end of the 
novel, with the scientific knowledge enshrined in the Memorabilia, may initiate a new phase in a 
closed cycle of “mythic” recurrence, or it may open the novel’s conclusion toward a utopian 
horizon even as the literal horizon of the setting erupts into flames. 
Miller’s suspicion that humanity may lack the capacity for survival—a more fundamental 
concern than whether humanity lacks the capacity for utopia—reemerges powerfully in 
contemporary post-apocalyptic fiction. By attributing the fall of civilization to human 
irrationality and hubris rather than to the functioning of a particular social or economic system, A 
Canticle for Liebowitz can be read as a novel that is less concerned with political commentary 
than with meditating on human nature. Treating the apocalypse as a symptom of humanity’s 
essential brutality has the effect of blunting any social critique in the text while also seeming to 
invalidate efforts to find utopian discourse within it. If the text frames humanity as evolutionarily 
predestined to consume itself, then how can it also contain hope for a better future?  
Much of the critical conversation surrounding Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006) 
turns around the question of its politics—particularly whether it should be read in political terms, 
at all. There are good reasons for this. The Road is not obviously political. The cause of its 
apocalyptic event is never identified in the text, its depictions of human relationality seem 
limited to the interpersonal level rather than the socio-political, and it does not offer much hope 





controversial point. Steven Frye addresses the significance of this ambiguity when he notes the 
tendency among critics to read the event as either a nuclear disaster or a meteor strike: “A 
nuclear holocaust would be the result of human evil, and the meteor or asteroid the outcome of 
natural evil” (Understanding 169). The former possibility would invite a reading of the novel as 
a social critique, while the latter would suggest that it is better understood as a meditation on 
humanity’s existential insignificance. 
Some critics have, rightly, pushed back against readings that assume that The Road’s 
apocalypse was caused by nuclear power. Dana Phillips writes that “the critical discussion of The 
Road has been skewed by an impression, possibly erroneous, that in it the end of the world is 
brought on, and not merely exacerbated by, human agency: specifically, by all-out nuclear 
warfare” (176). According to this view, the tendency to attribute the apocalypse to human agency 
may be a distortion of a narrative that is simply focused on other matters. John Cant accepts the 
nuclear disaster reading but qualifies it by noting that the world of the novel is not wholly 
consistent with the aftermath of such an event. He attributes these inconsistencies to McCarthy’s 
choice to privilege the novel’s allegorical structure over its scientific accuracy, claiming that “the 
‘nuclear holocaust’ is a metaphorical explanation for the state of the world that McCarthy creates 
as his wider metaphor for the condition of man in the realization of his cosmic insignificance” 
(269). Cant focuses on the event’s formal role in the narrative, reading the novel as an expression 
of humanity’s “cosmic insignificance” and taking the nuclear disaster as a plot point that simply 
facilitates the text’s existential musings. 
These readings liken the father and son to many other McCarthy protagonists: Job-like 





Border Trilogy, it is possible to identify the antagonistic force opposing John Grady Cole and 
Billy Parham as the advance of modernity and the technologies and ideologies associated with it. 
In The Road, however, only traces of these processes remain, and the novel does not offer a clear 
reason for their passing, leaving open the possibility that the apocalypse had little or nothing to 
do with the destructive potentials of modern civilization. Any reading of the novel as social 
critique that starts with the apocalyptic event seems to be built on an unstable foundation.  
How does one read a novel that seems to simultaneously demand and refuse a politicized 
reading? David Huebert’s ecocritical reading of The Road registers some of the difficulties here 
by deemphasizing the apocalyptic catastrophe and locating the novel’s political valences 
elsewhere; he writes that  
in The Road McCarthy is more interested in how his characters respond to their 
journey of torments than what, precisely, causes the horrors they endure. Whether 
or not he intends to portray a post-climate-disaster world, in this novel McCarthy 
depicts the imminent and universal horror of a terrestrial climate irrevocably 
altered. (69) 
 
Complicating the moral binaries that govern many readings of the novel, Huebert characterizes 
the father and son as “ecological cannibals” who represent the extractive and consumptive logic 
of capitalism, and he states that “the profusion of cannibals populating the text suggests that the 
cause of the disaster was ecological cannibalism” (74). Huebert’s ambivalence is symptomatic of 
novel’s complexity: he acknowledges that the catastrophe is not named before claiming that the 
text’s political function is not cancelled or lessened by that omission, but, nonetheless, a reading 






This complexity in Huebert’s reading is common in politicized readings of The Road. 
Christopher Pizzino’s reading takes a less travelled route by arguing that The Road goes beyond 
social criticism to express utopian hope. He writes that in the world of the novel, “There is still 
the possibility that life can be lived on other terms than those of murder and cannibalism, and 
that this life can come not from remembrance of the past but from an ethical commitment to 
futurity” (360). Key to this reading is the boy’s growing insistence on expanding the father’s 
ethics beyond their immediate familial contexts and into broader communal contexts. 
Contrasting the father’s orientation toward the past with the boy’s orientation toward futurity, 
and situating the novel’s utopianism in the latter, Pizzino deemphasizes the catastrophe in a 
manner similar to Huebert and other critics. His article includes only one oblique reference to it; 
he writes that “Whatever destroyed the world has had the effect of a nuclear winter” (362). 
Pizzino acknowledges the absence in passing but does not present it as essential to the novel’s 
politics. 
I argue that the novel’s refusal to name or identify the catastrophe is an element of its 
negative utopian structure. It is the point where the narrative’s patterns of omission are most 
obvious and striking. Huebert and Pizzino’s readings, considered in relation to each other, track 
the novel’s socially critical and socially constructive functions, respectively. Huebert, like many 
other critics, elucidates some of the novel’s critical operations on global capitalism while Pizzino 
demonstrates that the novel goes beyond critique, and that in it “The possibility of human care 
defined in new (non-familial, non-individualistic) terms is asserted as a fundamental reality that 
makes utopian thinking and feeling possible” (367). The Road does, in fact, contain both of these 





an apocalyptic collapse of human civilization, in the aftermath of which a few survivors combine 
in ways that suggest the possibility for new forms of social relationality, with the realization of 
those forms deferred beyond the narrative’s conclusion. The Road conveys this narrative through 
understated procedures of symbolic compression, however, rather than through overt political 
commentary voiced by the narrator or a character. 
Much of this process takes place on the level of imagery, as the father and son move 
through a landscape littered with the skeletal remains of twenty-first century America. The Road 
constantly meditates on historical time despite its refusal to offer any neat account of the events 
leading up to the narrative present, and these meditations are often organized around the father 
and son’s interactions with the material remains of consumer culture. Benjaminian historical 
materialism provides useful terms for understanding the historicizing functions of material 
objects in The Road. Benjamin writes of his approach to historical narration in The Arcades 
Project “Method of this project: literary montage. I needn’t say anything. Merely show […] the 
rags, the refuse—these I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their 
own: by making use of them” (460). Rather than offering a conventional narrative account of an 
historical epoch—for Benjamin, nineteenth century Paris—this method calls for an amassing of 
verbal and imagistic artifacts that enter into relation with each other to produce a vision of the 
epoch in non-linear terms that move away from the teleological structures of bourgeois history 
writing. 
The Road, similarly, does not narrate the origins of its post-apocalyptic world; it instead 
represents this world as riddled with the material and ideological residues of global capitalism, 





means of a “tattered oilcompany roadmap [that] had once been taped together but now it was just 
sorted into leaves and numbered with crayons in the corner for their assembly” (42). Artifacts of 
modern society such as the map generally remain anonymous, seldom associated with a brand 
name or identifying label. The roadmap’s association with the fossil fuel industry has clear 
implications in the context of an ecologically-scoured landscape, but the term “oilcompany” 
remains nonspecific, allowing readers to scan over it uncritically when a pointed reference to BP 
or ExxonMobil would make this more difficult.11 The father and son pass through “the ruins of a 
resort town,” but the resorts and the town remain nameless (29). They see billboards featuring “a 
pale palimpsest of advertisements for goods which no longer existed,” but the novel does not 
provide a description of these goods or any mention of the corporations that produced them 
(128). In an often-cited moment, the father reflects on “The names of things slowly following 
those things into oblivion. Colors. The names of birds. Things to eat. Finally the names of things 
one believed to be true […] The sacred idiom shorn of its referents and so of its reality” (89). 
The relics of consumer culture, once luminous repositories of monetary and cultural value whose 
names participated in the “sacred idiom” the father refers to, have relapsed into their material 
character as various configurations of matter, some of which are useful and some of which are 
not. Meditations such as these on the ontology of former commodities allow the novel to explore 
what remains when ideology fails—in this case, when the implosion of consumer capitalism 
evacuated its products of their monetary and cultural values. 
Many critics have noted that one brand name does appear twice in The Road: Coca-Cola.  
 
11 Huebert offers a similar reading of a scene in which the father remembers watching, as a child, while men doused 
snakes with gasoline and burned them: “it is significant that the men burn the snakes with gasoline, the single 





By the door were two softdrink machines that had been tilted over into the floor 
and opened with a prybar. Coins everywhere in the ash. [The father] sat and ran 
his hand around in the works of the gutted machines and in the second one it 
closed over a cold metal cylinder. He withdrew his hand slowly and sat looking at 
a Coca Cola. (23) 
 
The man’s first impression of the object relates to its materiality. Only when he looks at it is he 
able to associate the material object with its now irrelevant brand name. The coins scattered 
across the ashen floor are reminders of the decommodification of objects such as the Coca-Cola. 
The coins and the soft drink no longer exist in relation to each other as exchangeable signifiers of 
value, a point echoed later in the novel when the father finds a small round object in a field and 
cannot tell if it is a coin or a button. In this later scene, after identifying the object as a coin, the 
father “looked about at the gray country and the gray sky and he dropped the coin,” discarding an 
object that has become worthless in the context of the desolated world (204). Brian Donnelly, in 
his analysis of the grocery store scene, suggests that McCarthy chooses to label the Coca-Cola 
can because of the brand’s cultural resonance, noting that “the expanding corporate machine that 
is Coca-Cola has worked to forge an ideology for its customers, one that promotes the product 
and its consumers as part of a global family of happy, peaceful, refreshed drinkers” (71). This 
association seems superficial and hollow in the context of the novel’s present, which 
demonstrates that even if capitalist production was not directly responsible for the demise of that 
happy, familial world, it was incapable of ensuring its reproduction. 
The father and son enter a drugstore at one point where “The pharmacy was looted but 
the store itself was oddly intact. Expensive electronic equipment unmolested on the shelves […] 
Sundries. Notions. What are these?” (183–84). The father’s question “What are these?” 





relation of humans to that world has changed irrevocably. The function of passages like this is 
twofold: they describe a disoriented consciousness reeling from the radical disruption of 
normality, and they contribute to the novel’s persistent accumulation of artifacts of consumer 
capitalism. This accumulation—a roadmap associated with the unsustainable and extractive 
practices of the fossil fuel industry, Coca-Cola cans that evoke globalization and neoliberal 
capitalism, desolate resorts and useless technologies that symbolize the decadence and waste of 
consumer culture—adds up to an indictment that is never stated but constantly implied. 
Susan Kollin uses the grocery cart the father and son carry their belongings in to offer a 
neat expression of the processes of symbolic compression at work, here: “as a symbol of late-
capitalist consumer culture […] the cart is a reminder of the irrational exuberance that 
characterized the economy of contemporary America” (161). A tension arises from the grocery 
cart’s insertion into a context of scarcity and hunger, given its association with abundance and its 
previous function as a tool that facilitated consumption. Kollin also notes that the image of the 
man and the boy dressed in ragged clothes and pushing their belongings down the road in the 
cart is also a stereotypical representation of urban homelessness, compressing in the cart 
symbolic evocations of the related phenomena of extreme excess and deprivation in 
contemporary American society (168). 
The novel’s sparse cast of characters also participate in this historicizing project. Much of 
the novel is devoted to representing the ontological instability that follows from catastrophe, but 
it also demonstrates the persistence of the “sacred idiom,” the structures of meaning enshrined as 
reality before the catastrophe and revealed as contingent in its aftermath. Jameson writes in 





limited groups of people; but it can sometimes be mapped and allow a small-scale model to be 
constructed on which the fundamental tendencies and the lines of flight can more clearly be 
read” (14). Representing social totalities through compressed, small–scale models is important 
both to the novel’s socially critical and socially constructive functions. These models 
demonstrate the survival of global capitalism’s valorization of competition and consumption but 
also the possibility that society may be rejoined on more just and equitable terms. 
“In what direction did lost men veer?” the father wonders midway through the novel 
(116). The social practices of the apocalypse’s disoriented survivors indicate that they tend to 
veer in one of two directions: some toward cannibalism, and some toward community. Like A 
Canticle for Liebowitz, The Road compels readers to question whether humanity is doomed by 
evolution or by ideology. McCarthy’s corpus is very preoccupied with atavistic constructions of 
human nature. Given this, it is reasonable—perhaps necessary—to read the cannibalism in the 
text as a representation of humanity’s reversion to its animal instincts in reaction to extremity. 
These characters may be read as submitting to the meaninglessness of the post-apocalyptic 
condition and suspending the outmoded moralities that in this world prove to be liabilities and 
obstacles to survival, such that the world is quickly “populated by men who would eat your 
children in front of your eyes” (181). The value system passed from father to son is rooted in the 
distinction between the animalistic “bad guys” who engage in murder and cannibalism and the 
Promethean “good guys” who carry the fire and seem imbued with spiritual energy. The son, as 
embodiment of love and goodness, appears to the father as a being “from some unimaginable 
future, glowing in that waste like a tabernacle” (273), set in stark opposition to the one cannibal 





gray and rotting teeth. Claggy with human flesh” (75). The text supports a reading that frames 
the cannibals as embodiments of humanity’s animal instincts and the son as the bearer and 
representative of the spiritual energy symbolized by the fire.12 Essentializing the characters in 
this way, however, by contrasting a brutal human nature with the spiritual principle embodied by 
the son, risks eliding other readings. 
The cannibalism in the novel may be read not as a regression to some bestial state outside 
of ideology, but rather as a performance of ideology, a behavioral residue of consumer capitalism 
that foregrounds the persistence of its logic and the intensity of its hold over human 
consciousness. Brian Donnelly notes the connection between the pre- and post-apocalyptic forms 
of consumption described in the novel: “the supermarket epitomizes just the sort of self-
consuming society McCarthy sends to its demise […] Cannibalism as a metaphor for 
consumption is realized in this novel” (71). The image of the cannibal referenced above 
describes an intersection of animal instinct and instrumental rationality. Particularly disturbing—
and also evocative of the nightmare creature of the novel’s opening—is the reference to the 
“reptilian calculations” taking place in the cannibal’s brain. Reasoning, a uniquely human 
operation, is presented as cold-blooded and inhuman in this passage, where it reduces humans to 
consumable objects and legitimizes cannibalism as an amoral means to an end.13 
Clearly, these small pockets of human society are not capitalistic, but the cannibalistic 
present and the capitalistic past are related by a shared set of ethics and assumptions and, 
 
12 See William Katerberg’s Future West for a useful distillation of the tendency among critics to view the dystopian 
narrative as overtly political while sometimes denigrating the post-apocalyptic narrative for apolitical tendencies. 
 
13 For more thorough accounts of cannibalism in the novel see Huebert’s “Eating and Mourning the Corpse of the 





arguably, a relationship of historical causality. The cannibalism in the novel may be understood 
as continuous with economic mechanisms that facilitate the consumption of the labor of the 
disempowered for the material nourishment of the rich, that conceive of the human subject as an 
instrument of production and consumption, and that fetishize competition and self-interest. The 
Road projects capitalist ethics into a post-apocalyptic context of hunger and scarcity remote from 
the legitimizing ideological operations of the past, and it describes the brutal consequences of 
those ethics when carried to their logical extreme. 
Not all of the apocalypse’s survivors revert to cannibalism, though, and here it is worth 
remembering Benjamin’s definition of catastrophe. The Road describes two catastrophes: the 
disruption of history and the way humanity responds to it, the dissolution of civilization and 
humanity’s subsequent failure to replace the old order with more equitable and humane social 
relations. The naturalization of inequality is a basic feature of the post-apocalyptic world and of 
the society that produced it. The past has not been cleanly swept away, and those elements of 
pre-apocalyptic social relations resurrected by survivors of the catastrophe contribute to the 
future’s hellish character. Any substantial break from the antagonistic modes of relationality 
institutionalized before the apocalypse and seemingly legitimized by the material conditions 
ensuing from it is, indeed, revolutionary.  
The father/son relationship is the primary locus of utopian content in the text, though that 
content is characterized by the same wary minimalism that informs Theodor Adorno’s dictum 
that “There is tenderness only in the coarsest demand: that no-one shall go hungry any more” 
(Minima 156). Adorno’s claim is an acknowledgment that any but the most basic of propositions 





a generalized altruism and compassion, a willingness to share and to help others rather than 
reverting to self-interest in the face of extremity, is presented in this spirit. The father’s repeated 
insistence that he and the boy are “carrying the fire” describes an attempt to practice a mode of 
social relationality that is entirely antithetical to the horrifying alternatives in the text. 
The past and present have been thoroughly demystified for the father by the novel’s 
beginning, but he seeks to forestall this process in his son. The father’s resistance entails an 
imbrication of the spiritual and the socio-political as he uses Christian terms and symbols to 
articulate a belief system defined by communal values. The father reflects early in the novel that 
“If [the boy] is not the word of God God never spoke,” immediately associating the son with 
divinity (5), and he elsewhere describes the boy as a “Golden chalice, good to house a god,” 
alluding to the Arthurian cycle and the grail legendarium (41, 75). He “evoke[s] the forms” (74), 
adopting Christian images and applying them to a new spiritual being in whom he sees the 
wasteland’s only instance of goodness and salvific potential. These textual moments should not 
be construed as an attempt by the father to maintain traditional religious faith, nor should they be 
viewed as efforts to construct a wholly new system of belief. The father, reminiscent of 
Benjamin’s historical materialist, instead selects fragments of the traditions of the past and 
remobilizes them, adapting them to the social and material realities of the post-apocalyptic world 
while maintaining the values of love and goodness that animated them. 
These values cannot be practiced in isolation, however, and it is here, importantly, that 
the father and son diverge. The father is hesitant to interact with any other survivors, but the boy 
understands that their value system obligates them to relate in a certain way to those they 





declines, saying “in the stories we’re always helping people and we dont help people” (268). 
This moment, Lydia Cooper notes, “suggests that [the boy] sees the necessity of a functional 
correlation between fictional ideas and real-world praxis” (232). The ideas of the father impel the 
boy into the risky acts of kindness and generosity that the father avoids. Paul Knox discusses the 
centrality of community to the stories and lessons the father imparts to the son: “surviving the 
wasteland requires re-creating the communities that the apocalypse has erased—even if those 
communities will exist only in the imagination” (97). The novel focuses on the relationship 
between the boy and his father, but their orientation toward the rest of the world—their 
conviction that they are among the “good guys”— presupposes the existence of other good guys 
and situates community at the heart of their value system. These values answer Thomas Schaub’s 
question regarding “the status of the ethical, as well as the reason for being, in the absence of the 
social” (158). The ethics of the father and son are predicated on their enduring faith in the 
possibility of the social, in the potential for society to be, if not renewed, at least rejoined 
communally and on a microcosmic scale. The father fails to practice these values while the son 
does not, and the son’s persistent aspiration toward community is, for Pizzino, the point of 
departure for the novel’s utopianism. He writes that the son represents “a new position different 
either from his father’s or from that of the cannibalistic ‘bad guys’” (363). Pizzino also points 
out an overlooked element of the narrative’s structure. When the son sees a boy in the ruins of a 
town and begs his father to go looking for him, the father refuses. The novel then concludes, 
after the father’s death, with another father making the opposite choice, reaching out to the son 
and inviting him to join his family. For Pizzino, this is confirmation that “the man had, from the 





 This affirmation of an other-oriented praxis that privileges communal sharing and mutual 
aid imbues the novel’s conclusion with a hopeful note rare in McCarthy’s corpus, a faint utopian 
energy that is in tension with the overwhelming bleakness surrounding it. The closing image of 
brook trout with its nostalgia for a past “which could not be put back. Not be made right again” 
seemingly acknowledges that humanity’s progress toward extinction is irreversible (287). 
Suvin’s mythic and epic temporal paradigms are both present, here. To understand the 
bittersweet tone of the conclusion, it is useful to turn again to Benjamin’s theory of messianic 
time. Benjamin uses the figure of the Messiah not to indicate a hypothetical future savior, but 
rather to describe an historical potentiality. To live in messianic time is to lead an anticipatory 
existence, to see the future not as a homogeneous perpetuation of the status quo, but as a 
temporal field of radical indeterminacy, every second of which carries the possibility of 
unimaginable change. Catastrophes, for Benjamin, are caesuras in time, unforeseeable events 
that arrest the destructive trajectory of history and disrupt the logic of the status quo, making 
visible the utopian potentials constellated across the social and material worlds, such that the 
possibility for revolutionary change flashes in on the historical subject “with the sobriety of 
dawn” (Arcades 474). 
The son has often been described as a Christ figure, as a redeemer imbued with divinity, 
but he is also a messianic figure in the Benjaminian sense. The son represents the historical 
potential for a just, equitable, and sustainable society, even if the ecological conditions under 
which such a society could feasibly be established have passed. The novel never clarifies this 
feasibility. Early in the novel, after the father makes a wooden flute for the son, the son pipes “A 





ashes of its ruin” (77). The father is torn, here, between understanding the son as a representative 
of “the age to come” or as a final, fragile embodiment of human decency. Later in the novel, 
however, the father seems to projects the values embodied by the son beyond the end of the 
narrative when he describes the son as “looking back at him from some unimaginable future, 
glowing in that waste like a tabernacle” (273). The son and the radical consciousness that he 
carries are thus associated with the “unimaginable future” beyond the conclusion of the narrative. 
This consciousness, importantly, diverges from both the severely limited altruism of the father 
and the instrumental logic of the cannibals: it is a consciousness in which the self/other dialectic 
is resolved through an utter surrendering of self-interest, such that each becomes “the other’s 
world entire” (6).  
 There is little substantive content here to extrapolate into a detailed model of utopian 
social organization. Negative utopianism is, again, a set of textual practices oriented toward an 
imaginative horizon beyond or outside of ideology. This horizon can, by definition, never be 
reached, because the moment utopia is codified in positive terms it is reabsorbed within ideology 
and ceases to be utopia—the good place that is no place. The negative utopian text must evoke 
the concept of utopia without instantiating it in its fictional world; utopia must be present and 
absent all at once—present, in fact, in the very space of its absence. It is in this context that the 
novel’s refusal to name or identify the apocalyptic event becomes meaningful. Critics such as 
Dana Phillips are correct to point out the uncritical assumptions of readers who take for granted 
that the apocalyptic event was caused by human action. They err, however, in casting this 
ambiguity in the text as evidence of the novel’s supposed apoliticism. The Road’s withholding of 





decline is narrated in the service of one political position or another, is in fact essential to its 
negative utopian structure, and to the historicizing project that unfolds on every page of the 
novel. 
 The Road demands that its readers perform what Ursula K. Le Guin once called an 
“Archaeology of the Future” (Always 3) It asks us to sort through the Benjaminian “rags and 
refuse” of postmodernity where they lie in charred constellations of condemnation and hope, 
silently speaking, in the closing words of another McCarthy novel, of “the world to come” (All 
310).  Historical narratives can write with or against the ideological grain, but they cannot escape 
the range of political positions available in their historical moment. An account of the apocalypse 
attributing it to nuclear warfare or some form of ecological disaster caused by human 
irrationality and hubris would domesticate and familiarize the novel’s politics by bringing them 
within that range of positions. The apocalypse remains unnamed, however, and the novel 
contains no overt political commentary. 
The Road allows readers to find within it a narrative of social decay, catastrophe, and 
utopian possibility. McCarthy’s minimalistic aesthetic compresses this narrative into the 
relations among symbolically freighted objects and characters, however, such that the novel’s 
socially critical and constructive functions are always only implied, made available to readers but 
never insisted upon. The apocalypse is not named, but it is alluded to and described. The novel 
avoids historical narration, but its material world demands to be historicized. Its characters do 
not discuss politics, but their words and actions are saturated by ideology, and the father/son 
relationship instantiates utopian values that are never realized on any larger scale. The 





apocalyptic fiction are absent, here, but The Road constantly traces the outline of that absence 
that, according to the logic of negative utopianism, cannot be filled without sacrificing its 
subversive power.  
The conspicuous absences in The Road simultaneously invite and frustrate politicized 
readings. The sheer quantity of criticism dealing with the insoluble question of the text’s politics 
is the mark of its success as a negative utopian exercise, but it also speaks to one of the pitfalls of 
negative utopian thought and the anticipatory form of utopian discourse: the avoidance of 
representation risks rendering the text’s politics obscure or even illegible. If utopian discourse 
defers any concrete vision of a better society into an unknowable future, how useful can it be to 
marginalized people struggling to better their conditions of existence? What is lost when we cede 
the ability to imagine a radically better society? And, at what point does such a text cease to be 
utopian? 
Annihilation (2014), the first novel of Jeff VanderMeer’s Southern Reach Trilogy, 
usefully dramatizes what is at stake in how we answer these questions. Annihilation describes an 
ever-expanding region called Area X where humans are transformed, by forces eluding scientific 
explanation, into plants and animals. The protagonist, a biologist, frequently reflects on the 
inadequacy of scientific and ethical categories for accounting for Area X, which is assimilating 
the known world into a reality wholly outside of human comprehension. She notes of this 
process near the end of the novel “I can no longer say with conviction that this is a bad thing. 
Not when looking at the pristine nature of Area X and then the world beyond, which we have 
altered so much” (192). The novel thus explores a process of ecological and, ultimately, social 





being positive. The final pages of the novel offer no clarity or closure. Annihilation, therefore, 
has some thematic and structural similarities to The Road and other post-apocalyptic works of 
utopian discourse, but it also spotlights some of the limits of these texts. Commenting on 
Jameson’s insistence that utopia is an unrepresentable alterity, Ruth Levitas writes that “not only 
society, but our very selves, must be reconstituted in utopia […] Utopia might actually entail 
(imagining) a self so radically transformed as to be, rather, an annihilation” (“Looking” 303). If 
the radically different ontologies that utopia is predicated on lead to perpetual deferrals of 
representation and, in some texts, to representations of society and humanity that are barely 
recognizable as such, then how should we appraise these texts’ politics? 
I will conclude this chapter with a reading of a post-apocalyptic narrative that balances 
these strictures on utopian representation with its embrace of overt political commitment. N. K. 
Jemisin’s Broken Earth Trilogy (2015-7), diverges from the usual conventions of post-
apocalyptic narrative in several ways. The protagonist is a woman of color who spends much of 
her life as a slave, and the narration of the apocalypse and the social conditions that preceded and 
succeeded it is focalized through her perspective. The apocalyptic event itself is intentionally 
caused by another subaltern subject for the purpose of destroying an unjust civilization so that a 
just one may be built on its ruins. The Road represents, albeit ambiguously, a standard social 
critique conveyed by post-apocalyptic narratives, and the Broken Earth Trilogy replicates that 
critique with crucial differences. In Jemisin’s trilogy, the pre-apocalyptic civilization is 
destroyed only indirectly by its own irrationality and cruelty—the actual destruction is carried 





The Broken Earth Trilogy is set in a fantasy world on a geologically unstable continent 
called the Stillness. History in this world is a succession of civilizations that rise only to be 
destroyed by natural disasters. The current civilization is sustained through the enslavement of 
orogenes: humans with an ambiguous magical connection to the earth that allows them to 
manipulate seismic processes. The narrative is primarily focalized through an orogene named, at 
various times, Damaya, Syenite, and Essun, whose life story testifies to the injustices of the 
current civilization. There are complicated procedures of transposition at work in Jemisin’s 
world-building. While the small, agrarian towns and villages scattered across the Stillness are 
characterized by the pseudo-medieval social relations, technologies, and modes of production 
familiar from other fantasy world-building projects, elsewhere in the Stillness readers encounter 
advanced technologies and developed urban spaces that prevent any one-to-one correlation 
between the Stillness and some “real world” time and/or place. This means that historicizing the 
trilogy in terms of the contemporary moment is a complicated endeavor; this is not a 
straightforward transposition of today’s geopolitics onto an imagined world.  
There are important homologies, however. The primary one for the purposes of this 
chapter has to do with the closure of geographical and conceptual space. The Stillness is a 
massive continent unified under the Yumenescene empire, which enslaves orogenes and uses 
them to quell the continent’s seismic volatility. In short, this is a homogeneous world order that 
depends upon the exploitation of subaltern groups, that is impermeable to change, and that is 
violently hostile toward resistance. This condition is dramatized when Syenite and her mentor, 
Alabaster, escape to an island off the coast of the Stillness, where a small egalitarian society 





in the trilogy, is eventually found and destroyed. Syenite escapes and goes into hiding, adopting 
the name Essun. Alabaster also escapes, and, years later, he uses his power to destroy the 
Stillness’s capital city, opening a massive rift across the continent that ensures that most of 
humanity will die off. 
Jemisin describes an unjust civilization sustained by exploited labor and threatened by 
ecological disaster, so inhospitable to alternative modes of social organization that the only way 
to create positive change is by destroying it and starting anew. The thematic contours here are 
similar to those of other socially critical post-apocalyptic narratives, but Jemisin makes this all 
far more explicit than does McCarthy. The trilogy ends with Essun and her daughter, Nassun, 
tapping into a repository of magical energy that allows them to seal the fissure across the 
Stillness and ensure that humanity will survive the apocalypse and be able to rebuild. The final 
lines of the trilogy gesture toward the better future that awaits humanity. Essun tells the trilogy’s 
homodiegetic narrator, Hoa, 
“I want the world to be better” 
[…] 
“It might take some time.” 
“I don’t think I’m very patient.” But you take my hand. 
Don’t be patient. Don’t ever be. This is the way a new world begins. 
“Neither am I,” I say. “So let’s get to it.” (The Stone 398) 
 
Jemisin has said of this conclusion, “This is a world that for millennia has lived with oppression 
and is built upon oppression. It’s been burned down. What will happen now, well, I don’t know. 
There’s hope” (Hurley 474). This narrative closure is predicated on an openness and uncertainty 
that could lead to any number of possible futures, including one characterized by radical social 





that have a utopian horizon, but she does so critically, intervening in this tradition rather than 
simply participating in it.14 
Part of what makes the trilogy more optimistic than many similar works is the role that 
Jemisin attributes to choice and agency in her depictions of social structures and revolutionary 
efforts to transform them. Condemning the injustices that organize life in the Stillness, Alabaster 
writes  
Some things are so broken that they can’t be fixed. You have to finish them off, 
sweep away the rubble, and start over […] They could’ve chosen a different kind 
of equality. We could’ve all been safe and comfortable together, surviving 
together, but they didn’t want that. Now nobody gets to be safe. (The Stone 299-
300) 
 
By attributing social relations in the pre-apocalyptic civilization to choices made by agential 
humans, Jemisin diverges from the many texts that map dystopia as a vast, impersonal, 
bureaucratic entity, such as Franz Kafka’s The Trial (1925), George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four (1949), and Terry Gilliam’s film Brazil (1985). Viewed positively, the latter approach to 
representing dystopia affords opportunities for examining the ways that material, institutional, 
and ideological structures can constrain human thought and behavior, leading average people to 
participate in unjust systems for which no one is entirely responsible. Viewed critically, such 
representations risk deemphasizing the role that individual people with agency have in 
propagating and maintaining such systems. In the Broken Earth Trilogy, dystopia is the result of 
human choices rather than impersonal processes of technological development or bureaucratic 
ossification.  
 
14 In the same interview, Jemisin notes the tendency of post-apocalyptic narratives to follow white male protagonists 





This heightened respect for human agency also grants more space to transformative 
politics. The Stillness’s dystopia is destroyed by the resistance of a former slave, and the blighted 
continent is then restored by another former slave and her daughter. The trilogy, again, ends with 
Essun and Hoa planning to go forth into the world healing from catastrophe and change it for the 
better. The trilogy’s conclusion thus states a commitment to utopian change while also implicitly 
reasserting the unknowability of such change. 
Jemisin’s project is an important counterweight to others discussed here because it 
demonstrates that the anticipatory form of utopian discourse, and the wariness toward 
representation that generally attends it, can coexist with optimistic affirmation of revolutionary 
politics. The trilogy is also important because by making the linkage between apocalypse and 
utopianism explicit, it is able to confront the obvious ethical problems with this linkage. What 
does it mean to cast utopian social change as desirable if the mechanism needed to facilitate such 
change is an apocalyptic end to civilization, with the immeasurable human suffering that would 
entail? Jemisin acknowledges the implications of this, suggesting that “sometimes a revolution is 
necessary; sometimes you do have to burn it all down. I want to depict realistically what that’d 
be like. If you burn it all down, a whole lot of people get hurt” (Hurley 473). In the trilogy and 
her commentary on it, Jemisin declines either to endorse or condemn Alabaster’s act and the 
mass suffering it causes. She does, however, stress the lack of alternatives, such that the question 








UTOPIAN DIALECTICS IN MARGARET ATWOOD’S MADDADDAM TRILOGY 
  
AND CHANG-RAE LEE’S ON SUCH A FULL SEA1 
 After the text establishes ground for utopian hope, through some attribution of content to 
the utopian idea, it projects that hope into a future beyond the text’s conclusion. Darko Suvin 
writes, accordingly, that “Utopianism […] establishes orientations: vectors of desire and need 
toward radically better horizons” (187); this language emphasizes the principle that utopian 
discourse is a process, one organized around textual trajectories and lines of flight that never 
terminate. This chapter theorizes what I term the dialectical form of utopian discourse. This 
organizing principle, which I will refer to throughout this chapter as the utopian dialectic, 
establishes trajectories of hope, “vectors of desire and need,” through intratextual oppositions 
between concepts, represented communities, and/or aesthetic and narrative forms.  
Dialectical structures are uniquely suited to negotiating utopia’s contradictory identity as 
“good place” and “no place” due to these structures’ capacity 1) to specify utopian content by 
localizing the utopian idea to the terms of specific oppositions, while 2) deferring that content’s 
reification through the dialectic’s processual nature, according to which any resolution will itself 
be riddled with contradictions that reenact the dialectical process. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of Theodor Adorno and Fredric Jameson’s dialectical approaches to literary 
 
1 Part of this chapter has been published in my article “Negative Utopianism and Catastrophe in Margaret Atwood’s 
MaddAddam Trilogy.” Utopian Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, 2019, pp. 486-504. Copyright © 2019. The Pennsylvania 






utopianism; I then move on to analyze the utopian dialectics of a series of modern and 
contemporary dystopian texts, arguing that the politics of these texts are often determined by 
their staging of conceptual, social, and formal contradictions. Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam 
Trilogy (2003-13) and Chang-rae Lee’s On Such a Full Sea (2014) are my primary examples. 
The utopian dialectics of the MaddAddam Trilogy unfold primarily within the social and 
political oppositions structuring its storyworld; in On Such a Full Sea, however, this process is 
articulated through the procession of narrative and aesthetic oppositions. Collectively, these 
examples demonstrate that dialectical structures can mediate the text’s engagement with the 
utopian idea on the levels of represented social content and formal composition 
Negative Dialectics and Utopian Discourse 
Dialectical structures have organized the expression of utopian hope in literature since the 
bifurcated structure of Sir Thomas More’s Utopia (1516). The classical utopian narrative 
followed More’s precedent by staging encounters between travelers from the author’s milieu and 
representatives of the utopian society. The ensuing educative process is more didactic than it is 
dialectical, but the opposition between a “real-world” setting and its utopian negation, with the 
latter acting back upon the former to catalyze change, follows the rudimentary dialectical 
movement of thesis-antithesis-synthesis often attributed, albeit controversially, to Hegel.2 The 
dialectic is far from being a singular method, however; even the formulation “the dialectic” is 
objectionable insofar as the definite article reifies a variegated intellectual tradition into unitary 
coherence. My identification of dialectical thought as a method also runs against more 
essentialist iterations of this tradition, such as Soviet dialectical materialism, which once 
 





hypostatized the dialectic as a law of nature (Balibar 3). There is considerable conceptual 
distance between dialectical materialism and the Western Marxisms of the Frankfurt School, 
Jameson, and others who frame dialectical thought as a hermeneutic, just as there is considerable 
aesthetic distance between the classical utopias and the more narratively complex dystopian 
novels discussed below. 
Any treatment of utopian dialectics must therefore be capacious enough to account for 
the multiple ways that dialectical structures can organize texts while also being limited enough 
for the category to have some coherence. An example from Chapter One illustrates this 
difficulty. Utopian dialectics are discernible in The Road in at least three imbricated oppositions. 
The father’s nostalgia for the pre-apocalyptic world stages 1) an opposition between the past and 
the present. The novel gradually collapses this opposition by revealing the continuities between 
the two terms, however—the homologies between pre-apocalyptic consumer capitalism and 
post-apocalyptic cannibalism. The past is thus disqualified as the novel’s primary locus of 
utopian content, and this structural role passes to the father/son relationship. This sets the terms 
for 2) the opposition between consumer capitalism/cannibalism and the praxis of the father and 
son, with the latter standing as the antithesis of the former. No sooner does this praxis emerge as 
a locus of utopian content, however, than it becomes riven with contradictions that move the 
dialectic to yet another register: 3) the internal structure of the father/son relationship, itself, as 
the father’s pragmatism and the son’s idealism diverge into conflicting yet mutually-sustaining 
visions of an ethical post-apocalyptic social relationality. The son’s idealism is, of course, what 
emerges as the privileged term and what invests the ambiguous conclusion with a faint utopian 





conflicts between social forms and thereby demarcate conceptual spaces within which utopia is 
to be thought. While the collective movement of these oppositions generates a nebulous 
collection of utopian values and practices, however (communal sharing, mutual aid, and so on), 
these never materialize into any coherent vision of the storyworld’s “unimaginable future” (273). 
My formulation of this process builds on and revises a theoretical genealogy. Marx 
famously argued that history moves dialectically, that social contradictions—preeminently the 
contradiction of capital and labor, wherein the capitalist imperative to generate the former 
necessitates the exploitation of the latter—intensify until they can no longer be sustained by the 
prevailing social order, necessitating revolutionary change.3 It is a longstanding penchant of 
Marxist hermeneutics to find traces of this process sedimented in cultural productions, to detect 
within them formal contradictions that are symptomatic of economic contradictions in the 
author’s context. This analytic procedure is problematic for its unidirectionality, which 
reinscribes the “vulgar Marxist” base/superstructure relationship in which the former determines 
the latter, but also for its overriding preoccupation with contradiction. What if such readings 
impose an interpretive straitjacket on texts by organizing their plurality and fragmentation into a 
series of oppositions so that the critic can trace them back to some generative contradiction in the 
prevailing mode of production?4 This is a real danger, but utopia is, again, a fundamentally 
dialectical concept due to its verbal compression of the contradictory meanings of “good place” 
 
3 I prefer the term “opposition” to “contradiction” because the former is more flexible and less freighted with 
theoretical associations, but when discussing the work of theorists who use “contradiction” I mirror their language. 
 
4 Adorno takes up this perspective in Negative Dialectics when he discusses the possibility “that whatever happens 
to come into the dialectical mill will be reduced to the merely logical form of contradiction, and that […] the full 
diversity of the non-contradictory, of that which is simply differentiated, will be ignored” (Negative 57). Adorno 
dismisses this danger by arguing that dialectical thought is not an imposition but rather the adaptation of 






and “no place” into a conceptual unity. The dialectical structure of utopian discourse is therefore 
an example of what Jameson has described as a “local dialectic […] a local law of this or that 
corner of the universe, a set of regularities observable here or there, within a cosmos which may 
well not be dialectical at all” (Valences 16). Dialectical relationships have always permeated 
literary expressions of the utopian idea, and they generally serve as a means of negotiating the 
good place/no place contradiction on which the genre is founded.5 
My understanding of this formal tendency is informed by the work of Adorno and 
Jameson, who both identify dialectical structures as essential to the functioning of utopian 
discourse, though they formulate the role of these structures in different ways. For Adorno, 
contradictions statically bear witness to the absence of their own resolution (utopia). For 
Jameson, utopianism is a function of contradictions that generate utopian content through a 
procedure that he describes as negation and neutralization. Adorno’s theory is an important 
antecedent of Jameson’s; in Adornian negative dialectics, contradictions perform their utopian 
function by spotlighting the ontological gulf between ideological categories of thought and the 
objects or social phenomena to which they claim to apply. The mere existence of the 
contradiction implies a not-yet-existent state in which that gulf is bridged. “Regarding the 
concrete utopian possibility,” Adorno writes, “dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of 
things” (Negative 61-2). In the right state of things—an unalienated and uncontradictory 
existence—dialectical thought would be unnecessary, and perhaps even impossible. We do not 
 
5 The contradictions of More’s Utopia are many: the narrative’s bifurcated structure, which facilitates its 
presentation of Utopia as England’s negation; the authority of Raphael Hythloday’s voice even as his name suggests 
that he is a liar; the tonally earnest promotion of Utopia as a better society and the satirical jabs at this position; the 
provenance of Utopia’s nonviolence and egalitarianism in imperial violence and dispossession: the list goes on. This 
is why the perennial question about Utopia’s sincerity—whether it is a genuine blueprint for a better society or a 
satire—misses the point: it is both. Utopia stages the good place/no place contradiction by imagining a good place 





live in utopia, however, and the contradictions of the “wrong state of things” necessarily impress 
themselves on our cultural productions. Adorno writes of this process that “The unsolved 
antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent problems of form” (Aesthetic 7). The text, 
according to this formula, should refrain from resolving the contradictions inherited from its 
social context.6 It should instead allow the contradictions to crystallize formally such that they 
imply their unrepresentable resolution: “A successful work […] is not one which resolves 
objective contradictions in a spurious harmony, but one which expresses the idea of harmony 
negatively by embodying the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, in its inner-most 
structure” (“Cultural Criticism” 208). What does it look like for a text’s form to embody 
contradictions without resolving them? 
Adrienne Rich’s much-anthologized poem “Diving into the Wreck” (1973) exemplifies 
the procedure that Adorno attributes to “successful” artworks. The poem features a singular 
communal narrator who “embodies the contradictions” of dominant models of gender and 
subjectivity while demonstrating the ideological constraints preventing their resolution. The 
speaker oscillates between grammatically contradictory pronouns—male and female, singular 
and plural—to situate the exploration of the wreck, as an extended metaphor for feminist 
revisions of patriarchal historical narratives, within a communal reauthoring of history. The 
speaker’s expression of a more complex gender identity than that afforded by the binary 
categories of male/female is enacted through alternation between male and female images and 
pronouns that inscribe both poles of the opposition in the same subject: 
 
6 Resolving contradictions is, rather, the work of ideology: the neoliberal capitalist claim that individual greed and 
self-interest paradoxically serve the common good is an example of how ideology represents the relationship of 
individual and collective under capitalism in non-antagonistic terms—first naturalizing greed and self-interest as 





And I am here, the mermaid whose dark hair  
streams black, the merman in his armored body  
[…] 
I am she: I am he (72-3, 77) 
 
The conspicuous lack of a gender-neutral, singular third-person pronoun in English leads the 
speaker to use the language of the traditional gender binary to express an identity that subverts it 
and for which English lacks an adequate vocabulary.7 This interrogation of English pronouns and 
their limits crescendos into grammatical incoherence as the speaker strains to articulate a 
subjectivity that in addition to being both male and female is also both singular and plural: 
 We are, I am, you are 
 by cowardice or courage 
 the one who find our way 
 back to this scene 
 carrying a knife, a camera 
 a book of myths 
 in which 
 our names do not appear. (87-94) 
 
The “We,” “I,” and “you” of the first line comprise “the one who find our way” back to the 
wreck, carrying the “book of myths” that is the patriarchal construction of history. By 
compressing the “We,” “I,” and “you” into the singularity of “the one” and then re-pluralizing 
this oneness through the possessive pronoun “our,” the speaker initiates a grammatical crisis that 
reveals the ideologico-linguistic structures that will not allow the dialectic of 
individual/collective to resolve into a new mode of subjectivity. The poem’s formal 
contradictions are thus symptoms of the “wrong state of things” that the poem reveals without 
presuming to rectify. As Rich writes elsewhere, “poetry / isn’t revolution but a way of knowing / 
why it must come” (“Dreamwood” 16-18).  
 





“Diving into the Wreck” exemplifies Adorno’s injunction to allow social contradictions 
to crystallize unresolved in the work’s formal structure such that they evoke, without naming or 
specifying, their resolution. Adorno describes this unknowable resolution as “harmony”—a 
condition that cannot be represented, only evoked as an “idea” through the embodiment of its 
failure (“Cultural Criticism” 208). The intense negativity of Adorno’s dialectic is both what 
makes it utopian and what limits its utopianism. Its primary political function is critique; as a 
static indictment of a contradictory social reality, it cannot generate any positive utopian content. 
This avoidance of reification is also an avoidance of any constructive prescription for social 
betterment. This is an important point of departure for Jameson’s theory of utopian discourse: 
Jameson tracks the genesis of representations that occupy the position of harmony that Adorno 
leaves vacant, utopian content generated through negative dialectics that ultimately reify into a 
positivity that is then subject to further acts of negation. The two theorists therefore locate 
utopianism in related but distinct textual functions of contradiction. For Jameson, utopian texts 
materialize within their storyworlds the negativity that Adorno argues cannot be embodied 
without dispersing its subversive potential. 
Jameson tracks the ways that texts generate utopian content through processes of 
negation and neutralization rather than dialectical synthesis and combination. Resolution of 
social contradictions through dialectical synthesis produces, for Jameson, a “bad Utopianism” 
that “in fact seeks to have it both ways, and to define itself by exploiting everything supposedly 
positive about both poles of the opposition” (Archaeologies 179). The Greimasian semiotic 
rectangle provides Jameson with the conceptual framework for a more nuanced critical 





neutralizes them. If we begin, for instance, with the contradiction between capitalism and 
socialism, resolution through dialectical synthesis would generate a third term that borrows from 
both poles of the initial opposition, yielding something like social democracy. Negating the 
initial opposition, rather than synthesizing it, produces a new opposition between negative terms. 
The opposition between the positive terms capitalism and socialism thus becomes an opposition 
between the negative terms not capitalism and not socialism. It is the encounter of these negative 
terms that produces the neutral term: some preconceptual entity that resists codification and that 
Jameson identifies as a dynamic and tension-ridden space of utopian potential. If synthesis 
produces a “both/and,” neutralization produces a “neither/nor”: “Not both at once, but neither 
one nor the other, without any third possibility in sight” (Archaeologies 180). Of course, once the 
neutral term is named and codified, it falls comfortably back within the realm of ideology. The 
text’s subversive trajectory thus ossifies into some kind of utopian content that will be riven by 
contradictions of its own, such that it, too, must be subjected to procedures of negation and 
neutralization.  
Adorno and Jameson both describe ways that texts can stage contradictions such that 
those contradictions perform a utopian function, but both theories are problematic insofar as they 
are predicated on rigid and totalizing claims about the role of contradiction in utopian discourse. 
These are both examples of what Jameson has described as “local dialectics,” formulated with 
reference to specific bodies of cultural production. Adorno was interested in avant-garde 
aesthetics while criticizing art containing overt political commitment, and this emphasis 
immediately excludes the vast majority of recognizably utopian or dystopian literature as well as 





narrative, proper, or about works of science fiction in which he identifies utopian operations, and 
he is relatively less interested in other speculative fiction genres such as dystopian narrative and 
fantasy.8 
My formulation of utopian dialectics is more expansive in two ways. It cuts across genre 
distinctions and textual levels to define utopian discourse based on textual patterns and functions 
rather than on the nature of the dominant represented society. Any account of utopian discourse 
cannot limit itself to a blinkered focus on aesthetics or on represented content, as these textual 
levels often work in tandem to express utopian hope. It also demonstrates that while the deferral 
of utopian representation is an essential function of dialectical structures, this function is 
dependent on an initial moment of positivity in which the utopian process is situated within the 
terms of a social, conceptual, or formal opposition. This positivity is necessary to establish 
utopia as a possibility within the storyworld. It is by staking out a field of ideological 
contestation—freedom versus happiness, individual versus collective, capitalism versus 
socialism—that the text demarcates the space within which the articulation of utopian content 
commences. 
Totalitarianism and Resistance in the Modernist Dystopias 
Baccolini, Moylan, and others have convincingly demonstrated that dystopian narratives 
often contain utopian content, but the nature of this content varies between individual texts and 
literary historical moments. While I am primarily concerned with contemporary texts, here, I will 
 
8 In The Seeds of Time (1994) Jameson wrote “I should like to disjoin the pair Utopia/dystopia […] the dystopia is 
always and essentially what in the language of science fiction is called a ‘near-future’ novel” (56). More recently, in 
the chapter “Journey into Fear” in Archaeologies, he walked back this definition of utopia and dystopia as 
qualitatively different, acknowledging the work of Moylan and others on the utopianism of dystopian narratives. 





preface my main analyses with brief readings of three major modernist dystopias: Yevgeny 
Zamyatin’s We (1924), Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), and George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). These texts demonstrate that the utopian/anti-utopian function of 
dystopian texts is very often determined by their staging of textual oppositions, and they offer 
points of comparison that reveal how contemporary texts participate in this longstanding genre 
convention while also modulating it in historically specific ways. 
Fascism and state socialism provided the raw material for many modernist dystopias, 
with the result that these narratives tend to depict societies organized by totalitarian regimes that 
concentrate absolute power in a single individual, party, or class. Representations of intensely 
centralized power often correlate to an emphasis on revolution as a means of creating utopian 
change, regardless of the success or efficacy of those efforts. Baccolini and Moylan describe this 
tendency when they write that the conventional dystopian text “is built around the construction 
of a narrative of the hegemonic order and a counter-narrative of resistance” (“Introduction” 5)—
a resistance that is generally “crushed” (“Introduction” 7). This is why, in their view, these 
narratives can at best generate hope for the reader—not for the protagonists—while the dystopias 
of the later twentieth century more reliably maintain hope within their storyworlds by 
accommodating some possibility for utopian change. The utopian dialectic in dystopian fiction 
often takes the form of thesis (totalitarian regime) encountering antithesis (revolutionary 
opposition). The first two stages of this dialectic are easily identifiable in most of these 
narratives, but the third—the moment of synthesis or resolution—is more problematical. 
Nineteen Eighty-Four stages the first two moments of the dialectic only to then collapse them, 





utopia is present only negatively in the form of anticipation and deferred realization. In every 
case, the function of the dialectic is to signal (or foreclose) possibility within the storyworld 
while any extensive representation of a utopian future or the process of social change leading to 
it remains absent. 
The paradigmatic dystopian narrative, Zamyatin’s We, is also one of the clearest 
examples of utopian dialectics in dystopian fiction. The traditional contest between happiness 
and freedom as utopian values is mapped onto the socio-political antagonism between the 
totalitarian OneState and the “Mephi” revolutionaries.9 Daily life in OneState is organized by a 
strictly regimented schedule called the “Table of Hours” that mandates the quantities and 
sequences of work, sleep, leisure time, and sex that supposedly maximize human happiness. The 
cost of this state of happiness is freedom, and it is the goal of the Mephi, led by I-330, to shake 
OneState’s “Numbers” out of their anesthetized contentment. Phillip Wegner argues that the 
Mephi functions as OneState’s dialectical opposite while falling short of being a 
straightforwardly utopian alternative. We, he suggests, contains “both thesis and antithesis within 
itself. By so doing, Zamyatin is able to point toward the limits, the dystopian propensity, when 
either possibility is taken as an end in itself” (163). Wegner arguably overstates the equivalence 
between OneState and the Mephi—the novel clearly privileges the latter over the former—but he 
is undoubtedly right that the primary function of this dialectic is to initiate the utopian process 
that unfolds through the end of the novel. 
 
9 Late in the novel, the revolutionary leader I-330 says to D-503, the protagonist and first-person narrator, “Surely 
you see that only differences, differences of temperature, only contrasts in degree of heat, only that makes for life? 
And if throughout the universe all bodies are equally warm, or equally cool…You’ve got to smash them into each 
other” (169). Taken as a formula for utopian discourse, this moment clarifies the structural affinity between utopias, 
in which all bodies are equally warm, and anti-utopias, in which all are equally cool, and their difference from 





We ends with D-503, the protagonist, being subjected to a medical procedure that 
amputates his imagination and ensures his obedience to OneState, but the conflict between the 
two opposing collectives is not resolved. The specter of an absolute counterrevolution that 
effectively ends history looms over the conclusion of the novel, but this outcome is never 
realized, and its likelihood is subverted by an earlier exchange in which I-330 tells D-503 
“My dear, you are a mathematician. You’re even more, you’re a 
philosopher of mathematics. So do this for me: Tell me the final number.” 
“The what? I…I don’t understand. What final number?” 
“You know—the last one, the top, the absolute biggest.” 
“But, I-330, that’s stupid. Since the number of numbers is infinite, how 
can there be a final one?” 
“And how can there be a final revolution? There is no final one. The 
number of revolutions is infinite.” (168) 
 
Closure and openness compete throughout the narrative and it is important to note that the rather 
pessimistic tone of the conclusion does not fully coalesce into a defeat of revolutionary 
possibilities. The novel’s conclusion leaves open the possibility that the oppressive conformity 
propagated by OneState will be permanently reconstituted, or that it will be overthrown by a 
freer and more egalitarian collective that will, itself, be subject to future revolutions, perennially 
remobilizing the dialectic of individual and collective in the unending social and cultural flux 
that is, for Zamyatin, the very essence of utopianism.10 
In Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, as well, the mapping of the social landscape is the 
textual level where dialectical structures are most legible. As in We, the storyworld is bifurcated 
between a dominant dystopian order and an alternative space that accommodates different social 
 
10 In his 1924 essay “On Literature, Revolution, and Entropy,” Zamyatin writes that “harmful literature is more 
useful than useful literature: because it is anti-entropic, it militates against calcification, sclerosis, encrustedness, 
moss, peace. It is utopian and ridiculous” (15). This undercuts the anti-utopian trope that casts utopias as closed and 





relations. Here, the opposition is between the World State and the Savage Reservation. This 
socio-spatial opposition again correlates to the ideological opposition between happiness, 
stability, and order, on the one hand, and freedom, anarchy, and emotion, on the other. The 
Savage Reservation is by no means a utopian entity, however; it is presented in highly racialized 
terms as squalid, dirty, and full of violence, ignorance, and prejudice. It is never more than a 
stage for a few healthy atavisms that the World State has filtered out of its citizens’ social 
experience. 
Similarly, John the Savage’s fascination with Shakespeare is an example of the dystopian 
narrative’s conventional mobilization of nostalgia as an instrument of critique, but, as in The 
Road, the protagonist’s longing for the past does not offer a formula for utopian change. The 
communities in Brave New World that may have a utopian dimension are only referenced 
briefly—never visited by the characters or described in any detail. These are the islands where 
dissidents such as Bernard Marx and Helmholtz Watson are sent as punishment for their 
nonconformity: “All the people who, for one reason or another, have got too self-consciously 
individual to fit into community-life” (227). The islands are, collectively, a third space that offers 
an alternative to the original opposition between flawed terms, though the contents of this third 
space remain unspecified.11 
The balance between social conditioning and state violence as forms of control varies 
among dystopias. In We they are roughly in equal proportion; in Brave New World, eugenic and 
 
11 It is important to note, of course, that this is an elitist utopianism. Jameson describes Brave New World as “an 
aristocratic critique of the media and mass culture” (Archaeologies 202), and Patricia McManus similarly notes of 
the novel’s critique that “Huxley was committed to the high reaction of a self-conscious ‘intellectual’ elite against 
‘mass democracy’” (89). What matters is the islands’ formal role in the narrative, as a third space that mediates 





pharmacological manipulation make force largely unnecessary; in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the 
Party’s mechanisms for regulating truth and, by extension, human thought and behavior, are 
reinforced by extreme violence. “If you want a picture of the future,” O’Brien tells Winston 
Smith, “imagine a boot stamping on a human face—forever” (267). The novel gives readers little 
reason to doubt this prognostication. Moylan, again, argues that dystopias tend to be variously 
positioned along the ideological continuum between utopian and anti-utopian cultural impulses; 
We is positioned near the utopian end of this continuum and Brave New World near the anti-
utopian. Nineteen Eighty-Four is also located in anti-utopia’s borderlands; it replicates the socio-
political structure of the earlier novels’ storyworlds through the opposition between the Party and 
Goldstein’s revolutionaries, but it then undoes this opposition in a chilling reversal that reveals 
Goldstein’s revolution to be a fabrication of the Party itself, one that shores up the Party’s power 
rather than subverting it.  
Crucially, however, the suffocating closure of Nineteen Eighty-Four’s storyworld is 
disrupted through a narrative maneuver. As Moylan has pointed out, in the appendix at the end of 
the novel titled “The Principles of Newspeak,” a first-person voice discusses the history of 
Oceania, IngSoc, and Newspeak using the past tense (Scraps 162-3). The relation of this 
appendix to the narrative itself is ambiguous. It may be read as a paratextual note that exists 
outside the storyworld, or it may be read as a document emerging from a radically transformed 
future within the storyworld. Larry Caldwell writes of the appendix that the “temporal 
ambivalence of the verbs and of the adverbial locutions expressly confounds the Party’s ‘forever’ 
and destabilizes its closed narrative” (qtd. in Scraps 163). According to this reading, Nineteen 





different textual level, establishing a formal contradiction between a narrative that rules out any 
possibility of an “after” to its socio-political regime and an adjacent counternarrative that seems 
to confirm the existence of that impossible “after.” 
These three novels are often lumped together by critics as the classical dystopian novels 
that provided the foundation for the twentieth and twenty-first century prominence of the genre. 
All three describe oppressive and dehumanizing future societies. Their relationships to the 
utopian idea vary radically, however. The crucial factor here has to do with process. Adorno and 
Jameson’s utopian dialectics have contrasting temporalities: Adorno describes a state of 
epistemological arrest in which the contradictions of our alienated social reality have crystallized 
within the text while remaining utterly resistant to reconciliation, while Jameson describes a 
fitful process in which a social referent is neutralized into a utopian entity that is no sooner 
represented than it must be subjected to further acts of neutralization. The dialectics of the novels 
discussed below, I argue, follow a more constructive trajectory. 
Utopian Dialectics After the Cold War 
The landscape of dystopia shifted in the late twentieth century. While totalitarian 
dystopias in the vein of Nineteen Eighty-Four are still produced, the main antagonist in most 
post-Cold War dystopian fiction is global capitalism. In this context, the traditional antagonism 
between a totalitarian regime and a revolutionary opposition may seem outdated. Lucy 
Sargisson’s description of late twentieth century feminist utopian fiction holds true for shifts in 
the dystopian narrative at this same time. She writes that “it is […] common to find in 
contemporary feminist utopian literature and theory several worlds, often contrasting, none 





the creation of a perfect world” (20). Sargisson identifies, here, the possibility that plurality and 
multiplicity—formal configurations not necessarily reducible to contradiction—have had an 
increasingly prominent role in literary utopian production in recent decades. Dialectical thought 
may seem to provide an outmoded approach to contemporary texts, but my argument in this 
chapter is that these models of utopianism are not mutually exclusive. Utopian dialectics can, and 
often do, exist alongside other formal tendencies in contemporary dystopian literature. 
The arc of Margaret Atwood’s work offers a clear illustration of the literary historical 
shift from the totalitarian dystopia to the global capitalist dystopia. Chris Vials notes that 
Atwood’s 1985 novel The Handmaid’s Tale participated in “an earlier language on the left: 
antifascism” through its representations of a militaristic, centralized, authoritarian state that 
founds its authority on myth and nostalgia (245). Gilead, the novel’s future United States, is 
ruled over by a despotic regime that enforces order and obedience through violence. This regime 
is opposed by the revolutionary “Mayday” group that eventually rescues the protagonist, Offred, 
before she is captured by the regime’s secret police. Readers learn in the epilogue that Gilead 
eventually collapses and is apparently succeeded by a more just society. In Atwood’s later 
MaddAddam Trilogy, as in much post-Cold War dystopian literature, there is not such a clear 
enemy to oppose. Each novel of the MaddAddam Trilogy alternates between chapters set in a 
dystopian society and chapters set in the post-apocalyptic world that ensues from the dystopia’s 
collapse. This bifurcated temporality affords description of the pre- and post-apocalyptic 
experiences of two utopian micro-societies that emerge within and in response to the neoliberal 





Oryx and Crake (2003) describes a posthuman species produced through genetic 
engineering—the Children of Crake, or the Crakers—as they develop social and cultural forms in 
the wake of an apocalyptic pandemic that all but exterminated humanity. The Crakers are 
engineered such that the genetic bases of humanity’s vices are subtracted from their genome; the 
novel’s descriptions of this process follow Jameson’s prescriptions for the generation of utopian 
content through creative procedures of negation and neutralization. The primary utopian entity in 
The Year of the Flood (2009) is the God’s Gardeners, a religious eco-cult living in a social 
enclave within the dystopian order that preceded the apocalyptic pandemic. The Gardeners 
model the pitfalls of utopias constructed conceptually through the additive procedures of 
synthesis and implemented in the social world through conventional modes of political praxis. 
MaddAddam (2013) meditates on the failures of both groups while situating an unrealized 
utopian potential in their combination—the Crakers and Gardeners begin to merge genetically, 
socially, and culturally in the novel’s conclusion, but the resolution of this dialectic remains 
unrepresented. MaddAddam stages the conditions of possibility for utopia—the catastrophic 
dissolution of global capitalism and the potential, within this indeterminate space, for genetic, 
social, and cultural hybridizations that cannot be predicted. The trilogy therefore dramatizes 
three different conceptual operations on social contradictions: neutralization, synthesis, and 
infinite deferral. 
The dystopian society of the MaddAddam Trilogy is a product of extrapolation: it is a 
meditation on what the future might look like if social contradictions that produce injustice and 
oppression prove insoluble. Shari Evans points out that the distinction between totalitarian and 





government institutions; the novel, she writes, “portrays an inability to envision a clearly 
structured political society. The novel gives glimpses of a collapsing world and its social order 
only through the very limited perspective of what seems to be the last human” (35-6). What 
readers do see is that the distinctive features of neoliberalism—deregulation of markets, erosion 
of the public sphere, elimination of welfare programs, extractive economic practices, and so on, 
have produced a world in which nation-states are rarely referenced, New England has a 
subtropical climate, and multinational corporations exercise extreme violence to protect the 
circulation of capital. The wealthy live in corporate compounds while everyone else lives in the 
impoverished and disease-ridden “pleeblands.” A militarized police force called the 
CorpSeCorps is the only governing entity mediating between these spaces, generally by violently 
protecting corporate interests.   
 As Atwood notes elsewhere, however, dystopias tend to contain the seeds of utopia 
within them. The Gardeners are the most traditional utopian entity in the trilogy insofar as their 
utopianism is a matter of social organization rather than genetic engineering, and they therefore 
provide a logical starting point for an analysis of the trilogy’s utopianism despite the fact that 
they do not appear prominently until its second installment. The Gardeners are a human 
collective attempting to reorient themselves in relation to each other and to the natural world, 
opposing the dominant order not through violence, but by establishing spaces within it where 
alternative social relations may be practiced. As such, they are one of the “enclaves of 






 The Year of the Flood, which focuses on the God’s Gardeners, follows the conventions of 
the classical utopian narrative more closely than does Oryx and Crake, the first novel of the 
trilogy. It is narrated, primarily, by two women—Ren and Toby—who are affiliated with the 
Gardeners, but the narrative is also interspersed with homilies in the first-person voice of Adam 
One, the group’s leader. These homilies describe the history and philosophy of the Gardeners, 
complementing the accounts of the group’s day-to-day activities offered by Ren and Toby and 
expressing the odd synthesis of scientific and religious discourses that comprise the Gardeners’ 
philosophy. This discursive hybridization is an effort to resolve one of the major oppositions 
defining the trilogy’s dystopia: the opposition between science and the humanities—art, 
literature, ethics, religion and spirituality, and so on. In the world of the trilogy, profitable forms 
of knowledge are valorized, while unprofitable ones, which, importantly, provide conceptual 
models for critiquing the ethics of the former, are marginalized. Oryx and Crake stages this 
conflict through the ongoing dialectic between Crake, who represents the consequences of 
unchecked positivism, and Jimmy, whose ineptitude in the laboratory is coupled with a love of 
language and an aptitude for storytelling. The novel describes the consequences of science 
employed, by the corporations, on behalf of extractive, exploitative, and profit-driven economic 
practices, and, by Crake, in the service of a rationality liberated both from humanist ethics and 
the allure of profit. 
 The God’s Gardeners attempt to heal this cultural opposition through dialectical 
synthesis, investing their doctrines with both an acknowledgment of modern science and an 
affirmation of religious belief. Adam One states in one of his homilies  
we affirm our Primate ancestry – an affirmation that has brought down wrath 





also, the Divine agency that has caused us to be created in the way that we were, 
and this has enraged those scientific fools who say in their hearts, “There is no 
God. (Year 51) 
 
Adam One goes on to describe how God “created us through the long and complex process of 
Natural and Sexual Selection, which is none other than His ingenious device for instilling 
humility in Man” (Year 52), and he concludes by thanking God “for having made us in such a 
way as to remind us, not only of our less than Angelic being, but also of the knots of DNA and 
RNA that tie us to our many fellow Creatures” (Year 53). The Gardeners thus advocate a 
hybridic environmentalism that borrows from a variety of secular and religious discourses. 
The Gardeners are based in a compound in the pleeblands of what was once, presumably, 
Boston. Over time, however, the Gardeners grow in size and prominence, becoming less 
centralized as they establish outposts in the “Exfernal world” and place agents in the corporate 
compounds. Each branch of the Gardeners maintains an “Ararat”—a hoard of supplies stored 
away in preparation for the Waterless Flood that, like the literal flood of Genesis, will wipe the 
greater part of humanity from the Earth. The name of the Gardeners’ home—Edencliff 
Gardens—suggests its utopian aspirations, and Toby’s first impression of it evokes the name’s 
biblical referent: “She gazed around it in wonder […] Each petal and leaf was fully alive, shining 
with awareness of her. Even the air of the Garden was different” (Year 43). The beauty and 
liveliness of the Garden starkly contrasts the squalor of its urban surroundings. The rooftop, 
socially and spatially insulated from the dystopian cityscape, serves as a locus where alternative 
configurations of the social can be practiced. 
  These alternative configurations are predicated on egalitarianism and ecological 





friendly and that allow them to avoid participating in consumer culture, and they frame their 
relationship to material objects in terms of use rather than possession. Ren comments on one of 
their dwelling places near Edencliff Gardens that “The Gardeners didn’t exactly own the 
building, because ownership was wrong, but somehow they controlled it” (Year 79). This is an 
instance of the tonal ambiguity saturating Atwood’s portrayal of the Gardeners. The structure of 
property relations among the Gardeners is never described in detail, and here, as elsewhere, the 
relation of the Gardeners’ principles to their practices seems dubious. The looseness of the 
Gardeners’ abandonment of the property form may be a case of pragmatism defeating idealism, 
but this has social consequences: “Adam One insisted that all Gardeners were equal on the 
spiritual level, but the same did not hold true for the material one” (Year 44). The frailty of the 
Gardeners’ utopianism appears as their procedures of synthesis and reconciliation—of science 
and religion, society and nature, self and other—produce new fissures and contradictions. 
The ambiguity surrounding property forms among the Gardeners bleeds into their gender 
relations and sexual mores. While ostensibly advocating equality and egalitarianism across lines 
of gender, the Gardeners are ultimately a patriarchal and heteronormative group. When Toby is 
sexually assaulted by Mugi, Pilar tells her “We never make a fuss about such things […] You 
must forgive him in your heart” (Year 104). Calina Ciobanu notes of the trilogy’s representations 
of patriarchy that “the trilogy as a whole insists that any possibility of imagining a posthuman 
future will depend not just on situating humankind as one species among many, but on unsettling 
mankind’s primacy in relation to womankind as well” (154). The Gardeners, in keeping with 





plaguing the society they resist, while Adam One generally explains these failures away through 
evasion or euphemism.  
A schism within the Gardeners prompted by a disagreement over the relative merits of 
passive and violent resistance results in the formation of MaddAddam, a group of revolutionaries 
who actively sabotage corporate projects. Adam One’s countercultural activities are tolerated by 
the CorpSeCorps because they do not pose any substantive threat to corporate interests. The 
aggressive opposition of Zeb and the MaddAddam saboteurs is more threatening, but because of 
this it is stamped out. MaddAddam’s origin in the God’s Gardeners leads the CorpSeCorps to 
attack and scatter Adam One’s followers as well. Oppositional politics prove to be ineffective, 
caught between a quietism that is sustainable precisely because of its futility and more radical 
methods that are promptly suppressed. The Year of the Flood, therefore, may be read as lending 
support to the view that political praxis is not a viable route to utopia. 
 The trilogy never clearly identifies the constraints that the Gardeners fail to transcend. 
They may be biological, ideological, or both. In any case, the failure of politics as a route to 
positive social change leads Crake, in the first novel of the trilogy, to search for a different one: 
“Let’s suppose for the sake of argument,” said Crake one evening, “that 
civilization as we know it gets destroyed […] Once it’s flattened, it could never 
be rebuilt […] All it takes,” said Crake, “is the elimination of one generation. One 
generation of anything. Beetles, trees, microbes, scientists, speakers of French, 
whatever. Break the link in time between one generation and the next, and it’s 
game over forever.” (Oryx 223) 
 
Crake imagines something far more radical than a healing of social contradictions, here: an 
apocalyptic end to human civilization that will forcibly create a posthuman future. 
Oryx and Crake, like The Year of the Flood, describes a crumbling and decadent 





to ameliorate social ills are few and comically ineffective, reduced to rehearsing platitudes and 
carrying out acts of sabotage on a small scale. The novel introduces Crake’s particularly 
antiutopian brand of genetic determinism in this context. War and other forms of competition 
are, in Crake’s formulation, based not in economic imperatives or religious or ethnic tensions, 
but in human sexuality. According to this view, humans are torn between competing impulses 
toward unfettered promiscuity and unwavering fidelity, and this conflict leads to psychological 
torment, repression, and the redirection of sublimated sexual energy into war, competition, 
consumption, and so on. 
 The implication of this theory that innate human imperfections preclude egalitarian and 
sustainable social organization is that utopian humans must have the capacity for utopia wired 
into them. In the Crakers, 
Gone were [humanity’s] destructive features, the features responsible for the 
world’s current illnesses. For instance, racism—or, as they referred to it in 
Paradice, pseudospeciation—had been eliminated in the model group […] 
Hierarchy could not exist among them, because they lacked the neural complexes 
that would have created it. Since they were neither hunters nor agriculturalists 
hungry for land, there was no territoriality: the king-of-the-castle hard-wiring that 
had plagued humanity had, in them, been unwired […] Their sexuality was not a 
constant torment to them […] there would be no family trees, no marriages, and 
no divorces. They were perfectly adjusted to their habitat so they would never 
have to create houses or tools or weapons, or, for that matter, clothing. They 
would have no need to invent any harmful symbolisms, such as kingdoms, icons, 
gods, or money. (Oryx 305) 
 
More important than the social content described here is the formal contingency of the 
description on negation. The Crakers’ distinctive qualities—those that might qualify as 





that create hierarchy, the absence of any need for material possessions or symbolic structures, 
and so on.12 
Jameson’s commentary on the problems inherent in utopian visions predicated on 
synthesis, rather than on negation and neutralization, is useful in understanding the difference 
between the Gardeners and the Crakers. The Gardeners seek to reorganize social relations on a 
microcosmic level within a dominant dystopian system. The reliance of this process on synthesis 
carries with it the consequence that this new society is clearly sewn from the same fabric as the 
old, the injustices and irrationalities of the dominant order persistently reiterating themselves in 
subtle and insidious ways in the Gardeners’ practices. The development of the Crakers, however, 
was not an additive process in which salutary elements of existing social materials were 
recombined to produce some better alternative. Rather, it was predicated on subtraction, as Crake 
removed from his design all the human qualities that he believed led to suffering. Rather than 
seeking to resolve social contradictions, Crake seeks to remove the Crakers from those 
contradictions entirely.  
 For the Crakers to thrive, they must have space in which to do so. Crake, through his 
position with the pharmaceutical corporation RejoovenEsense, designs a medication and uses it, 
unbeknownst to his employers, as a vector for an extraordinarily effective pathogen of his own 
making. Crake arranges for Jimmy to survive the ensuing pandemic so that he can shepherd the 
Crakers to safety. As Oryx and Crake and MaddAddam demonstrate, however, Crake’s efforts to 
subtract humanity’s vices from the Crakers are not entirely successful. The Crakers are already 
 
12 Crake’s genetic determinism is, arguably, internally contradictory insofar as it identifies human sexuality as the 
primary source of violence, inequality, and so on, when it is not clear that all of his interventions in the human 





becoming recognizably human, in ways antithetical to Crake’s design, by the end of Oryx and 
Crake. Jimmy constructs a mythology for them in which Crake and Oryx figure as deities, and 
they develop a love of stories and storytelling. At the end of the novel, they build a likeness of 
Jimmy that allows them to “send out [their] voices” to him, indicating that they are developing 
art and a grasp of symbolism (361). This process continues in MaddAddam, which describes the 
interactions between the Crakers and the surviving Gardeners as they navigate the post-
apocalyptic world. Much of the novel is devoted to Toby’s friendship with the young Craker 
Blackbeard, whom she teaches to read and write. Toby grasps the implications of these lessons 
only after Blackbeard has enthusiastically embraced them. She wonders “Now what have I done? 
[…] What comes next? Rules, dogmas, laws? The Testament of Crake? How soon before there 
are ancient texts they feel they have to obey but have forgotten how to interpret? Have I ruined 
them?” (MaddAddam 204). The Crakers clearly retain cognitive abilities that Crake sought to 
amputate from them. Late in the novel, Blackbeard takes over the storytelling duties that Jimmy 
had previously passed on to Toby. In the concluding section, Toby and Blackbeard’s journal 
entries alternate with each other, culminating in Blackbeard’s “Story of Toby,” which describes 
Zeb’s death and Toby’s journey away from the group of survivors. The novel’s ending seems to 
justify, to a limited degree, Toby’s concern that writing and reading may corrupt the Crakers. 
Blackbeard becomes a leader because of the narrative authority passed on to him by Toby, and 
he evidently prepares to propagate this hierarchy into the next generation by passing on his 
knowledge to the hybridic children of human/Craker unions. 
As with much of the trilogy, the political implications here are ambiguous. The 





knowledge, and so on may be read as ominous. But, this conclusion also seems to situate the 
future of the human and Craker races in the negotiation of otherness. According to Shelley Boyd 
“Atwood suggests that there is hope, but only through interspecies communion” (172). Atwood 
stages a new dialectic, here, returning to the starting point of the utopian procedure described by 
Jameson, but the resolution of this dialectic is deferred beyond the trilogy’s conclusion. 
Atwood’s trilogy may be understood as an effort to explore the problematic nature of 
utopian representation. While the conceptual content of the Crakers’ society is dependent on 
negation, the embodiments of that content reify it back into positivity. A nameless lack of 
hierarchy becomes recognizable as egalitarianism. The Crakers are “neither hunters nor 
agriculturalists,” but they can be described instead, in positive terms, as nomadic gatherers. The 
trilogy’s utopianism is not located in the God’s Gardeners or the Crakers, but in the dialectic 
between them. MaddAddam moves this dialectic toward a resolution as the two groups begin to 
merge, but, importantly, that resolution is deferred past an open-ended conclusion of the sort 
that, as Suvin and Moylan have noted, maintains a utopian horizon.13 
The utopian dialectics of the MaddAddam Trilogy are located primarily within and 
between social groups in the trilogy’s storyworld. Other aspects of the trilogy’s composition 
contribute to these dynamics, though. The trilogy’s bifurcated narrative temporality facilitates its 
staging of social oppositions. Its modulations of narrative perspective stage a contrast between 
the singular, masculine focalization of Oryx and Crake and the more egalitarian splintering of 
narrative authority in The Year of the Flood and MaddAddam. There are traces, here, of the 
 





aesthetic and narrative formal contradictions that Adorno identifies as constitutive of textual 
politics. 
Utopian dialectics can organize texts on these other formal levels in multiple ways. In the 
dialogic structure of the classic utopias, the oscillating narrative temporality of the MaddAddam 
Trilogy, and the grammatical patterning of “Diving into the Wreck,” we see dialectical 
relationships functioning as broad organizing principles. The frame narratives and epilogues of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four and The Handmaid’s Tale are interventions that unexpectedly enact a 
subtle switching of the text’s political charge, revealing utopian horizons beyond the closure of 
the narrative. These effects depend on how narrative or aesthetic forms are coordinated with the 
social content represented in the text. 
The relationship between these textual levels is one of the concerns of Chang-rae Lee’s 
2014 novel On Such a Full Sea. While the MaddAddam Trilogy conducts its utopian 
experiments primarily in the represented space of the storyworld, On Such a Full Sea uses 
communal narration to place narrative forms at the forefront of its utopian project.14 Susan S. 
Lanser describes communal narration as “a spectrum of practices that articulate either a 
collective voice or a collective of voices that share narrative authority” (21). This spectrum 
consists of “a singular form in which one narrator speaks for a collective, a simultaneous form in 
which a plural ‘we’ narrates, and a sequential form in which individual members of a group 
narrate in turn” (Lanser 21). Lanser’s definitions indicate a kinship between the effects of 
 
14 The MaddAddam Trilogy, again, has some very interesting narrative formal elements that are worth considering 
in the context of its utopianism, but it is important to remember that these elements are fairly common in Atwood’s 
fiction, generally. The trilogy’s narrative temporality, for instance, with its oscillations between present and past, 
also appears in other, non-dystopian, Atwood novels such as The Robber Bride (1993), Alias Grace (1996), and The 






communal narration and the recurring preoccupations of much utopian and dystopian literature, 
in which demarcations of subjectivity, contours of thought and perception, and patterns of 
multivocality are often framed by the text as symptomatic of or homologous with the social 
structures acting on the characters.15 
Such a relationship itself constitutes a dialectical interaction between textual levels, but in 
communal narratives the text’s perspectival dynamics are themselves necessarily contradictory. 
According to Brian Richardson, simultaneous communal narration, or “we” narration, provides 
“an essentially dialectical perspective” (58). Sundry perspectives are funneled through a pronoun 
that compresses them into a discrete unit. The “we” is defined by this contradiction between 
plurality and singularity, and its politics are determined by the text’s staging of that 
contradiction. Richardson argues that “We” narration can be framed as a formal correlate to a 
“new, more communal, and more egalitarian society” (56), but he also notes that the category of 
the “we” lacks a fixed political allegiance.16 It can be associated with communal social forms 
that challenge neoliberal values, such as individualism and competition, that validate a wide 
range of extractive and exploitative economic practices. It can also, however, enact an oppressive 
elision of difference by representing a multiplicity of individual subjects with diverse interests 
 
15 Communal narration can be a means of investigating some of the major questions of utopian and dystopian 
literature: how do economic and political structures act on individual and collective? Should the prospect of a more-
or-less unified collective consciousness inspire utopian hopes for a social order founded on solidarity and 
egalitarianism, or should it incite dystopian fears of mindless conformity and the erasure of the individual subject? 
 
16 Despite his reservations, Richardson claims that “The vast majority of ‘we’ texts valorize collective identity in no 
uncertain terms” (50). Amit Marcus, alternately, argues that “we” narratives tend to “portray life within a 
community as fraught with (internal and/or external) conflicts and controversies rather than being harmonious, 
peaceful, and cooperative,” and he questions “why there are no twentieth-century ‘we’ narratives that would express 






through a homogenizing voice. Cast in this way, the “we” may function as a narratological 
expression of a communal body that is stifling, uniform, and hostile to individual expression. 
All of these contradictory meanings associated with the “we” perspective are present in 
On Such a Full Sea, which, in Lee’s words, is “as much about the telling as it is the tale” 
(Leyshon). The basic characteristics of the unnerving future it imagines—environmental 
degradation, thorough corporatization of social life, and authoritarian political structures—are 
common to many contemporary dystopias.17 The novel is narrated, however, by the community 
of a futuristic Baltimore—called B-Mor by its inhabitants—as it grapples with the legacy of Fan, 
a young woman who forsook the anesthetizing comfort of B-Mor to search for her lost partner, 
Reg. The voice of B-Mor’s population is riven by ambivalences and antinomies that work 
themselves out over the course of the novel, culminating in a formal shift, in the novel’s final 
lines, that signals a reformation of the communal consciousness. The communal voice serves as 
the novel’s primary means for modeling processes of social change, exploring relations between 
individual and collective, and signaling utopian possibilities. 
 The storyworld of On Such a Full Sea is both predictive and cautionary. Privatization of 
the public sphere, unregulated corporate activity, and other markers of the neoliberal era have 
ravaged the environment, warmed the climate, and reduced cities to blighted slums. National 
governments have been replaced by an association of multinational corporations that administer 
services and regulate daily life in a steeply stratified system of settlements. The wealthy and 
powerful live in affluent towns called Charter villages that are isolated from the outer world by 
walls and security forces and protected from the climate by elaborate geoengineering 
 





mechanisms. Industrial cities such as Baltimore and Detroit have been repurposed as production 
facilities populated and maintained by imported laborers from Southeast Asia and designed to 
supply the Charter villages.18 The communal fabric of the facilities is engineered to ensure an 
efficient and orderly production process, while daily life in the Charters is centered on the 
consumption of goods produced in facilities like B-Mor. The pre-dystopian inhabitants of 
Baltimore and other industrial cities have been driven out by the gentrification processes 
described above and forced to make a living in the open counties: vast spaces outside of the 
Charter villages and production facilities where the majority of the population must survive 
without access to basic services. 
 The dystopian nature of this imagined world emerges from the contradictions and elisions 
in the communal narrator’s representation of it. For instance, in an early chapter that describes 
the provenance of B-Mor and the process by which Chinese villagers were brought in to build 
and staff the production facility, the narrator writes that 
The originals were brought in en masse for a strict purpose but with their work- 
and family-centric culture intact, such that they would not only endure and 
eventually profit the seed investors but also prosper in a manner that would be 
perpetually regenerative. 
And while all this is true, and uplifting, and everyone you might greet on a 
stroll down Longevity Way will automatically trill It is fine or It is right, one has 
to accept that deformations have appeared on the surface of our serene terra, 
 
18 The centrality of Southeast Asia to the novel’s vision of the future puts it in conversation with techno-orientalist 
dystopias such as the film Blade Runner (1982) and the television series Firefly (2002-3) and Maniac (2018). 
Stephen Hong Sohn writes of techno-orientalism, a discourse that associates Southeast Asian cultures with 
technological sophistication, that “In traditional Orientalism, the East is often configured as backwards, anti-
progressive, and primitive. In this respect, techno-Orientalism might suggest a different conception of the East, 
except for the fact that the very inhuman qualities projected onto Asian bodies create a dissonance with these 
alternative temporalities” (8). Christopher Fan notes that On Such a Full Sea avoids techno-orientalist terms, 
suggesting that “the novel problematizes not only our desire to conflate Asian subjects and technology but also our 
countervailing liberal desire to dismiss such a desire as racist and then bestow some form of humanism on the 
racialized subject” (678). The novel’s collective subject is one of the primary structural means for this critical 





where even the most positive feelings can begin to pool, and seep down through 
new fissures, and trickle away. (19) 
 
The narrator expresses a limited awareness here that the communal dynamic of B-Mor exists to 
serve the needs of capital. Any subversive potential that may attend such an awareness is shunted 
into an insistent belief that this communal investment in the production process is a thoroughly 
salutary condition, only for this optimism to give way to an acknowledgment of the “fissures” 
between the community’s work-oriented culture and the alienating and numbing social relations 
it produces. The novel is shot through by this basic tension between its “real” world, which the 
reader is never allowed unmediated access to, and the narrator’s reading of that world, which is 
riddled with ambivalence. 
The communal narrator occasionally reflects on the nature of this mediation. In an early 
passage describing the repeated retelling of Fan’s tale, the narrator admits that “we can’t help but 
build upon what is known, our elaborations not fantastical or untrue but at times vulnerable to 
our wishes for her, and for ourselves” (33). Later, the narrator acknowledges that Fan’s story is 
partially a product “of our own shifting perspective on that brief period, what we have come to 
overlay upon her journeys as we revisit them over time” (156). The narrator’s mediation of Fan’s 
journey constantly destabilizes itself by reminding the reader of its own contingency, such that 
the facts pertaining to Fan, her motives, and her experiences remain inaccessible beneath the 
novel’s discursively flat surface. 
This flat discourse produces a tension between sameness and difference. Structurally, the 
narrative alternates back and forth between passages in which the communal narrator describes 
life in B-Mor and passages relating Fan’s search for Reg. Embedded in the story of Fan’s 





does not create a layering or a juxtapositioning of differentiated voices, however, because all of 
these passages are narrated in the voice of the communal “we.” A seemingly trivial feature of the 
novel’s formatting is the lack of quotation marks framing moments of direct speech. Lines of 
dialogue are usually indented to set them off from the rest of the text, but aside from an 
occasional colon, there are no other formal features demarcating them. A characteristic example 
of this is the following exchange between Fan and Quig while they are driving through the 
counties on their way to a Charter village: 
Something she couldn’t explain, then, made her say to Quig from the backseat of 
the car: Whatever you’re looking for, I’ll help you find. 
He didn’t answer right away, tapping at the wheel with his long fingers. 
Loreen was dozing, her jaw sunk, her tarnished lower teeth jammed together like 
kernels on a stunted ear of corn. 
You’re going to help me find a well drill? 
No, she said. The other thing. 
The other thing, he repeated, his tone raised. 
Yes, she said. This was, in fact, only the second conversation they’d had. 
(109) 
 
The lack of quotation marks, along with the general paucity of direct speech and the narrator’s 
repeated reminders of the text’s mediated character, cues the reader to understand these moments 
of dialogue as a sort of implied indirect discourse. Statements that seem to be framed as direct 
speech are subverted by the absence of the conventional formal markers that set off this type of 
discourse, serving as a reminder that every verbal utterance in the text is mediated through the 
diegetic voice of the community. The narrative is discursively flat rather than layered, univocal 
rather than polyphonous. It is not the tale of Fan; it is the tale of a community working through 
its crisis of purpose and identity through an act of narrative creation. This is the significance of 





constructed narrative of Fan lies not in its relation to Fan’s “real” experiences, but in its status as 
a projection of communal fears and desires.  
Frankfurt School critical theory, particularly Adorno’s description of capitalism as a 
totalizing system, seems to inform the novel’s positioning of its communal narrator within the 
relations of production structuring life in the settlements. Adorno argues that the pervasive 
reification of culture and social life under capitalism leads to a uniformity of consciousness that 
precludes any semblance of autonomous, unideological thought or action. Only critical 
awareness of this condition enables the subject to resist permeation by ideology. 
Commodification alienates individual subjects from the material world and from each other, but 
this radical differentiation is coupled with the systematic accommodation of social life to the 
demands of production and consumption, the reduction of all things to universal, monetary 
measures of equivalence. Adorno writes that under capitalism 
The network of the whole is drawn ever tighter, modelled after the act of 
exchange. It leaves the individual consciousness less and less room for evasion, 
preforms it more and more thoroughly, cuts it off a priori as it were from the 
possibility of differencing itself as all difference degenerates to a nuance in the 
monotony of supply. (“Cultural Criticism” 198) 
 
Adorno’s emphasis on negativity proceeds from this conviction that late capitalism is an 
inescapable total system: a system that isolates the subject from others while simultaneously 
binding all together in an anesthetizing consciousness that precludes any difference not amenable 
to production and consumption. The subject permeated by ideology can at best unmask social 
contradictions in order to foster in others a critical awareness of them. 
 On Such a Full Sea describes such an unmasking, as a disruptive event—not apparently 





awareness of itself and its position within dystopia. Fan’s departure rends the once integral 
community into a “we” and a “she,” an “us” and a “her,” and this fracture spurs the community 
into a cycle of self-reflection and narrative creation, its meditations on its own composition and 
its constructions of Fan’s story alternating with and informing each other. The progress of this 
dialectic between the community and its constructed Other is measured through the narrator’s 
shifting attitude toward Fan. Two impulses compete in the narrator’s imagination: to pathologize 
Fan as deviant and irrational, and to valorize her as an extraordinary individual who transcended 
her circumstances in the performance of an act that encapsulated the repressed dreams and 
desires of the community.19 These two impulses are introduced and juxtaposed in the novel’s 
early pages. The narrator reflects in their opening description of Fan, “Nor would anyone have 
thought that [Fan] could do the thing she did. Such a lamentable action!” (3). The narrator’s 
characterization of Fan’s departure as “lamentable,” however, is followed almost immediately by 
the observation that “she could appear to possess a special perspective that one might 
automatically call ‘wisdom’ but is perhaps more a kind of timelessness of view […] Perhaps Fan 
truly had that kind of clarity, and not just a semblance of it” (3). This coupling of criticism and 
admiration, fear and the uneasy recognition of possibility, is soon followed by a passage that 
refracts these perspectives through the metaphor of the fish tank. 
Fan’s role in B-Mor is to manage one of the fish tanks in which the community produces 
food for the Charter settlements. Like B-Mor, these tanks are insulated spaces that appear to be 
 
19 Marcus writes that in “we” narratives that include what he terms “exclusive disorienting discourse,” “only a single 
member of the ‘we’ group has the courage, impertinence, or naiveté to violate the group’s norms. Such a member’s 
subversive destabilizing discourse engenders ambivalent feelings within the community—reverence and hostility, 
fascination and aversion, admiration and contempt” (148). Fan is never granted unmediated speech in On Such a 
Full Sea and therefore has no opportunity to vocalize “disorienting discourse.” Marcus’s description is still 





self-contained, functional ecosystems, when in fact they are carefully engineered and monitored 
such that they efficiently perform a role in the production process. Fan’s aptitude for navigating 
her fish tank—moving naturally through it while remaining, somehow, an outsider—parallels her 
status as a member of B-Mor’s community who possesses unique capabilities that set her apart. 
Describing Fan’s tendency to sit at the bottom of the fish tank holding her breath, as if she could 
exert “a different kind of force that would transform not her but the composition of the realm, 
make it so the water could not harm her” (6), the narrator speculates  
And if that is an indication of her instability, everything else that happened makes 
sense and no more needs to be accounted for. 
 But let’s suppose another way of considering her, which was that she had 
a special conviction of imagination. Few of us do, to be honest. We wish and wish 
and often with fury but never very deeply. For if we did, we’d see how the world 
can sometimes split open, in just the way we hope. That it and we are, in fact, 
unbounded. Free. (6) 
 
Fan’s prodigious ability to hold her breath under water, stretching the natural constraints 
imposed on her by her environment, as if she has power to “transform […] the composition of 
the realm” is a metaphor for her status in the community of B-Mor. She is uniquely resistant to 
the milieu she is immersed in, and her departure, which the narrator struggles to comprehend, 
does indeed transform the community. This passage further illustrates the community’s polarized 
appraisals of Fan’s departure. The first appraisal, expressive of the logic of the status quo, brands 
her as unstable, while the second expresses a recognition of the emancipatory possibilities 
opened by her act. The narrator’s continual movement between these poles is enclosed in a 
broader trajectory away from the former “way of considering her,” which is most prominent in 





 These two examples of the narrator’s vacillation between criticism and admiration are 
embedded, in the novel’s early sections, within an attitude that may be described as uneasily 
condemnatory. Roughly a quarter of the way through the novel, the narrator remarks that  
[Fan’s] endeavor was misguided and wrong and maybe plain crazy, akin to 
someone waking up one day and deciding he’s going to scale Kilimanjaro because 
he can’t stop imagining the view from the top […] And while it’s easy to say this 
is a situation to be avoided, isn’t this what we also fear and crave simultaneously, 
that some internal force which defies understanding might remake us into the 
people we dream we are? (79) 
 
This passage adheres to the same dialectic structuring the judgments of Fan excerpted above. A 
critical sentiment is followed immediately by a corrective that considers Fan’s act from an 
opposing perspective.20 There is little qualification of the narrator’s insistence that Fan’s 
departure “was misguided and wrong and maybe plain crazy,” but the relative strength of this 
denunciation places emphasis on the shift in perspective that follows—both in the immediate 
corrective to the critical statement and in the narrator’s general shift, after this moment, toward 
open longing for the daring and imaginative freedom that Fan represents. Acknowledging the 
fear and craving comingled in their construction of Fan, the communal narrator voices their 
desire for an “internal” compulsion, not subject to ideological and material constraints, to well up 
and spur them toward an agentic transformation of the social world. Shortly after this passage, 
the narrator admits “And the funny thing, it occurs to us, is whether what Fan committed, as well 
as the fact that she left us, was aberrant at all” (96). This growing capacity to remove Fan’s 
 
20 The critical moment in these formulations is often couched in terms that attribute it to a subset of the community, 
however, or that explicitly pose the critical attitude as one possibility among many. For instance, at the end of the 
first chapter, the narrator notes that “Some […] can hardly utter her name without a stony jaw, unable to forgive Fan 
for what she did before disappearing” (10). Fan’s unforgiveable, pre-departure act was the poisoning of her fish, 
possibly because she, by virtue of her imaginative acuity, became aware of the metaphorics of the fish tank and 
chose to “transform” the world of the tanks irrevocably, just as she does to B-Mor through her departure. But, 
significantly, it is only “some” who cannot forgive Fan for this act. This is one of the important moments—





behavior from the realm of pathology is soon followed, roughly a third of the way through the 
novel, by the affirmation “Was it Reg we were yearning for? Was it Fan? Yes. Let it be heard. 
We can speak it now” (104). Following this declaration, the criticisms of Fan’s actions dwindle 
away, replaced by a clear desire to identify with her. The “now” in the excerpt situates this 
transition as a moment in a temporal continuum; the community’s ability to “speak” its 
“yearning” for Fan and Reg is linked to the progress of its narration of Fan’s journey.  
As the community’s constant retellings of Fan’s narrative accumulate, and as the 
community grows farther away in time from Fan’s departure, the narrative’s correspondence to 
the “facts” of Fan’s journey likely decreases. The narrator repeatedly affirms this and 
contemplates its implications:  
Whenever we tell the story of Fan, details are apt to change. You don’t mean to 
alter anything; in fact, your intention is the very opposite […] isn’t it the truth 
that, despite your fealty to the story, a moment will arise that compels a 
freelancing, perhaps even a rebellious, urge? […] we can’t help but add a little of 
our own special imprint, a tiny remarking here, a slight miscoloration there, and 
sometimes even more than that if the feeling is intense enough. (210) 
 
As Lanser indicates, communal narration is not a unitary device. The narrative of On Such a Full 
Sea is apparently told by a collective speaking in unison as a cohesive unit. The uniformity and 
integrity of the communal voice is continuous with the novel’s thematic concern with the 
homogeneity of consciousness under capitalism. The reflections excerpted above on the 
historical progression of Fan’s narrative evoke, however, Lanser’s definition of sequential rather 
than simultaneous communal narration: Fan’s tale has been told by many tellers since her 
departure, and these tellings have informed and inflected subsequent tellings, all of which have 
altered in minor ways their source material. Is the unified tale of the novel’s “we” the telos of 





Fan’s tale isolated out of a narrative polyphony unfolding over time? The communal narrator’s 
easy transgression of temporal bounds suggests a third option—that this singular narrative is a 
sort of summary, modeling through its evolving judgments of Fan the trajectory of the 
community’s narrative reconstructions of her tale through the generations since her departure. 
 This narrative polyphony is not actually present in the text of the novel. It is merely 
referenced by the “we” as a precondition of the narrative it tells, instantiating again the tension 
between sameness and difference, singularity and multiplicity, that defines the “we” perspective. 
The perpetual resolution of diversity into a homogeneous narrative voice that ostensibly contains 
difference even while effacing it terminates in the novel’s epiphanic conclusion, which may 
suggest a shift in narrative perspective that correlates with the community’s arrival at a new self-
awareness. The final chapter of the novel describes how the period of unrest following Fan’s 
departure from B-Mor fades back into a complacent acceptance of the status quo. A mysterious 
administrative body “has reversed some of the more disheartening measures of recent times” as a 
minor compromise that encourages cooperation and docility without substantively changing 
daily life in B-Mor (336).  
The reinscription of the status quo is not perfect, however. Occasionally, someone will 
“rise up from a chair in an eatery or a tea shop […] and without having to utter a word say to all: 
So what is this?” (337). Strangers will exchange glances on the street and feel the desire “to 
exchange all kinds of notations again, even the most improbable tales and rumors, to report 
everything we know of our Fan, who we’re sure can somehow hear us a little better now” (338). 
The result of the community’s questioning of itself and of the powers ruling it is a more nuanced 





consciousness is an unequivocal appreciation for Fan that marks a major shift from the 
ambivalence of the novel’s early pages: “We simply wish her to know that we are here, and not 
unsatisfactory, and that in this regard she can please pay us no great mind” (338). The 
community seems to have learned the lesson of Fan’s narrative. Consequently, it no longer needs 
her. The final lines of the novel emphasize this point as the community addresses the absent Fan: 
 But sometimes, we’re sure, you’re much closer than we know, waiting out 
word of Reg in some modest but nice place […] We can almost see it now, small 
but tidy, emptied of its household save for a black-clad girl, the brightest shape 
we know. 
 Don’t hurry, Fan. 
 Stay put for now. 
 We’ll find a way. 
 You need not come back for us. (352) 
 
The final four lines of the novel suggest a formal shift with important thematic ramifications. 
The third and fourth lines contain plural first-person pronouns, but the indentation and lineation 
of the statements place them in the same format that the novel uses to set off lines of direct 
speech. Most of the novel’s instances of direct speech are attributed to individual characters 
while being mediated through the communal narrator’s diegetic voice. The last four sentences, 
however, seem to represent a new modulation of that voice. The sentences are attributed to the 
community, but their formatting, and the grammatical possibility for each utterance to stand 
alone, suggests that they may be spoken by distinct individuals within the community. There is a 
tension, noted above, between the “we” narration of the novel’s form and the sequential 
communal narrative that the former is a product of and a commentary on. The framing of the 
conclusion may indicate that as the community completes Fan’s narrative and accepts it as an 
expression of its own desire for liberation and agency, the homogeneous communal voice 





The communal reconfiguration signaled by these lines is anticipated and enabled by 
Fan’s assertion of an individualized love that had no place in B-Mor’s lukewarm and 
undifferentiated amity, in which “in essence everybody was like a cousin” (Lee 91). The novel 
presents an individual’s seemingly apolitical act as a disruptive event powerful enough to de-
reify the thought of a community, opening a space in the communal imagination for 
emancipatory dreams. The novel, like the MaddAddam Trilogy, does not describe what happens 
next, though. It ends in a Joycean epiphanic moment that seems charged with possibilities that 
are not fulfilled within the pages of the novel. These possibilities are very ambiguous. There is 
little indication that the community’s reformed consciousness will correspond to a radical 
political praxis. Indeed, the community’s halfhearted revolution ended in the reinscription, albeit 
imperfect, of the status quo. The closing lines may, furthermore, easily be read as spoken by the 
same diegetic voice that narrates the rest of the novel. 
Indeterminacies such as these are integral to the novel’s structure, and to the utopianism 
of its conclusion. On Such a Full Sea, even in its relatively hopeful ending, never presumes to 
resolve its formal contradictions. Such a resolution might have been accomplished through an 
epilogue representing an idyllic future in which the injustices of the past have been abolished and 
replaced by equitable alternatives, described through the sequential communal narration that the 
novel’s conclusion gestures toward and which arguably resolves the opposition between plural 
and singular forms of first-person narration. This is, however, a negative utopian narrative like 
others discussed in this project, informed by the same preoccupation with unsayability and the 





Sequential, like simultaneous, communal narration is an ambivalent form. One might 
argue that sequential communal narration reinstates a neoliberal hierarchy of values that 
privileges the category of the individual over that of the communal. A more determinedly 
optimistic reading might claim, instead, that it creates a progressive discursive egalitarianism. 
This reading can also be turned on its head, though. What if situating diverse voices on the same 
discursive plane reduces them to a common level of equivalence, reflecting the passage from 
quality to quantity, incommensurability to exchangeability, that characterizes postmodernity’s 
thorough commodification? Progressive and retrograde valences accrue to this form as they do to 
any other. The utopianism of On Such a Full Sea’s conclusion, therefore, is not a property of a 
particular mode of narrative perspective; rather, it is the potential for transformative change 
figured by the unresolved dialectical tension between the dominant form and its corrective. This 
moment of ambiguous mobility will presumably crystallize into another imperfect form, but the 
novel does not describe that outcome. It instead concludes in the tension-ridden moment of 
transformation, when the antiquation of the old communal consciousness testifies to the 
possibility for radical change, the possibility for the community to continue revolutionizing itself 
toward a perpetually deferred utopian condition. 
The Limits of the Dialectic 
Dialectical relationships are so pervasive within literary utopianism due to their capacity, 
as suggested above, to negotiate the tension on which the genre is founded: utopia as “no place” 
and utopia as “good place.” The most successful utopias have thematized this basic contradiction 
by representing good places that are imperfect or unfinished, that work toward an ideal that they 





ideological contestation within which the utopian process commences, necessarily lending a 
baseline of content to the utopian idea even if this content never reaches any final expression. 
The positive components of this process have too often been underemphasized in utopian 
theory. In Jameson’s review of The Year of the Flood, he writes of the God’s Gardeners that 
“Functional hierarchy (the Adams and the Eves) is here made palatable by co-operative 
egalitarianism and a serene acceptance of the frailties of human nature […] Regressive it all is, 
however (and it is always helpful to wonder what politics today could possibly be otherwise)” 
(“Then”). Jameson nods to the Gardeners’ progressive impulses only to declare these impulses 
circumscribed by a broader regressive character, one that can be attributed to the epistemological 
straitjacket of ideology. In the context of degrading ecosystems and a rapidly warming climate, it 
is worthwhile to question the usefulness of a utopianism that shuns blueprints for a habitable 
future and dismisses traditional modes of political praxis as futile or compromised. The danger is 
that this tendency may sanction an ethos of paralysis and resignation that is in fact perfectly 
amenable to the status quo it claims to despise, and that is of little use to marginalized and 
oppressed peoples struggling to better their material conditions of existence. 
The MaddAddam Trilogy’s tonal pessimism certainly resonates with Jameson’s theory of 
ideological closure, but the trilogy’s unrelenting satire does not spare the avatars of this 
diagnosis. Late in Oryx and Crake, Jimmy is living with his college girlfriend Amanda and her 
two artist friends. The friends, who are insufferably pretentious, describe society as “a sort of 
monster, its main by-products being corpses and rubble. It never learned, it made the same 
cretinous mistakes over and over, trading short-term gain for long-term pain” (243). When 





analysis was one thing but correct solutions were another, and the lack of the latter did not 
invalidate the former” (243). The trilogy also does not offer solutions, but it is keenly aware that 
while this stance has a long history in the utopian tradition, it does not provide a strong basis for 
transformative politics. 
The trilogy’s tendency to explore routes to social change only to dismiss them raises 
questions about the political functions of utopian discourse in the twenty-first century. Is the 
utopian idea best expressed through wary and minimalistic allowances of hope, or through more 
brazen images of emancipation? Atwood’s treatment of the eco-friendly Gardeners is satirical, 
but it is also, in the spirit of utopian ambiguity, rather earnest. It suggests that while this 
particular utopian vision ultimately failed to transcend its social constraints, it is still, in 










EMBODYING UTOPIAN CONTENT  
IN CHINA MIÉVILLE’S BAS-LAG TRILOGY 
 To distinguish between utopian discourse and the utopian genre is to argue that there are 
distinctly utopian patterns of representation and formal organization that can be detached from 
the traditional genre conventions of the utopian narrative. Chapters One and Two argue that two 
important tendencies of utopian discourse are its resistance to narrative closure and its dialectical 
structure. These formal tendencies must, however, organize and act upon some kind of utopian 
content in the text. Utopian discourse, therefore, is also constructive: it posits ethical values, 
political theories, or modes of social relationality and then frames these as potential building 
materials for a better society. Utopian content is a necessary component of works of utopian 
discourse, even in texts that seek to minimize this content in order to navigate the definitional 
impossibility of imagining utopia. Utopia’s contradictory identity as “good place” and “no place” 
leads texts to embody utopian content in such a way that it works against its own reification; 
utopian discourse therefore presents its content as dynamic, subject to change, and situated 
within open and undetermined historical temporalities. 
I begin this chapter by discussing major approaches to theorizing utopian content, 
arguing that these are generally limited by an impulse to assign value to different approaches to 
instantiating content and an investment in traditional genre categories. I respond to these 
tendencies by elaborating the more capacious understanding of utopian content outlined above. 





existing theories of utopian content and that demonstrates the specificity of utopian discourse as 
a mode of engagement with the aesthetics and politics of social betterment. The first two novels 
of the trilogy are exercises in two differing categories of utopian content: the impulse and the 
program. Perdido Street Station is a novel organized by subtle utopian impulses, while The Scar 
approximates the conventions of the genre utopia by describing a fully formed utopian society. 
Crucially, however, the utopian content of both novels is ultimately static. In Perdido Street 
Station, it is dormant and unrealized, and in The Scar, it is fully realized and resistant to change. 
Iron Council, the third novel, exemplifies utopian discourse by presenting a series of failed 
utopian programs while writing these failures into an anticipatory, future-oriented temporality. 
Utopia is continually embodied and continually dissolving, receding into the future, but, in the 
novel’s optimistic closing image, “always coming” (564).  
Theorizing Utopian Content 
Tom Moylan’s compelling work on literary utopianism informs my argument in this 
dissertation, but it also exemplifies the problematic investment of much utopian theory in the 
traditional genre categories of utopia, anti-utopia, and dystopia. As such, his work demonstrates 
some of the limits of this approach while also providing valuable insights into how texts 
instantiate utopian content. These insights are spread across Moylan’s definitions of two 
subgenres of utopian writing that he terms the “critical utopia” and the “critical dystopia.” In his 
influential book Demand the Impossible (1986), where he discusses the revival of the utopian 
genre in the 1970s, Moylan writes that 
A central concern in the critical utopia is the awareness of the limitations of the 
utopian tradition, so that these texts reject utopia as blueprint while preserving it 
as dream. Furthermore, the novels dwell on the conflict between the originary 





more directly articulated. Finally, the novels focus on the continuing presence of 
difference and imperfection within utopian society itself and thus render more 
recognizable and dynamic alternatives. (10-11) 
 
Moylan shows how critical utopias internalize and thus undermine two major tropes of anti-
utopian arguments: that utopian social organization is unattainable, and that such social 
organization would necessarily be oppressive. Critical utopias follow the most basic convention 
of the utopian genre by offering expansive representations of imagined societies framed by the 
text as radically better than “real world” alternatives, but they differ from earlier narratives by 
stressing openness, heterogeneity, and a capacity for change as necessary features of any 
radically better society. The troublesome standard of “perfection” often attributed to the utopian 
idea is thus rendered irrelevant. 
 Keeping pace with shifts in cultural production during the 1980s and 1990s, Moylan’s 
later criticism shifted to a focus on the utopianism of dystopian narratives and the ways in which 
these narratives can be unlikely vessels for the utopian idea. I discuss his work on dystopia in 
previous chapters, but I will reiterate here his claim that the utopian functions of dystopian texts 
tend to be articulated through “utopian enclaves of resistance or horizons of hope beyond the 
pages of the text” (Scraps 180-1). Of course, only some dystopias contain these elements, and 
this leads Moylan to describe them as “critical dystopias”: dystopias that are framed by the text 
as historically situated, perforated by dissident elements, and subject to change. 
Moylan’s definitions are useful, but they are limited by their attachment to the traditional 
genre categories that partition utopian thought. To present the “critical utopia” and the “critical 
dystopia” as separate genres is to suggest that there is a qualitative difference between them, 





differentiates them is the scale and scope of the utopian content they contain. Critical utopias and 
critical dystopias mutually 1) imagine non-existent societies, generally set in the future, 2) 
position these societies as products of historical change that are, therefore, subject to further 
historical changes, and 3) encode utopian content into the text’s narrative form, aesthetic 
composition, and/or represented social relations. The difference between the critical utopia and 
critical dystopia is articulated through the third category—utopian content. In a critical utopia, 
this content is more prominent in the text; in a critical dystopia, it appears on a smaller scale, but 
its role in the text is the same: to express qualities that could define a better society in a possible 
future.  
The possible textual locations for utopian content can be grouped into two broad 
categories: utopian programs and utopian impulses. Utopian programs, for Jameson, are efforts 
to imagine and implement utopian social organization (Archaeologies 3). Most genre utopias 
represent utopian programs textually while, in some cases, seeking to inspire similar programs in 
the real world.1 Jameson presents utopian programs as efforts to activate or embody utopian 
impulses. Jameson borrows the latter term from Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope, in which, 
Jameson writes, “Bloch posits a Utopian impulse governing everything future-oriented in life 
and culture; and encompassing everything from games to patent medicines, from myths to mass 
entertainment, from iconography to technology, from architecture to eros, from tourism to jokes 
to the unconscious” (Archaeologies 2). What these disparate examples share is that they are all 
 
1 It is important to clarify the utopian program’s relevance to literary production, specifically. I focus here on how 
texts represent utopian programs. Texts do sometimes participate in, contribute to, or inspire utopian programs, but 
it is very rare for this to happen on any measurable scale. Bellamy’s Looking Backward is one of the few examples 
of a text that inspired utopian programs in the real world. The only recent work in the genre that has had a 






unlikely repositories for radical political energies. Many of these examples would be viewed 
skeptically by a typical Marxist: myth for its ahistoricism and tourism for its commercialism and 
its power disparities, for instance. The utopian impulse in such cultural productions and practices 
is, according to Bloch, evidence of humanity’s constant, unconscious longing for a better world. 
Utopian discourse, I argue, can articulate utopian impulses on two interrelated textual 
levels: the text’s storyworld and its formal composition. At one point in The Road, for instance, 
the boy plays a tuneless song on a wooden flute that his father has made for him, and the father 
thinks of it as a “formless music for the age to come” (77). This is a utopian impulse that exists 
for the characters, coloring their experience of the storyworld and the possibilities it affords. 
There is no concrete image of a better society, here; there is only a figure of hope (the son) 
engaging in an act of creation that is defined by its divergence from preexisting aesthetic 
conventions and its anticipation of a coming future.2 This moment is an entry in the patterning of 
textual elements that makes The Road itself legible as an artwork animated by utopian impulses. 
Some of these elements are formal; McCarthy’s lyrical prose, for instance, is sometimes read by 
critics as serving a compensatory function relative to the horrific events that it describes3. This 
argument is most frequently made of Blood Meridian, but a similar case can be made for The 
Road. McCarthy’s lyrical minimalism both is and is not commensurate with its subject matter. 
 
2 Music is a frequent location for utopian content in literature. One of the only discernible utopian impulses in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four occurs immediately before Winston Smith and Julia’s capture, when Winston hears a prole 
woman singing a song and, despite the song’s ideological, mass cultural function, hears in it “the vitality which the 
Party did not share and could not kill” (220). The technically perfect but bloodless music of OneState in We is an 
inverse example—a music devoid of any utopian impulse that is instead a straightforward aesthetic correlate to the 
state’s oppressive structures. 
 






The novel’s short, declarative sentences and clipped dialogues correlate to the post-apocalyptic 
world’s material and conceptual scarcity, but Bloch would observe that the prose contains an 
aesthetic surplus that exceeds this paralleling of form and content.4 So, texts can describe utopian 
impulses in their storyworlds that are available for the characters to perceive, experience, and act 
upon, and these can complement or interact with utopian impulses in the text’s formal structure 
that are available only for the reader.5 
Utopian discourse, as I define it in this project, is capacious and eclectic. A non-
exhaustive list of textual locations where texts can instantiate utopian content includes: 1) 
representations of social organization, ranging from large-scale social structures to interpersonal 
relationships, and including treatments of space and place, 2) patterns of figuration that compress 
political meanings into the text’s imagery, plot, or setting, and 3) formal features such as 
narrative structure, focalization, or sentence-level stylistics that the text associates with political 
meanings. I argue that utopian discourse cuts across traditional genre distinctions and that the 
tendency to assign value to the possible embodiments of utopian content listed above is based on 
shaky assumptions about reader response and the social efficacy of the literary text. More 
important than whether a text articulates its utopian content as an impulse or a program is how 
 
4 The trajectory of the following passage exemplifies McCarthy’s tendency to frame stretches of spare and 
declarative descriptions with a more lyrical and subjective voice: “Soggy volumes in a bookcase. He took one down 
and opened it and then put it back. Everything damp. Rotting. In a drawer he found a candle. No way to light it. He 
put it in his pocket. He walked out in the gray light and stood and he saw for a brief moment the absolute truth of the 
world. The cold relentless circling of the intestate earth. Darkness implacable. The blind dogs of the sun in their 
running. The crushing black vacuum of the universe” (130). 
 
5 The utopian impulse is thus a fraught and controversial hermeneutic category—the primary danger is that almost 
anything can be interpreted as a utopian impulse, when to spread the utopian category so widely is to risk making it 
less meaningful. Jameson notes this when he writes that “To see traces of the Utopian impulse everywhere, as Bloch 





the text thematizes this content as “good” and then frames it as a sign of concrete utopian 
possibility.  
The Utopianism of Monsters in Perdido Street Station 
The Bas-Lag Trilogy borrows from a wide range of genres, but it is above all a work of 
fantasy, and its utopianism is thoroughly imbricated with its fantastical elements. The fantasy 
genre has not always enjoyed a reputable status within utopian studies. Darko Suvin famously 
described it as a “subliterature of mystification” in Metamorphoses of Science Fiction (1979), 
and notable critics reinforced this judgment over the subsequent decades (9).6 China Miéville has 
been an important voice in the pushback against this stigma. In a 2013 talk titled “Marxism and 
Halloween,” he offered a compelling argument for celebrating the fantastical on historical 
materialist grounds. Central to this argument is the distinction between a pragmatic Marxism that 
partakes of post-Enlightenment rationalism and a “Gothic Marxism” that spotlights the limits and 
elisions of that rationalism. According to Margaret Cohen, whom Miéville cites in his talk, a 
major feature of Gothic Marxism is its “valorization of the realm of a culture’s ghosts and 
phantasms as a significant and rich field of social production rather than a mirage to be 
dispelled” (11). Contrary to more secular and “scientific” Marxisms hostile to the supernatural, 
Gothic Marxism affirms the political importance of images of alterity. 
Miéville claims that what lies outside of human knowledge is “awe and dread” 
(“Halloween”), and that to dismiss the cultural images of this awe and dread is to be complicit 
 
6 For instance, Fredric Jameson’s chapter “The Great Schism” in Archaeologies builds on Suvin’s definitions while 
nuancing them, offering a comparatively more positive reading of fantasy while ultimately reinforcing the 






with rationalism’s erasure of the chasm between knowledge and reality. This is one of the pillars 
of Miéville’s Marxist argument for the political utility of monsters.7 Their radical alterity 
subverts the rationalist pretension to know the universe: as figures of the unknown and 
unknowable, monsters enact a subversion of bourgeois epistemologies that is relatable to Marxist 
ideology critique. Essential to this argument is what Miéville calls the abcanny. The abcanny is 
Miéville’s response to what he sees as the inadequacy of the Freudian uncanny as an ontology 
for the monstrous. The uncanny is that in which the familiar and the unfamiliar cohabitate. The 
abcanny is that which resides wholly beyond knowledge and recognition; it is, in Miéville’s 
words, that which “we did not know, never knew, could not know, that has always been and will 
always be unknowable” (“On Monsters” 380). The abcanny surfaces frequently in Miéville’s 
fiction, which teems with creatures and phenomena that elude description and that are never fully 
explained within the texts. 
To understand the politics of the abcanny, it must be put in conversation with another key 
concept in Miéville’s thought. The abcanny, after all, is not the only alterity dwelling in the 
preconceptual space beyond knowledge: this is also the sea in which utopia is islanded. In his 
essay “The Limits of Utopia,” Miéville acknowledges the most fundamental quandary of utopian 
thought when he writes that “if we take utopia seriously, as a total reshaping, its scale means we 
can’t think it from this side” (25). In October, his account of the Russian Revolution, Miéville 
describes this ethos of unsayability and deferral as a “political via negativa, an apophatic 
 
7 The other, more obvious reason why Miéville insists on the importance of monsters is their historically ubiquitous 
use as a trope in racist, sexist, and classist discourses. According to Miéville, such reactionary usages need to be 
rigorously criticized, and the figure of monstrousness needs to be appropriated and mobilized toward the more 





revolutionism” (305). Negative utopianism is woven through Miéville’s fiction and non-fiction, 
and while he never explicitly links this strain of thought to the abcanny, I argue that the 
imbrication of these concepts is constitutive of his aesthetic in the Bas-Lag Trilogy.  
A moment in Miéville’s essay “Close to the Shore” models this aesthetic by hybridizing 
two influential figurations of the utopian idea. One of these is Walter Benjamin’s angel of 
history, propelled into the future by the storm of progress even as he struggles against its 
momentum and seeks to “make whole what has been smashed” (“Theses” 257). The other is 
Ursula K. Le Guin’s porcupine, which she borrows from the Swampy Cree phrase “I go 
backward, look forward, as the porcupine does” (“A Non-Euclidean” 171). Miéville notes the 
contrasting directionality of these images. Benjamin’s angel moves into the future while gazing 
into the past; Le Guin’s porcupine moves into the past while gazing into the future. True to his 
fascination with hybridity, Mieville combines these images into a monstrous figure of utopian 
praxis: “Our utopianism is always-already a chimera. Angelus erethizon: a porcupine with 
celestial wings; a seraph bristling with spines […] It will move, perhaps, as it is just possible we 
might, with a new motion neither and both animal and divine” (“Close” 9). The utopian and the 
abcanny are domesticated the moment they are concretized into an image, but Miéville resists 
this through images that strain toward a strangeness resistant to classification, suggested here in 
the ambiguous dialectic of the “animal and divine.” As Miéville writes in “The Limits of 
Utopia,” “What utopias are are new Rorschachs. We pour our concerns and ideas out, and then in 
dreaming we fold the paper to open it again and reveal startling patterns” (25). Miéville’s 
utopian/abcanny images are hybridic, transgressive, and profoundly strange. They look like 





To situate this aesthetic among the approaches to utopian content outlined in the previous 
section, it is useful to note the continuities between Gothic Marxism’s interest in the politics 
encoded in “a culture’s ghosts and phantasms” and Bloch’s insistence on the ubiquity of utopian 
impulses animating unlikely cultural productions. The utopian impulse is legible as a surplus in 
the image that exceeds its most literal or obvious meaning; by seizing upon this hidden surplus of 
meaning, the critic can unlock a subversive reading of the image that rescues it from its 
ideological function. The utopian/abcanny images in Miéville’s work, especially Perdido Street 
Station, are usually monsters that perform a literal role in the novel’s plot and setting while also 
functioning figuratively as signs of the “awe and dread” beyond knowledge, language, and 
ideology. Strangeness and hybridity, as exemplified by the angelic porcupine, are important 
features of the monstrous image, but equally important is the aesthetic through which this alterity 
is mediated. In Perdido Street Station, Miéville represents monsters through what I will call an 
aesthetic of excess, one that consists of exhaustive descriptions that never aggregate into 
totalizing images of the monsters. These profuse descriptions are the primary means by which 
the novel inscribes political meaning onto the monstrous body, but the failure of these 
descriptions to ever add up to a totalizing image preserves the monster’s alterity. The monster 
thus serves as an ideal figure for the utopian/abcanny. 
New Crobuzon, the greatest city-state in the fantasy world of Bas-Lag, is a teeming, 
industrial metropolis populated by humans and a diversity of humanoid “xenian” species. 
Perdido Street Station opens with a traveler emerging from the wilderness and gazing upon the 
city for the first time, describing it with a blend of rapture and revulsion: 
Its light wells up around the surrounds, the rock hills, like bruise-blood. Its dirty 





and dark walls, squat churches like troglodytic things […] What trick of 
topography is this, that lets the sprawling monster hide behind corners to leap out 
at the traveller? It is too late to flee. (2) 
 
Here, as in the rest of the trilogy, Miéville’s imagery is sensual and grotesque. The city is like a 
bruise, a network of veins, a crowd of “troglodytic things.” This accumulation of likenesses 
aggregates into an assertion not of similarity, but of identity: simile becomes metaphor. The city 
is a “sprawling monster.” 
 The monstrous New Crobuzon is a dystopia that, to apply Margaret Atwood’s words, 
contains a “latent” utopia within it (In Other 66). Perdido Street Station is largely about the signs 
of this latency. The novel presents the city’s governance, economy, urban geography, 
demographics, and so on as generating a wide range of social contradictions. The city’s diversity 
produces both xenophobia and cosmopolitanism, racial hatred and interracial solidarity; its 
nascent capitalist economy generates both exploitation and labor unionism; its geographic 
congestion results in both urban squalor and vibrant, interconnected communal spaces. It is the 
last of these points that leads Christopher Kendrick to describe the city as having an “immense 
utopian appeal […] for all its considerable violence and disorder” (“Socialism” 15). The brutality 
of the city’s authoritarian government, working in tandem with organized crime rings and the 
major companies, actively suppresses this potential, which remains legible in the constellation of 
utopian impulses scattered across the city’s socio-spatial landscape. 
 As noted above, however, Miéville also inscribes these politics onto the bodies of literal 
monsters, such that these monsters become figures for social processes and political formations. 
Steven Shaviro’s 2002 article “Capitalist Monsters,” for instance, influentially argues that the 





criticism is undoubtedly right to emphasize the novel’s anti-capitalism, but it risks overlooking 
the utopian impulses embedded in these critical elements. This is why Kendrick’s comment 
about New Crobuzon’s “immense utopian appeal” is important—it registers that the city’s 
“violence and disorder” are dialectically paired with countervailing utopian tendencies generated 
by the same set of social preconditions (“Socialism” 15). 
Perhaps the clearest example of this aesthetic logic in which the monstrous, the 
capitalistic, and the utopian converge is a description of New Crobuzon’s most representative 
citizen: a Remade mob boss named Mr. Motley. “Remaking” is a punitive measure practiced by 
New Crobuzon’s authoritarian government. Criminals, dissidents, and so forth are sent to 
“punishment factories” where their bodies are surgically altered, most often through the addition 
of animal and/or mechanical parts. The logic of Remaking is usually straightforwardly punitive. 
A Remaking might make the performance of daily tasks exceedingly painful or difficult, or the 
Remaking might reflect the individual’s crime in some way. Sometimes, because the Remade are 
used for slave labor, a Remaking might make an individual’s body more suited to a particular 
kind of manual labor. 
The most monstrous case of Remaking in the trilogy is undertaken willingly, and for 
aesthetic rather than punitive reasons. Motley has paid to have his body Remade so thoroughly 
that it has become a hybridic assemblage of organic parts that the novel only describes in 
fragments. Readers first encounter Motley through Lin, an artist whom Motley commissions to 
create a sculpture of him: 
Scraps of skin and fur and feathers swung as he moved; tiny limbs clutched; eyes 
rolled from obscure niches; antlers and protrusions of bone jutted precariously; 
feelers twitched and mouths glistened. Many-coloured skeins of skin collided. A 





each other in violent currents. Muscles tethered by alien tendons to alien bones 
worked together in uneasy truce, in slow, tense motion. Scales gleamed. Fins 
quivered. Wings fluttered brokenly. Insect claws folded and unfolded. (42) 
 
The grammatical parsing of this passage into staccato independent clauses reflects the 
fragmentation of Motley’s body and the fitful nature of Lin’s apprehension of it. Her gaze does 
not linger on any one of his parts; it instead skips from fragment to fragment, all of which are in 
motion (note the recurring subject-verb structure and the scarcity of objects). This is not a 
sustained contemplation of a static object, but rather a dynamic and failing effort to perceive 
something that continually frustrates perception. Importantly, this paragraph-long description, 
vivid and detailed as it is, gives very little sense of what Motley actually looks like.8 What this 
passage dramatizes is the chasm between phenomenology and ontology, the incommensurability 
of the perception with an object that exceeds it. Miéville undertakes the paradoxical task of 
describing the indescribable through a representational procedure of expansive—even 
compulsive—description that fails to aggregate into any coherent image of its object. What this 
self-conscious failure of representation communicates is sheer alterity.9 
 Motley’s body is an example of the abcanny because it is a totality that cannot be 
conveyed as such in language, or apprehended as such by the perceiving subject, who can only 
 
8 Motley notably insists of his body later in the novel “This is totality” (115). 
 
9 Miéville sometimes represents the abcanny through an aesthetic minimalism that declines description of the 
abcanny object and instead defaults to thematic reflections on its indescribability. In another early moment in 
Perdido Street Station, the protagonist Isaac Dan der Grimnebulin describes a region of Bas-Lag called the 
Cacotopic Stain, which was transformed years before by a deadly supernatural force called “the Torque.” The 
region, he says, is populated by “things I wouldn’t even bother trying to describe […it] makes a total mockery of our 
sentience […] the Torque is unknowable” (232). Here, we see a minimalism that does not seek to describe the 
indescribable object, but that instead underscores its indescribability as its defining characteristic. This is not, 






respond to it with “astonishment and terror” (42), and a frantic and failing effort to comprehend 
it.10 Carl Freedman’s reading of Perdido Street Station politicizes Motley’s body by treating it as 
a figure for global capitalism. He writes that “the almost unimaginable Motley […] personifies 
the increasing multiplication of commodities during the current epoch […] As capital becomes 
more and more nearly ubiquitous, it becomes […] more and more difficult to see or grasp” (38). 
Freedman’s reading illuminates an aesthetic continuity between Miéville’s representation of 
monstrousness and his representation of capitalism, one which is clearly apt given Motley’s role 
in the plot as an organized crime boss allied with New Crobuzon’s government and its 
capitalists. William Burling has made a similar argument, claiming that “the collective details of 
[Motley’s] physical appearance serve as a metaphor for the nearly incomprehensible 
complexities of capitalism” (334). What these readings omit is the way that this same aesthetic 
organizes Miéville’s treatment of a third ungraspable totality: utopia. Motley is a capitalist 
monster, in Shaviro’s terminology, but he is also a utopian monster.  
 Motley does not figure global capitalism and utopia in separate moments; he instead 
figures the latency of the latter within the former, and in that sense, he is a synecdoche for New 
Crobuzon, itself. What makes Motley an embodiment of capitalism? As Freedman notes, 
Motley’s body is an assemblage of commodities insofar as he bought them and paid for their 
surgical attachment (38). Given that each part (wings, scales, fins, and so on) is itself a 
synecdoche for one of Bas-Lag’s xenian species, he represents the commodification of cultural 
and racial difference under global capitalism. The riotous cacophony among these parts, as in the 
 
10 Lin’s “astonishment and terror” echoes the “awe and dread” that Miéville associates in “Marxism and Halloween” 





line “Tides of flesh washed against each other in violent currents,” figures New Crobuzon’s 
interspecies violence, and more broadly the racial tensions that ensue when multiculturalism and 
diversity are contained within a global capitalist system that foments economic competition 
between races and nations. 
Around the same time that Miéville was writing Perdido Street Station, Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri argued that while global capitalism is extractive and exploitative, it also 
establishes the conduits of trade and communication that, if democratized and put in service of 
“the multitude,” could provide the infrastructure for an interconnected and multicultural world 
organized on a more equitable basis than that afforded by capitalism.11 Motley’s body valorizes 
the species-differences that in New Crobuzon occasion so much xenophobia and violence. 
Irreducible difference and diversity are, here, constitutive of wholeness. This diversity is not 
organized hierarchically—in the description excerpted above, there are no locational markers. 
Miéville democratizes the metaphor of body as polity by making Motley into a chaotic 
intermingling of parts, none of which are subordinated to any other. And, as Motley himself 
insists, this chaos constitutes an aesthetic unity.12 There are reasons to take this assertion 
seriously, despite the fact that Motley is one of the novel’s chief villains. His soliloquies about 
the aesthetics of the “hybrid zone” are metacommentaries on the composition of the novel itself 
 
11 See Empire (2000). 
 
12 There is a utopian impulse, too, in Motley’s bending of Remaking to aesthetic ends. Derkhan, an art critic and 
writer for a revolutionary newspaper called Runagate Rampant, tells Isaac at one point that writing about art and 
revolution is “the same thing […art is] a bringing together of…of everything around you into something that makes 
you more human, more khepri, whatever. More of a person. Even with Remaking a germ of that survives” (94). This 
appropriation of Remaking—a torturous instrument of the state—as a metaphor for art and revolution is elaborated 






(41), and these principles, as indicated above, are also essential to the novel’s utopian content. 
The utopian impulses of Motley’s body are suppressed by the character’s more loathsome 
qualities, just as the utopian impulses of New Crobuzon are suppressed by its authoritarianism, 
inequality, and so on.  
 As this analogy between New Crobuzon and Motley suggests, Perdido Street Station’s 
utopian content manifests on at least two textual levels: the literal social struggles that occupy 
one of its major subplots, centered on a strike of vodyanoi dock-workers, and the metaphoric 
encoding of these struggles in the primary narrative of monster hunting.13 These plots have 
different outcomes, however. The vodyanoi strike is brutally suppressed by the militia, and a 
separate militia detachment concurrently raids the headquarters of the dissident newspaper 
Runagate Rampant, destroying the press and arresting its leader. There is little indication that 
radical social change is possible in New Crobuzon’s near-future, and the city’s utopian impulses 
remain dormant. Perdido Street Station’s approach to navigating the representational problems 
posed by radical social change is to shift the primary locus of utopian content from the strike 
plot, which ends midway through the novel, to the monster-hunting plot. As Freedman and 
Kendrick have argued, this is not a shift away from political engagement but rather a resituating 
of the novel’s politics in its metaphorical structures, where the overturning of capitalism can be 
enacted figuratively (Art 41, “Socialism” 20). 
The monster-hunting narrative follows Isaac, a scientist and inventor, as he seeks to 
destroy the slake-moths that he unwittingly helped to unleash upon the city. Slake-moths are 
large, winged insects with kaleidoscopic patterns on their wings that they use to hypnotize their 
 





prey. The slake-moths feed on dreams. Their wings, in the words of one character, “tap the 
frequencies of the dreams that are…ah…bubbling under the surface of the sentient mind. They 
focus them, draw them out into the surface” (374). Once the dreams have been brought to the 
“surface” of the victim’s mind, the slake-moth drinks them, leaving behind a zombified body 
drained of sentience. The slake-moths were brought to New Crobuzon as part of a government 
research project, but when their management proves to be too dangerous and costly, the 
government sells them to Motley. Motley values the slake-moths because their feces—the 
invisible residue of digested dreams—is an ingredient in a potent hallucinogenic drug called 
“dreamshit,” which allows the user to experience the dreams of the slake-moth’s victims. A 
complicated series of events results in Isaac acquiring a caterpillar that, unbeknownst to him, is a 
slake-moth in its larval stage. When the caterpillar metamorphoses into a mature slake-moth, it 
escapes from its enclosure and rescues the slake-moths then being held by Motley, and they 
begin to prey upon the city’s populace. As they fly about digesting their meals, the slake-moths’ 
feces rain down upon the city, fertilizing the population’s sleep and causing an epidemic of 
nightmares that creates further sustenance for the slake-moths. 
 Isaac and his companions ultimately destroy the slake-moths by using the novel’s 
primary science fictional conceit: crisis energy. Crisis energy is a latent force inhering in all 
matter that is generated out of the tensions within it. According to the ontology of crisis theory, 
reality itself is constituted by unstable tensions between contradictory forces.14 Isaac builds a 
crisis engine, a machine designed to harness crisis energy, and uses it to kill the slake-moths. 
 
14 The real-world referent for this theory is dialectical materialism, which asserted, among other things, that nature is 
organized dialectically. This invocation of dialectical materialism carries a complicated history with it, given that 





Shaviro, Freedman, and Kendrick have all found a robust anti-capitalist politics encoded in this 
narrative. Freedman reads the slake-moths as metaphors for capitalist production, likening their 
predatory consumption of dreams to capitalism’s consumption of the productive capacities of the 
infinitely replaceable worker. Freedman describes this as “the vampiric function of capital, 
sucking the creative powers and ultimately the life out of the wage-earning proletariat” (33). In 
Kendrick’s similar argument, the zombified slake-moth victim is the consumer of a thoroughly 
commodified mass culture. He likens the slake-moths to “television, or more generally, the 
culture industry”: a medium for ideological spectacles that deaden the subject’s creative and 
critical faculties (“Monster Realism” 270). Importantly, for both Freedman and Kendrick, the 
capitalist monsters are undone by the dialectical force of the crisis engine. The dialectic destroys 
capitalism. 
 The struggle against capitalism fails in the strike plot only to be sublimated into the 
metaphorical relations of the monster-hunting plot, where the opposite outcome is achieved. As 
Kendrick argues, “the moth plot is only a continuation by other, broader fantastic means of the 
social struggle for the city. It thus helps to make Isaac’s crew […] legible as a working-class 
alliance, and its rescue of the city’s imagination an epiphany of class consciousness” 
(“Socialism” 20). I will add to this that the slake-moth plot also dramatizes the limitations of a 
Marxist politics organized primarily by anti-capitalist critique. As is true of Motley, the slake-
moths are capitalist monsters, but they also have other referents that need to be identified in 
order to clarify the novel’s utopianism.  
While the novel’s descriptions of the slake-moths are more comprehensive than the 





that one reason why the slake-moths are so difficult to kill is that they “live in several planes” in 
addition to the material (379). The descriptions on the page only apply to one of their planar 
embodiments. As is true of Motley, the slake-moths are overdetermined figurative intersections 
for the abcanny, for capitalism, and for utopia. The novel’s first description of a slake-moth 
occurs when the one Isaac has been raising escapes from its cage and hypnotizes Isaac’s 
colleague, Lublamai. Miéville writes of the slake-moth’s wings that “They were irregular, 
chaotic in shape, random fluid whorls; but mirror-perfect left and right, like spilt ink or paint 
patterns on folded paper” (254). Compare this to the quotation excerpted above from Miéville’s 
“The Limits of Utopia”: “What utopias are are new Rorschachs. We pour our concerns and ideas 
out, and then in dreaming we fold the paper to open it again and reveal startling patterns.” 
Miéville uses the same image to describe the dream-stirring patterns on the slake-moth’s wings 
and the Rorschach-like contours of utopian alterity. This parallel, regardless of any intentionality 
on Miéville’s part, can catalyze questions about how the slake-moths’ wings, full of beautiful 
and shifting patterns that stimulate the subject’s dreams, might carry more positive political 
meanings. 
 Kendrick’s comparison of the slake-moths to television and the culture industry is 
particularly useful, here. In this reading, the moths are figures for a mass culture that lures the 
subject into consumption of cultural productions saturated by ideology. As Bloch has argued, 
however, even the most degraded and commodified of cultural productions contain utopian 
impulses. An example of this is his argument about advertisements.15 The advertisement’s cheap 
and tawdry appeal to desire as a way of motivating commodity consumption has a utopian 
 





impulse within it. The advertisement channels the subject’s dissatisfaction with his or her 
conditions of existence into desire for a commodity that will ostensibly satisfy the subject’s 
want. When the acquisition of the commodity does not, in fact, allay the desire, the cycle begins 
again. The structure of feeling that the advertisement elicits is, at its core, utopian. It is 
predicated on a desire for betterment, on the subject’s recognition of lack in his or her current 
condition and the subsequent will to fulfill that lack through action. The problem is that this 
structure of feeling is commandeered by consumerism, such that its energy is redirected into 
channels that perpetuate capitalism rather than challenging it. Commodity culture thus works “to 
transform every real and possible need into a weakness” (Bloch 344). 
There is a similar process at work in the slake-moths’ relationship to their victims’ 
dreams. The slake-moths are indeed monstrous embodiments of television and of mass culture, 
but the utopian impulses within these phenomena are preserved in their inscription onto the 
monstrous body. When Miéville uses the Rorschach image as a metaphor for utopian production, 
he differentiates between two stages of creation: 1) the pouring of ideas onto the page, and 2) the 
dreaming that folds the paper in two and then opens it to “reveal startling patterns.” It is the 
process of dreaming that injects the utopian vision with strangeness and alterity, that makes it 
both more and less than a blueprint.16 The slake-moths stimulate this creative potential that could 
be mobilized toward positive ends, but they then siphon it off and leave behind a living corpse: a 
figure for the subject whose creative capacities are drained by capitalist production and whose 
desires for a better life are channeled into consumerism. 
 
16 Miéville is not the only author to use dreaming as a metaphor for utopian production—the most famous example 






 To identify Perdido Street Station’s capitalist monsters as simultaneously being utopian 
monsters is to see them as constituted by contradiction and, in the language of the novel, crisis. 
Crisis theory states that the ontology of things is dialectical, that things have a natural tendency 
to become their opposites. New Crobuzon and its monsters are all defined in the time-present of 
the narrative by capitalism, but they contain its suppressed opposite as well. The utopian 
impulses documented above are signs of this subordinated opposite that everything in the novel 
tends toward. 
In Perdido Street Station, it is the activation of crisis that leads to the metaphorical 
destruction of capitalism. The crisis that Isaac initiates involves two of the novel’s monstrous 
characters: the Weaver, a massive interdimensional spider who performs a sort of aesthetic 
maintenance on the fabric of reality, and the Construct Council, a self-aware network of robots. 
The Weaver’s interventions in reality are organized by an esoteric aesthetic sense that to human 
perception is aimless and inscrutable, and it speaks in a roiling, unmediated stream of 
consciousness. “For the Weaver,” Isaac realizes, “dreams and consciousness were one” (630). 
The Construct Council is the Weaver’s psychological opposite. Its calculations are rational and 
amoral. Isaac feeds these two psychic streams into his crisis engine, where they encounter a third 
input: the consciousness of a dying man named Andrej. The crisis is initiated when the engine 
registers that the Weaver/Council inputs, taken additively as one consciousness constituted by 
dreams and rationality, is both identical and not identical to Andrej’s consciousness. Analyzing 
the relationship between these inputs, “the crisis engine arrived at two simultaneous conclusions: 
x=y+z; and x≠y+z. The operation that had been carried out was profoundly unstable. It was 





Weaver, the Council, nor the various human and xenian characters succeed independently in 
destroying the slake-moths. When Isaac routes all these inputs through the crisis engine, 
however, they unleash an unimaginable power that explodes the capitalist monsters. 
 Dreams and rationality: this combination evokes Miéville’s advocacy for a Gothic 
Marxism that welds the tradition’s scientific aspirations to a recognition of the importance of 
societies’ dreamworlds. Crucially, however, this dialectic is translated into praxis only when 
brought into contact with a proletarian subject (Andrej). This conclusion figuratively enacts the 
destruction of capitalism that fails in the novel’s strike plot, but this does not lead to any change 
in social relations in New Crobuzon, itself. Isaac and his companions have saved the city, but 
they are then forced to flee from the New Crobuzon militia and from Motley’s henchmen. The 
conclusion is bittersweet, and it is important to note that there is no discernible utopian 
orientation to the narrative’s conclusion. In the literal social world of the novel, the dominance of 
New Crobuzon’s authoritarian capitalist ruling class remains intact. In the monster-hunting plot, 
capitalism has been detonated, but so have the latent utopian impulses within it. This is a novel 
about the crisis energy inhering in global capitalism, its precipitous inclination toward its latent 
utopian opposite. The destruction of the slake-moths metaphorically undoes this crisis. 
 The aftermath of the final confrontation with the slake-moths suggests that the Weaver, at 
least, sees something lost in their destruction. Isaac looks down on the slake-moth corpses and 
sees that “Their wings had faded to a pale, drab dun, without pattern or variation” (654), and the 
Weaver suggests “PATTERNS INHERE EVEN IN THESE THE VORACIOUS ONES 
PERHAPS I JUDGE QUICK AND SLICK TASTES FALTER AND ALTER AND I AM 





recognizes his kinship with the slake-moths and recognizes patterns of dynamic possibility even 
in the murderous/voracious slake moths [as] fragments of immanent utopian potential” (253). 
This reading is part of Rankin’s larger argument that the Weaver is a utopian figure and that “we 
need not only rational, strategic Marxism, but also Bloch’s weird speculative philosophy, a 
vastly hopeful Marxist philosophy” (249). These traditions, the novel indicates, complement 
each other. The Weaver is unable to defeat the slake-moths on its own: it is only when the 
Weaver’s dream-consciousness is joined with the Construct Council’s AI-consciousness that it is 
able to initiate the crisis. This is a Marxism in which the irrational and the rational are bound 
together in a dialectical unity, and in which neither element dominates the other.  
 The aesthetic excess of Perdido Street Station primarily works by overdetermining its 
settings, monsters, and so on to reveal the utopian impulses within them. The utopian content, 
here, consists of these impulses scattered across the social and metaphorical landscapes of the 
storyworld.17 It engages the utopian idea through understated and even covert means, lending it a 
minimal degree of content while refraining from any large-scale act of construction. Where 
Perdido Street Station differs from, for instance, On Such a Full Sea is in its comparatively 
closed ending, which lacks the optimistic orientation toward utopia of the other novel. In the 
terms of Chapters One and Two, the novel is rigorously dialectical, but it is not anticipatory. Its 
utopian dialectics terminate in the novel’s conclusion in stasis and an apparently thorough 
 
17 There are moments in Perdido Street Station that prefigure the more robust acts of utopian construction in The 
Scar and Iron Council, however. It includes numerous scattered descriptions of communities beyond and within 
New Crobuzon with varying political charges, some of them positive. Perhaps the most notable of these occurs early 
in the narrative, when a character describes garuda social organization. The garuda are a winged humanoid species 
seemingly related to eagles; they live in a desert region where they practice a form of egalitarianism based on a 
value system that takes individual choice as its organizing principle. Such constructive moments occur on a small 






reinscription of the oppressive status quo. Perdido Street Station should therefore be understood 
as the first stage of the Bas-Lag Trilogy’s experiment in utopian discourse; it shows that for 
utopian content to function as a sign of hope and possibility, it must be organized within an 
anticipatory historical (and narrative) temporality. 
The Scar, Iron Council, and the Route(s) to Utopia 
I devote more space in this chapter to the New Crobuzon-centered novels in the trilogy 
due to their continuities of plot, setting, and theme, but the second novel, The Scar, also 
contributes to the trilogy’s utopian project in ways that bear mentioning here. In generic terms, 
The Scar is Perdido Street Station’s opposite: a utopia rather than a dystopia. Here, however, I 
emphasize the novels’ discursive similarity due to their mutual positioning of their utopian 
contents—different though they are—within temporalities that cast doubt on the possibility of 
radically positive social change. 
Bellis Coldwine, the protagonist of The Scar, is a former lover of Isaac Dan der 
Grimnebulin fleeing New Crobuzon upon learning that Isaac’s friends and colleagues are being 
arrested and questioned by the city militia. She boards a ship bound for a colony of New 
Crobuzon called Nova Esperium, but, en route to the colony, the ship is commandeered by 
pirates from the floating city of Armada. In Armada, Bellis and her fellow passengers find a 
relatively egalitarian society that ignores the caste-distinction between Remade and “whole” that 
organizes much of social life in New Crobuzon. 
Built of hundreds of ships lashed together with ropes and walkways and organized into a 
federation of semi-autonomous boroughs called “ridings,” Armada slowly chugs its way through 





however, is a society enabled by a particular set of historical determinants—namely, the fact that 
Bas-Lag is just entering its colonial period, and there are still many blank, or at least hazy, spaces 
on New Crobuzon’s maps of the globe.18 Armada is by far the most fully realized “good” society 
in the trilogy, and the novel is largely about its material conditions of possibility. These, 
Freedman argues, are endangered by the rise of capitalism and colonialism, which are beginning 
to establish the durable conduits of trade and communication that will facilitate the gradual 
closure of global space, shrinking the spaces on the map not yet fully incorporated into the 
spheres of influence of New Crobuzon and the other major city-states (64).  
An overlooked feature of the novel is its representation of global space, which continues 
some of the aesthetic patterns of Perdido Street Station. While the earlier novel is preceded by a 
fairly detailed map of New Crobuzon, the later two novels, which are largely set elsewhere in 
Bas-Lag, are conspicuously map-less. Instead, the novel orients its readers and its characters 
through exhaustive narrative descriptions of global space, ones that, reminiscent of the earlier 
novel, are characterized by a performative insufficiency. Space, for the characters as for the 
reader, is discursively constructed. Consider, for instance, Bellis’s reflection on the Gengris, a 
grindylow-controlled region through which New Crobuzon hopes to build a trade route: 
At its easternmost edge, Cold Claw Sea was separated from the saltwater 
of the Swollen Ocean by a tiny strip of land: a ribbon of mountainous rock less 
than thirty miles wide. The sea’s sharp southernmost tip—the point of the talon—
was almost directly north of New Crobuzon, more than seven hundred miles away 
[…] lodged like an impurity in the sea’s jag was an extraordinary, dangerous 
place, something between an island, a half-sunk city, and a myth. An amphibious 
badland about which the civilized world knew next to nothing except that it 
existed and that it was dangerous. (134) 
 
 
18 See Freedman’s chapter on The Scar in Art and Idea and Kendrick’s “Monster Realism” for discussions of The 





There are many passages like this in the novel, where detailed descriptions and quantifications of 
geography slur into myth and speculation. This concern with the discursive construction of space 
allows The Scar not only to replicate a period of “real world” historical change, but also to 
allegorize the generic shift effectuated in the utopian genre by that change. Colonial 
encounters—in the Americas, for instance—initially served as an inspiration and catalyst for 
utopian narratives that placed their utopias in uncolonized regions. Early modern utopias, 
following More’s Utopia (1516), were most often set in remote parts of globe as yet relatively 
unknown to Europeans; Susan Bruce writes that these utopias “insisted on the location in real 
space of the communities they described [and] rejected any temporal relocation” (xii). The 
colonization of global space eventually contributed to a different approach to literary utopian 
production, as temporal rather than spatial dislocation became the genre’s primary mechanism of 
estrangement. 
 The Scar is concerned with how the globe’s increasing consolidation under a totalizing 
economic and political system—a process ominously beginning in Bas-Lag—shrinks the spaces 
in which autonomous utopias can exist or be imagined.19 Bellis understands the consequences of 
this process when she reflects late in the novel that if the city succeeds in taking the Gengris “A 
constellation of places that were so far little more than myth would open to New Crobuzon. With 
trade, colonies, and all that they entailed” (576). The Scar, despite containing the most highly 
developed utopian content in the trilogy—and following the genre conventions of the utopian 
narrative most closely—lacks an anticipatory temporality. The upheavals in Armadan society 
 
19 A reference in Iron Council to the possibility of grindylow serving with the New Crobuzon militia suggests that 





throughout the narrative conclude in a reinscription of the status quo, and this return to normalcy 
is contextualized within a broader historical temporality that casts doubt on the sustainability of 
the Armadan model.20 As Freedman points out, “the pirate utopia of Armada must inevitably be 
a fragile, temporary one […] as imperialism achieves a firmer and firmer grip on the nations and 
sea-routes of Bas-Lag, Armada must, surely, be suppressed eventually” (64). The Scar is only the 
second stage in the trilogy’s utopian project, however. It goes on, in Iron Council, to imagine a 
more dynamic utopianism, one that, instead of struggling to establish and maintain a “good 
place” in the interstices of imperial power, seeks to transform its center.  
Iron Council is a complex mediation between utopian impulse and realized utopian 
society. It centers on the failed efforts of revolutionaries to translate the former into the latter, but 
the novel’s final pages concretize this failure into an image of hope and possibility. Utopia is 
continually being filled with and drained of content throughout Iron Council as it seeks to work 
through trial and error to a vision of the good place that never quite materializes, but that, in the 
final words of the novel, is “always coming” (564). The novel is thus a prolonged effort to 
imagine utopian content while navigating the good place/no place contradiction on which the 
concept of utopia is predicated, modeling utopian discourse within a complex intersection of 
genre conventions that cannot be classified under the traditional rubric of utopia, anti-utopia, and 
dystopia. 
 
20 Sherryl Vint argues that The Scar’s conclusion does, in fact, leave open utopian possibility. This argument is 
based on the role of possibility theory in the novel. She argues that “Tanner’s revolutionary moment thus does not 
mark the end of the novel or the process of social struggle but instead leaves the horizon open to new possibilities” 
(284). Vint compellingly demonstrates that possibility theory has a utopian dimension, but her reading of the 
conclusion is troubled by the fact that Tanner’s uprising prevents Armada from engaging in “possibility mining” and 





Iron Council is divided into thirty-five chapters and ten parts, but there is a more basic 
tripartite organization to the narrative. In the first part, New Crobuzon is on the verge of 
revolution, and a council of revolutionary groups called “the Caucus” is organizing the city’s 
working classes. Judah Low, one of the novel’s protagonists, learns that the government has 
discovered the location of the Iron Council: an egalitarian community that lives on and around a 
perpetually moving train. Judah, followed by a group of friends, leaves the city to warn the Iron 
Council that the militia is pursuing it. This narrative is interwoven with the story of a young 
Caucus-member named Ori, who becomes frustrated with the Caucus’s slow grassroots 
organizing and leaves it to join a group of vigilantes and assassins led by a mysterious figure 
named Toro. The second part of the narrative, titled “Anamnesis: The Perpetual Train,” is a long 
flashback that describes Judah’s backstory and the origins of the Iron Council. Years before the 
main narrative, a New Crobuzon company called the Transcontinental Railroad Trust (TRT) 
sought to build a railroad across the continent to facilitate trade and expand the city’s influence. 
Judah takes part in an uprising of railroad workers who commandeer the train and create an 
egalitarian society around it. The Iron Councilors continually disassemble the tracks behind the 
train and re-lay them ahead of it, so that the train never stops moving and can slowly rove across 
the continent. The final part of the novel narrates the Iron Council’s journey back to New 
Crobuzon as the Caucus morphs into a new entity called the Collective and begins a revolution 
against New Crobuzon’s ruling class. 
There are three social groups, each correlated with a specific praxis, that contribute to 
Iron Council’s utopian content: the stiltspear, the Iron Council, and the Caucus/Collective. None 





by qualities that the novel frames as better than the available alternatives in the storyworld. The 
novel also contains metaphorical relations similar to those described above in Perdido Street 
Station, in which monsters and science fictional concepts become locations for theorizing utopia 
and revolution.  
Of the societies referenced above, the stiltspear appear first, and they are essential to the 
novel’s theorizing of history, imperialism, and the relationship between what Benjamin calls “the 
oppressed past” and utopian programs in the present (“Theses” 263). The “Anamnesis” section 
opens with Judah working as an agent for the TRT. Agents like Judah are sent ahead of the work 
crews to perform ethnographies of the indigenous peoples that the train will eventually encounter 
as it cuts across the continent. Judah is assigned to study the stiltspear—a xenian species of tree-
people who live in a vast wetland southwest of New Crobuzon. After spending time with the 
stiltspear, Judah becomes fascinated with their culture. They live in small tribal units; their 
villages are integrated into the wetland such that they have little impact on the environment, and 
their social relations seem to be relatively peaceful and egalitarian. Their “language is deep-
structured with courtesy. To be rude takes effortful and irregular declensions” (151). Stiltspear 
culture and social relations thus differ radically from New Crobuzon’s, which are embodied most 
immediately by the TRT. The stiltspear have roughly the same relationship to the TRT and New 
Crobuzon that Native American tribes had to, for instance, the Union Pacific Railroad and the 
nineteenth century United States more generally. 
In keeping with Iron Council’s engagement with the genre conventions of the Western, 
Judah evokes the character-type of the male Anglo-American subject who “goes native” upon 





against his fellow colonizers. One problem with this trope is that it tends to involve an uncritical 
romanticizing of the indigenous community that perpetuates stereotypes of the “noble savage” 
variety. This is what Miéville resists, however.21 The stiltspear—murdered, dispossessed, and 
displaced by the TRT—figure modernity’s history of imperial violence, but they are not 
presented in the novel as a replicable model for a utopian society. Their utopian function is more 
complicated. During his ethnography, Judah sees stiltspear children using thaumaturgy—the 
trilogy’s term for practices that are part magic and part science—to create mobile figurines out of 
mud and sticks. Adult stiltspear use a related technique—an intervention in time rather than in 
matter—to catch fish. They perform a rhythmic chant that immobilizes the fish by trapping it in a 
singular moment isolated out of the sequential flow of time. This kind of thaumaturgy is called, 
in the language of the novel, golemetry. Golemetry is the creation of golems: it is an intervention 
in some preexisting substance of reality that shapes it into a particular form and then sets it in 
motion. Judah eventually masters golemetry and uses it as a weapon on behalf of the Iron 
Council; more importantly, as the novel’s primary science fictional conceit, it assumes the role 
performed by crisis energy in Perdido Street Station and becomes a metaphor for revolution. 
Miéville strives here for a meditation on utopia and indigeneity that is more complicated 
and nuanced than that offered by, for instance, Le Guin’s The Word for World is Forest (1976) 
and Always Coming Home (1985), both of which offer societies modelled on Native American 
cultures as relatively straightforward utopian alternatives. Miéville’s intervention in this subset 
of utopian thought affirms its impulses while avoiding its wholesale positioning of utopian hope 
 
21 In his “Marxism and Halloween” talk, Miéville describes James Cameron’s Avatar, probably the most popular 





in a romanticized, non-Western past. In “Close to the Shore,” Miéville pointedly notes that Sir 
Thomas More’s eponymous island has a colonial history. The island that became Utopia was 
once a peninsula with a civilization of its own called Abraxa. King Utopus conquered Abraxa 
and enslaved its inhabitants, using their labor to dig a vast trench sundering the new kingdom, 
Utopia, from the mainland. The interminable recurrence of such processes of conquest and 
renaming throughout real world history leads Miéville to insist that “A start for any habitable 
utopia must be to overturn the ideological bullshit of empire, and, unsentimentally but 
respectfully, to revisit the traduced and defamed cultures on the bones of which some 
conqueror’s utopian dreams were piled up” (7). 
Judah rushes to document stiltspear culture before it disappears forever, but he ultimately 
leaves them to rejoin the TRT and use golemetry to aid the revolution against it. Judah thus 
enacts Miéville’s call to “revisit” and learn from the cultures effaced by imperialism without 
romanticizing them—still, however, putting what he learns in service of a future-oriented praxis. 
This is the meaning of Miéville’s angelic porcupine: utopianism must move forward while 
looking to the past, and move backward while looking to the future, equipped to rescue the 
memory of what has been lost and to remobilize it in the fight for what is to come.  
Golemetry’s metaphorical function is first suggested in the “Anamnesis” section.22 A 
friend of Judah’s who studies golemetry in New Crobuzon’s university describes the practice as 
follows:  
 
22 The stiltspear are, again, an indigenous people who most immediately evoke the Native American tribes 
massacred and displaced by the United States’ western expansion, but golemetry’s real world origin in Judaism also 
needs to be registered. Judah is named after the historical rabbi Judah Loew who legendarily created a golem to 





The unalive, though, is inert because it happens to lie just so. We make it 
meaningful. We do not order it but point out the order that inheres unseen, always 
already there. This act of pointing is at least as much assertion and persuasion as 
observation. We see structure, and in pointing it out we see mechanisms and grasp 
them, and we twist. Because patterns are asserted not in stasis but in change. 
Golemetry is an interruption. It is a subordinating of the static IS to the active 
AM. (205) 
 
As is the case in Perdido Street Station, Miéville’s monsters and science fictional concepts are 
politically overdetermined, even though Iron Council’s telling of revolution is much more literal 
than that of the earlier novel. Golemetry’s metaphorics are similar to those of crisis theory. Both 
golemetry and crisis theory assert that the material world is organized by invisible structures that, 
if properly acted upon, allow the subject to wield immense power. As Judah reflects at one point 
not long before the railroad uprising, “Golemetry’s an argument, an intervention” (208). The 
golem-maker looks upon matter and apprehends the hidden order within it, the patterns by which 
it is organized, the lines of tension and connection. The golemetric “argument,” “persuasion,” or 
“intervention” then urges this matter into a determinate shape and sets it in motion—in defense 
of the oppressed and against the ruling classes. The order of the material entity that can be 
reshaped and urged into motion is analogous to what Marx saw as industrial capitalism’s 
unwitting organization of the working class into socio-spatial coordinates that could, with the 
right catalyst, slip instantaneously from passivity into action, stasis into change.23 
 The TRT relies on both Remade and “free and whole” workers for its project, but the 
former are slaves while the latter work as wage-laborers. When the TRT’s funds begin to 
disappear and payments to the wage-laborers become infrequent, they begin to strike. In one of 
the early strikes against the TRT, when the wage-laborers put down their tools, “Judah stands 
 





among them, ashudder with excitement […] An intervention, he thinks” (221), linking the 
strike’s intervention in the power relations surrounding the train project to golemetry’s 
intervention in the fabric of reality, itself. Ultimately, the work stoppages lead to a moment of 
violent conflict that literalizes the golemetry metaphor. The TRT’s security force is beating a 
Remade boy as a mass of workers looks on, and, as he stands among the workers, “Judah feels 
the thing in him reach out, the oddness and the good in him reach out and push them, and it 
makes him smile even in this blooded heat, and they move” (241). Judah imagines the mass of 
workers as a golem organized and urged into motion by the “good” within him. The workers 
drive off the security force overseeing them, commandeer the train, and flee across the continent, 
engaging in multiple battles with the TRT and the New Crobuzon militia before they 
successfully escape. Judah’s actual golems—made of dirt, railroad ties, and whatever other 
materials lie at hand—are here as elsewhere integral to the revolutionaries’ success. 
 The Iron Councilors level the caste distinction between Remade and “whole.” Most of the 
free wage-laborers flee the train after the uprising, but some, including Judah and his occasional 
lover Ann-Hari, who emerges as the Council’s leader, remain with the Remade. The Councilors 
express comradeship by calling each other “sister,” renouncing the masculinism of the term 
“brother” (265).24 Ann-Hari, evoking Perdido Street Station’s conflation of the monstrous and 
the utopian, describes the uprising as a “Remaking” (251). Remaking is a practice that 
 
24 The invented term “chaver” is also used by the novel’s revolutionaries as a rough equivalent for “comrade.” The 







enmonsters the criminal and the dissident: here the term is appropriated to describe the 
transformation of the oppressive order by the enmonstered underclass.25 
After the Council escapes from the militia, Judah leaves. He returns to New Crobuzon to 
tell the Iron Council’s story: “The truth, escape, a new life, a rolling democracy, Remade 
arcadia” (295). Readers do not learn more about the Council’s social relations until the novel’s 
third part, when Judah, Cutter, and their companions have found the Council in a remote corner 
of the continent. Railroad tracks have been laid down in a huge circle, and the train rolls around 
it slowly and perpetually, “neither sedentary nor nomadic” (341). The neither/nor language is an 
indicator that the utopianism here resembles Jameson’s theory of neutralization, and Cutter’s 
early impressions of the Council reinforce this by repeatedly emphasizing its resistance to 
taxonomy: “There were no cognates of this life. There was nothing like this. […] He could not 
map the alterity he felt. […] These are new people, he thought. They ain’t the same as me. […] I 
didn’t make this place, so it didn’t make me” (346-7). 
 Miéville’s utopias tend to be mobile, but the circular nature of the train’s motion figures 
the Council’s attainment of social stability—a condition similar to Armada’s at the end of The 
Scar. The Iron Council needs to move again in order to save itself from stagnancy, but also, and 
more immediately, to save itself from the approaching militia. The stiltspear, earlier in the novel, 
continued the trilogy’s concern with the closure of global space under imperialism; the Iron 
Council, like the stiltspear and Armada, is another example of a utopian enclave that depends for 
its survival on the existence of spaces not yet integrated into the expanding fields of imperial 
 
25 The metaphor is further elaborated later in the novel as the Collective is forming in New Crobuzon: “The 





power. Judah recognizes this when he tells the Councilors “You couldn’t stay hid forever” (351), 
but he fails to follow this diagnosis to its logical conclusion, instead urging the Councilors to 
hide again—to flee into even more remote reaches of the continent. Earlier in the novel, the 
leader of the Council’s Remade contingent, Uzman, declared that the Council’s decision to run 
from the militia was “Utopian” (253). The alternative that he proposed was for the Council to 
stand its ground in the wilderness while sending messages to the labor unions in New Crobuzon 
urging them to join in the fight, with the goal of profoundly altering social relations in the city. 
He is overruled, however, and the Council flees. Twenty years later, when Judah confronts the 
Council with the same dilemma, the Councilors decide that instead of fleeing imperial power, 
they will join in the effort to overturn it—a decision that follows more logically from Judah’s 
recognition that a society safeguarded by perpetual flight from New Crobuzon’s influence will 
never be sustainable. 
 The trilogy is repeatedly preoccupied by this problem. The utopias it describes are 
relatively small and their existence is precarious, predicated entirely on their geographic isolation 
from the emerging imperial order. A lasting utopianism would, accordingly, have to transform 
that order. This is the final stage of the trilogy’s utopianism: an effort to imagine a utopian 
program that actualizes the utopian impulses of Perdido Street Station while avoiding the 
unsustainability of Armada in The Scar. This effort brings problems of its own, however. Most 
of the New Crobuzon-centered chapters of Iron Council follow the young revolutionary, Ori, 
who has been taking part in underground meetings organized by Runagate Rampant. Runagate 
and the organization built around it are one of the most influential groups in the Caucus, 





grassroots organizing among the working classes aimed at generating mass support for an 
insurrection against New Crobuzon’s ruling class. Ori, frustrated by what he perceives as the 
Runagaters’ passivity and inaction, seeks out and joins a terrorist group led by a masked 
vigilante named Toro. The “Toroans” assassinate, rob, and intimidate wealthy people and 
government officials, substituting violence for the Caucus’s incremental formation of a working-
class movement.26 
The praxis of Toro’s group is framed by the text as a superficial, inorganic, and 
ineffective approach to social change. As Curdin, a prominent Runagater, tells Ori at one point, 
“shock and shooting ain’t enough” (76), and the novel reinforces this in its later chapters, when 
Ori helps Toro to assassinate the Mayor of New Crobuzon only to find that the act had no 
meaningful impact on the class struggle in the city. At this point, the revolution is already 
underway, and the Caucus has become the Collective—an egalitarian and democratic city within 
a city, controlling large swaths of New Crobuzon and beginning to radically reorganize social 
relations within them. The Collective is short-lived, however. It is defeated by the militia before 
the Council can arrive to reinforce it.27 When Cutter is unable to convince the Council to change 
course and flee, avoiding the near-certain demise that awaits them in New Crobuzon, Judah 
prepares a final act of thaumaturgy. He lays mechanisms along the tracks outside the city, and 
when the Iron Council clatters out of the wilderness and toward the waiting army of militia, 
 
26 The historical referents here are forms of praxis such as Blanquism and Narodnik terrorism; see pages 71-72 of 
Freedman’s Art and Idea for a discussion of the latter and its relationship to Leninism. 
 
27 One of the novel’s subplots involves a costly and unpopular war between New Crobuzon and the mysterious city-
state of Tesh. The war is one of the catalysts for the Caucus’s revolution, but when Judah and his companions learn 
of a Tesh plan to destroy the city, their thwarting of the plot has the side-effect of ending the war and allowing the 
New Crobuzon militia to focus on destroying the Collective. The war with Tesh is to the Caucus’s revolution what 





Judah builds a golem out of time. The time golem envelops the train and binds it in “a clot in 
diachrony” (541), a moment isolated out of sequential time within which it is invulnerable. 
 The Iron Council thus becomes what Kendrick describes as a “monument to a revolution 
frozen in time” (“Socialism” 23). Freedman discusses the ethical ambiguity of Judah’s act at 
length, observing that while Judah has likely saved the Council from annihilation, he does so by 
“depriving them of that autonomy of decision-making without which the revolutionary project 
becomes deeply problematic at best” (77). Judah thus embodies the dialectic of individual action 
versus collective praxis elsewhere resolved unambiguously in favor of collective praxis and mass 
democratic action. There are numerous examples of this dialectic throughout the novel—the 
Toro/Caucus opposition is one, but it is also seen in the formation of the Iron Council, when 
“Judah is one of a conclave […] struggling for strategy […] But parallel to them, something 
raucous and collective is emerging” (252-3). It appears again in the early days of the Collective, 
when, as Curdin later recounts, “People on the streets were moving much faster than the Caucus 
[…] We had to run to catch up” (487).  This is also a preoccupation in The Scar. The rebellion of 
the Brucolac and his vampiric followers against Armada’s would-be dictators, though right in its 
motivations, “was a doomed adventure without the people of their own riding behind them” 
(580). This contrasts Tanner Sack’s rebellion at the end of The Scar, which sought the same 
result but in which “there was no chain of command, no order, no hierarchy, nothing but a 
rugged, contingent democracy” (619). 
Just as crisis theory is troubled by its association with dialectical materialism, golemetry 
is troubled by its relationship to Leninist vanguardism and, more broadly, theories of revolution 





metaphorics of golemetry, the proletariat is comparable to unthinking matter controlled wholly 
by the will of the one who animated it: this, arguably, is more a caricature of Leninism than it is 
a figure for democratic revolution.28 Freedman identifies the fantastical elements of the novel as 
“utopian signs—or figures, or placeholders—for social forces whose precise nature cannot yet be 
identified” (81). The more immediate function of these elements, I argue, is to embody already-
existent social forces and political ideas, some long past, that a utopian praxis must grapple with. 
They collectively figure a past strewn with broken utopias. This is the content that the trilogy 
sifts through in order to find fragments of substance and longevity that can be lifted out and used 
to build something new.  
Utopian discourse is predicated on the inscription of its content within an anticipatory 
temporality, its orientation toward a horizon of radical social betterment. This is what 
differentiates Iron Council’s conclusion from the conclusions of Perdido Street Station and The 
Scar. The Collective has been crushed but the Council has been saved, and in such a way that it 
is “always coming” (564). When Cutter asks Judah how long the time golem will hold the 
Council, Judah responds “Don’t know. Perhaps till things are ready” (543), indicating that the 
time golem will eventually expire, releasing the Council back into sequential time at some 
unknowable moment in the future when, perhaps, conditions for revolution will be more 
favorable. And, as Cutter and the Collectivist Madeleina write in Runagate Rampant, “‘Order 
reigns in New Crobuzon!’ You stupid lackeys. Your order is built on sand. Tomorrow the Iron 
 
28 Nicholas Birns notes that while Judah’s overriding of democratic choice is framed ambiguously by the novel, 





Council will move on again, and to your horror it will proclaim with its whistle blaring: We say: 
We were, we are, we will be” (561).  
From Utopia to Uchronia 
The Bas-Lag Trilogy instantiates its utopian content on multiple textual levels. I focus 
here on the trilogy’s representation of imagined societies and on its encoding of utopian ideas in 
its monstrous bodies and science fictional concepts, but much could be said about the trilogy’s 
narrative form, as well. The epilogue to Iron Council, for instance, is narrated by a lyrical 
communal voice that expresses the endurance of collective hope in New Crobuzon even after the 
failure of the revolution: “There we will come to Iron Council. There we will come to the 
perpetual train, truly perpetual now perhaps poised always poised forever just about its wheels 
just about to finish turning” (562). The trilogy is best understood as a massive and diverse 
exercise in utopian discourse that arrives in the final pages of the last novel at an image that 
promises future revolutions. The discussion of utopian content inevitably involves the discussion 
of utopian time. 
Paradoxically, it is a stoppage of time that secures the trilogy’s future-oriented, 
anticipatory temporality.29 The Council is “always coming,” and Cutter and Madeleina write of 
the Council “We were, we are, we will be.” The Council as utopian sign is more than just a future 
possibility—it is something that is always abiding within the social fabric of New Crobuzon. The 
novel affirms the principle that utopianism is an open-ended process while, through this 
 
29 Birns notes the philosophical ambiguity of this moment when he points out that “Judah’s golemized Iron Council 
becomes synchronic and circular—two adjectives that certainly sit ill at ease with Marxism” (208). His comparison 
of the time golem to Benjamin’s angel of history suggests a dialogue between the novel and Benjamin’s 
idiosyncratic Marxism, however, which fixates on moments of historical temporal arrest as moments when 
alternatives become momentarily possible (206). See Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” and the 





experiment in time, trying to articulate a temporality that is not simply linear and progressive. 
Utopian discourse, as I have defined it, is predicated on the narrative’s evocation of a future 
beyond itself, its framing of time and history in such a way that radical social betterment is a 
concrete possibility within the storyworld. This temporality is itself an example, however, of 
how all utopianisms are articulated from within history, with the attendant constraints that 
Jameson and others have documented. How is a utopian temporality of anticipation different 
from conventional linear models of time that have been critiqued from a broad range of 
theoretical angles as bourgeois, teleological, and heteronormative? Can theories of utopian 
futurity be external to or exempt from the thoroughly ideological association between progress 
and historical time? And if we forswear such temporalities altogether, what implications does 








JOURNEY AND RETURN: RECURSIVE TEMPORALITIES 
IN URSULA K. LE GUIN’S CRITICAL UTOPIAS 
 The definition of utopian discourse I have offered thus far is difficult to dissociate from 
concepts of progress and linear time. To describe utopian discourse as anticipatory, dialectical, 
and constructive is to freight it with the ideological baggage discussed at the end of Chapter 
Three, lending credence to Ursula K. Le Guin’s warning that “the utopian imagination is trapped, 
like capitalism and industrialism and the human population, in a one-way future consisting only 
of growth” (“A Non-Euclidean” 173). This is a legacy of nineteenth century shifts in the genre, 
when the closure of global space by imperialism led authors to use dislocation in time rather than 
space as the mechanism for distancing the utopian vision from their audience’s milieu. Unlike 
nineteenth century texts such as Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888), the texts in this 
dissertation do not actually represent the utopian future—they instead represent its conditions of 
possibility while deferring its realization. This is a response to the political and aesthetic 
shortcomings of the older genre utopias, but the contemporary texts nevertheless maintain the 
conventional projection of utopia into the future. What, if anything, rescues utopian discourse 
from the charge that it is infected by capitalist, imperialist, patriarchal, and heteronormative 
patterns of thought and representation? 
 I argue in this chapter that the success of individual texts in contending with these 
associations depends on how they frame what I will describe as the recursive form of utopian 





derived from extant social relations, political theories, or ethical systems. This is a consequence 
of the author’s embeddedness in history: our images of a better future will always be dependent 
on the past they seek to break from. In this chapter, I argue that contemporary utopian discourse 
is distinguished by self-aware interrogations of this condition. Rather than claiming a radical 
novelty of vision, these texts actively represent their utopian content’s reliance on the past. 
Recursion thus becomes an intratextual formal principle that organizes the text’s representations 
of historical time, revolutionary praxis, and utopian social organization. In Cormac McCarthy’s 
The Road and Margaret Atwood’s The Year of the Flood, for instance, characters revise and 
repurpose images and concepts from Christian traditions to articulate alternative modes of social 
relationality. In Chang-rae Lee’s On Such a Full Sea, the communal narrator’s continual 
retellings of Fan’s narrative represent the process by which successive generations reimagine and 
reapply her revolutionary act. We see a similar process in China Miéville’s Iron Council when 
Judah appropriates golemetry from the vanishing indigenous culture of the stiltspear and uses it 
in the struggle against imperialism and capitalism. 
 All of these texts project the author’s condition onto the characters, such that the 
characters excavate the storyworld’s past for content that can be reimagined within the context of 
the present and then repurposed in service of new struggles for emancipation. This, in part, is an 
answer to Jameson’s theory of ideological closure—these texts reconceptualize the role of 
history in utopian production in more positive terms, and they use this as a counterweight to the 
progress- and future-oriented tendencies I have discussed in previous chapters. In these texts, 
moving forward into a better future is a function of looking to the past. I focus in this chapter on 





and non-teleological terms. This project is predicated on a range of recursive forms that organize 
the texts’ narrative arcs, representations of social change, and meditations on the nature of time 
and history. Rather than denying or struggling against the past, these novels embrace it and 
frame it as indispensable to any effort in the present to forge a utopian future. I conclude the 
chapter by using these readings of Le Guin to question the value of theory and criticism that 
defines utopian discourse in terms of its limitation by an inherited political imaginary.  
History and Narrative Time 
As in the previous chapters, I will track recursive forms as they manifest on various 
textual levels; in Le Guin’s novels, they are uniquely pervasive, organizing the texts’ narrative 
arcs, representations of history and political praxis, and meditations on the nature of time. Darko 
Suvin’s bifurcated schema for analyzing temporality in speculative fiction narratives is a useful 
starting point for this discussion, as it is predicated on the conventional opposition between 
linear and cyclical models of time that Le Guin seeks to complicate. 
Suvin frames this opposition as the difference between “epic” and “mythic” constructions 
of time, and he argues that these differing temporalities can be used to demarcate the formal 
spectrum on which most speculative fiction texts are situated. For Suvin, epic time is diachronic 
and historical. The epic narrative explores the storyworld’s social, political, and economic 
relations, and it affirms the possibility for these relations to be changed over time through 
individual and collective action. These narratives generally have open-ended conclusions that 
facilitate the projection of the text’s “novum”—its utopian content—into the future. The epic 
narrative, Suvin writes, is a 
chronicling of a unique series of events […] instead of and as opposed to the 





choices of the “epic” novel, teleologically connected with the unforeseeable 
outcome of the story […] will refuse the mythological homeomorphy where all 
cycles and all agents are, centrally, such transformations of each other which can 
bring forth neither truly new values nor a hesitation as to the empirical success of 
existing values. (Positions 78) 
 
Epic narratives present history—the changing of societies and of subjects—as a contingent and 
undetermined process unfolding through comprehensible and verisimilar relations of cause and 
effect. This is consistent with how my first three chapters have defined utopian discourse, which 
represents history as a dynamic process and defers narrative closure in order to accommodate 
utopian hope and possibility. This conception of history has, arguably, a teleological orientation 
that imbricates it with concepts of progress and linear time. Suvin ascribes complex forms and 
trajectories to epic narratives, describing them as “flowing, eddying, meandering and rushing 
forth” (Positions 77), but he also casts these movements as being “teleologically connected” to 
the conclusion. Taken collectively, these descriptions ascribe a range of possible shapes and 
movements to epic narratives while always enclosing these within a general trajectory from Point 
A to Point B. 
Mythic narratives, by contrast, always return to Point A. As the quotation above 
indicates, mythic time is synchronic and cyclical. It is organized by a “homeomorphy where all 
cycles and all agents are […] transformations of each other.” The myth has no mooring in 
historical time, and any represented social relations are abstract and lacking in substance. The 
world simply is the way that it is. The mythic narrative, therefore, must always return to where it 
began with nothing having fundamentally changed. The heliotropism that orients everything in 
the narrative toward this point of departure/arrival warps relationships of cause and effect out of 





example of this in modern science fiction is Isaac Asimov’s short story “Nightfall” (1941), 
which describes an alien world with six suns in which night occurs only once every two thousand 
and forty-nine years. When this happens, it unleashes a panic that destroys civilization. The 
survivors then rebuild civilization only for the process to repeat itself two millennia later. Such a 
narrative presents time as an endlessly repeating cycle in which nothing really changes, 
rendering hope a structural impossibility. The problems with mythic time lead Suvin to assert 
that “modern SF is then—in proportion to its meaningfulness—under the hegemony of the epic” 
(Positions 77). Suvin casts epic time as politically progressive and mythic time as conservative, 
exemplifying the tendency among some utopian theorists to present cyclical time as the 
dialectical other to linear time and then to associate it with closure, repetition, and stagnancy, 
making cyclicality an even more problematic spatial metaphor for utopian time than is linearity.  
The main limitation of Suvin’s framework, for the purposes of this chapter, is that it 
cannot account for the recursive tendencies of utopian discourse, for narrative forms and 
representations of historical time that are cyclical as well as linear, that depend on creative acts 
that move from the present to the past in order to bring the past into the present. There is an 
intimation of this when Suvin describes the critical utopias of the 1960s and 1970s as 
representing “a spiral and ongoing development” (Positions 83), but he never develops this 
insight. For this, it is useful to return to Walter Benjamin. Benjamin never would have endorsed 
any cyclical theory of time, but his version of historical materialism has a cyclical form insofar 
as it calls for interventions in the past that identify its emancipatory moments and then bring 
these to bear on contemporary social struggles. For Benjamin, history is a contingent material 





The vocation of the historical materialist, in Benjamin’s view, is to identify obscured or 
domesticated revolutionary events, movements, or subjects in the “oppressed past” and then 
isolate them out of the dominant historical narrative, making them legible as signs of concrete 
utopian possibility (“Theses” 263). The historical materialist thus rescues this radical moment 
from its cooptation or elision by the dominant narrative. 
This operation, which takes hold of repressed utopian energies in the past and drags them 
into view of the present, is not an effort to return to the past or reconstitute it in the present; it is 
instead, as Susan Buck-Morss writes, “a transforming rescue of tradition that is the antithesis of 
reactive return” (77). Of course, falling into “reactive return” is one of the dangers of 
utopianism’s dialogue with the past, and this is why the wariness of much utopian theory toward 
texts that are not sufficiently adversarial toward history remains important. Utopian texts can 
frame the past in ways that are uncritical, regressive, and dangerous. They can ignore or deny the 
inevitable reliance of all utopian visions on extant social forms, pretending to a novelty that is in 
fact just a lack of self-awareness. They can also idealize a moment in history and then posit a 
return to or replication of that moment as the ultimate horizon of utopian hope. This is a defining 
trait of fascist and ethno-nationalist politics, and it demonstrates that a utopianism oriented 
unidirectionally toward the past is at least as problematic as its inverse. 
The political imaginary of any utopian text will be inherited and therefore subject to the 
limitations theorized by Jameson, but my argument that individual texts thematize this condition 
through their narrative forms and represented utopian content is specific to postmodern and 
contemporary texts. This is not to say that older texts necessarily lack this internal structure and 





Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four—set elements of the storyworld’s past in opposition to its dystopian present. Only 
We, however, frames the past in a way that prefigures the later texts, and this is because the 
novel’s revolutionaries refrain from idealizing that past. They instead use elements of it, 
critically, in service of their efforts to construct a radically new future. In Brave New World and 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, the future is comparatively closed, and the past is idealized and reified in 
objects such as Shakespeare plays in Brave New World and the contents of Mr. Charrington’s 
antique shop in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Beginning with the critical utopias of the 1960s and 
1970s, it became more common for utopian texts to have internalized the examples of earlier, 
pseudo-utopian projects that either fetishized the past or sought to break from it entirely, and this 
resulted in more self-reflexive meditations on historical time. 
Rescuing the Past in Ursula K. Le Guin’s Critical Utopias 
In Chapter Three, I reference Le Guin’s essay “A Non-Euclidean View of California as a 
Cold Place to Be” and the porcupine that Le Guin uses as a figure for utopian praxis. Le Guin 
adopts the porcupine from the Swampy Cree phrase “I go backward, look forward, like the 
porcupine does,” and she applies the phrase to utopian discourse by suggesting that “In order to 
speculate safely on an inhabitable future, perhaps we would do well to find a rock crevice and go 
backward” (171). This suggestion may elicit the well-founded fears noted above regarding 
utopian projects animated by desire for an idealized past, visions that reject progress in favor of 
equally problematic dreams of return. The theory of historical time that Le Guin develops 
throughout her critical utopias is more complicated than this, and it begins, in her earlier works, 





time. Her 1971 novel The Lathe of Heaven, for instance, is about the dangers of trying to design 
a better future for humanity and then force its implementation. The protagonist, George Orr, has 
the power to alter reality through his dreams. George falls under the influence of Dr. Haber, a 
psychiatrist who seeks to harness George’s dreams and use them to recalibrate reality. Explicitly 
drawing on Taoist philosophy, Le Guin stages an opposition between George, who represents 
balance, equilibrium, and presence, and Haber, who values knowledge, change, and progress. Le 
Guin presents this as an opposition between East and West, a Taoist and a Christian worldview.1  
It is possible to read The Lathe of Heaven as an anti-utopian novel, but it is more accurate 
to understand it as critical of the particular kind of utopianism represented by Dr. Haber, as well 
as by Orgoreyn in The Left Hand of Darkness (1969), A-Io in The Dispossessed (1974), and the 
People of the Condor in Always Coming Home (1985). It is the totalizing post-Enlightenment 
drive to impose an order on reality through discursive and political power. Le Guin uses the yin-
yang symbol to represent this utopianism and its opposite: 
Utopia has been yang […] Bright, dry, clear, strong, firm, active, aggressive, 
lineal, progressive, creative, expanding, advancing, and hot […] What would a 
yin utopia be? It would be dark, wet, obscure, weak, yielding, passive, 
participatory, circular, cyclical, peaceful, nurturant, retreating, contracting, and 
cold. (“A Non-Euclidean” 180-1) 
 
This passage is a useful guide to the symbolic system that structures much of Le Guin’s work. 
Her early novels, especially The Lathe of Heaven and The Left Hand of Darkness, make it clear 
that Le Guin personally prefers “yin” values of passivity and inaction, but ultimately the 
organizing principles for Le Guin’s ethics and politics are balance and equilibrium: a condition 
 






in which neither the yin nor the yang predominates. After all, when Haber insists that “Life […] 
is essentially change,” George partly agrees, saying “That is one aspect of it […] The other is 
stillness” (139). George himself embodies this balancing of oppositions. When he takes a series 
of personality tests, Haber tells him “you are so sane as to be an anomaly […] Where there’s an 
opposed pair, a polarity, you’re in the middle; where there’s a scale, you’re at the balance point” 
(137). George, therefore, embodies an understanding of time and praxis that unites action and 
inaction, change and continuity, line and circle. 
The Left Hand of Darkness theorizes this synthesis on a larger scale by representing a 
process of utopian social change while rejecting progress as a category for conceptualizing that 
change. The most famous image from this novel is the androgynous alien body of the 
Gethenians, who have both male and female sexual organs and who, therefore, lack gender 
categories.2 Genly Ai, an envoy from a league of worlds called the Ekumen, travels to Gethen to 
persuade its various societies to join the emergent interstellar order. The two major nation-states 
on Gethen are Karhide and Orgoreyn. Karhide is ruled by a king, but social life in the state is 
organized around close-knit communal units called Hearths, and the state is comprised, 
politically, of myriad and diverse Domains with their own leadership and a degree of autonomy 
in their doings. Orgoreyn is a centralized, rigidly administered police state in which citizens are 
classified as “digits” and “units” (79), reminiscent of Zamyatin’s “Numbers” in We. Increasing 
centralization of political power along with cultural shifts toward jingoistic nationalism in 
 
2 See Mona Fayad’s article “Aliens, Androgynes, and Anthropology” for an analysis of the novel’s complicated 
engagement with the traditional gender binary. David Lake’s article “Le Guin’s Twofold Vision” is also useful as an 





Karhide create escalating tensions that threaten to ignite into war: a form of extreme and 
widespread violence that the Gethenians had, previously, never conceptualized.  
The Gethenians are, historically, peaceful people for whom “progress is less important 
than presence” (50), and they approximate Le Guin’s description of what a “yin” society would 
look like. She writes that it would be 
A society predominantly concerned with preserving its existence; a society with a 
modest standard of living, conservative of natural resources, with a low constant 
fertility rate and a political life based upon consent; a society that has made a 
successful adaptation to its environment and has learned to live without 
destroying itself or the people next door. (“A Non-Euclidean” 190-1) 
 
This is a society that is concerned with reproducing its existence through sustainable social, 
economic, and biological rhythms; it is not concerned with expansion or growth. Gethenians 
have a planet-wide, cross-cultural disposition toward these values. Le Guin makes this plausible 
through a practice that Jameson has called “world reduction,” through which “the sheer teeming 
multiplicity of what exists […] is deliberately thinned and weeded out through an operation of 
radical abstraction and simplification” (Archaeologies 271). By imagining gender out of 
existence, Le Guin does away with gender roles and inequities. By imagining a planet in a 
perpetual ice age, she is able to imagine societies that are “predominantly concerned with 
preserving [their] existence.” In short, she carefully engineers a world in which the kind of 
society she summarizes above can function. 
Even so, there is some difference between the major nation-states of Gethen. Orgoreyn is 
a more organized and progress-driven society. Genly describes the Orgota as “Lords of the 
Earth” and likens them to “Other cults on other worlds” that insist on humanity’s primacy within 





powerful state apparatus, exerts total control over its citizenry, conducts an expansionist, 
jingoistic foreign policy, and is invested in growing its power. Karhide is a more passive and 
disorderly society. Its culture is represented in microcosm by the Handdarata, an order of mystics 
who practice a philosophy of inaction and non-interference, and whose valorization of darkness, 
silence, ignorance, and other negatives functions as a critique of positivist systems of knowledge. 
The political crisis backgrounding the narrative is precipitated by a shift in this traditional system 
of values, as Karhide begins to emulate Orgoreyn’s more progress-driven, statist tendencies. 
Progress is the destructive force leading the Gethenians toward war, and so the novel 
undertakes the seemingly paradoxical task of representing utopian social change that is distinctly 
antithetical toward concepts of progress, expansion, growth, development, and so on. This 
project largely depends on the novel’s narrative form, which embodies the motif of “journey and 
return” that Le Guin theorizes more fully in The Dispossessed. The two primary narrators in The 
Left Hand of Darkness are Genly and Estraven, and the telling of the main narrative takes the 
form of a dialogical alternation between their first-person perspectives. This pattern is broken up 
by chapters consisting of ethnographic reports that document Gethenian social forms or 
transcribe Gethenian myths and legends. These chapters bracket the chapters contributing to the 
main narrative. Chapters One, Three, Five, Eight, Ten, Thirteen, Fifteen, Eighteen, Nineteen, and 
Twenty are narrated by Genly. Chapters Six, Eleven, Fourteen, and Sixteen are narrated by 
Estraven, and Chapters Two, Four, Seven, Nine, Twelve, and Seventeen are ethnographic 
documents. The novel is therefore what Samantha Castleman has described as “a polyphony of 
narrative voices which often become jumbled, intertwined, and contradictory” (11). The story 





 This multivocal dispersal of narrative authority also has the effect of disrupting the 
progression of the main narrative with fragments of Gethenian culture. Castleman argues that 
this pattern “repeatedly aligns new Gethenian information to familiar Ekumen frames” for the 
purpose of facilitating empathy across lines of difference (13). It also has the effect of creating 
an oscillation between present and past, as Genly, who assembled and coordinated all these texts, 
uses stories out of Gethenian history to contextualize the events of the alternating chapters. This 
representation of the present’s entanglement with the past is mirrored by the arc of the main 
narrative. Genly’s mission begins in Karhide, but, after he runs afoul of the King and 
inadvertently precipitates Estraven’s banishment, he journeys to Orgoreyn. There, he is arrested 
and sent to a euphemistically termed “Voluntary Farm,” or forced-labor camp. Estraven rescues 
him and the two trek across the ice sheet covering the northern latitudes of Gethen, arriving back 
in Karhide and signaling Genly’s starship. Karhide then commits to joining the Ekumen at the 
end of the novel, with the other nations of Gethen soon to follow. The journey begins and ends in 
Karhide, just as it begins and ends with Genly’s voice, and its outcome is the synthesis of the two 
opposed nation-states through their mutual absorption into the Ekumen. Karhide and Orgoreyn 
have changed for the better, but Le Guin makes a concerted effort to dissociate this betterment 
from progress. The two nation-states abandon their statist, expansionist ambitions and instead 
return to traditional values: presence over progress, sustainability and survival over the pursuit of 
power. It is a journey and return, a movement toward a better future that welcomes the new 
(membership in the Ekumen) while also returning to the old (the values that predominated in 





 The Left Hand of Darkness represents utopianism as a recursive process, one that moves 
into the future through cyclical returns to the past, evoking Suvin’s description of the “spiral and 
ongoing development” of utopian production in the 1960s and 1970s. As in her other novels, Le 
Guin borrows eclectically from real world history in constructing the societies of Gethen. 
Orgoreyn is reminiscent of the Soviet Union, and Jameson has described the basic texture of 
Gethen, in unfortunately dated terms, as being like “some Eskimo High Middle Ages” 
(Archaeologies 267). The novel’s utopian content is, of course, also drawn from real world 
sources with relatively little mediation. The mystical philosophy of Handdara, with its skepticism 
toward positivist constructions of knowledge, is drawn from Taoism. The Ekumen is a sort of 
interstellar United Nations. Critics have debated how to appraise the Ekumen as a locus of 
utopian content, of course. Jamil Khader describes it as possessing “tremendous imperial and 
capitalistic powers” and as motivated by an “expansionist ideology” (116). David Higgins reads 
the Ekumen as a counterpoint to the way that so much science fiction world-building implicitly 
or explicitly validates imperialism; the Ekumen, in his reading, is a cosmopolitan entity defined 
by “its refusal to enforce hegemony and its willingness to be changed by the Other” (350). Both 
readings are certainly authorized by the text: like all utopian content, the Ekumen is thoroughly 
contradictory, an ambiguous crystallization of the novel’s ideas about social betterment, but one 
which cannot outpace the baggage of its real world referents.  
The Dispossessed is, both for better and for worse, a more narratively and conceptually 
coherent novel than The Left Hand of Darkness. This is because the later novel is, to some 
degree, an effort to retroactively theorize what the earlier novel does. The Left Hand of Darkness 





contents through the dialectical movement of contradictions, which leads to an open-ended and 
anticipatory conclusion. And, all of this depends on dialogues with the past. The author 
repurposes material from real world history to imagine social alternatives, and she constructs 
analogies for this process in the novel’s narrative form and represented processes of social 
change. Both are simultaneously cyclical and linear, oriented toward the past and the future: the 
chapter sequence continually brings the past into the present, the narrative arc ends where it 
began while emphasizing that this point of departure/arrival has fundamentally changed, and the 
represented societies move into a better future only by virtue of their return to older principles. 
The Dispossessed is organized by the very same dynamics, but it also explicitly theorizes them 
through the voices of the third-person narrator and the protagonist, a physicist named Shevek. 
The later novel thus offers a more systematic and comprehensible theory of time, history, and 
utopian praxis precisely by losing the messy, unruly quality that makes The Left Hand of 
Darkness more formally aligned with Le Guin’s anarchism. Lewis Call notes this when he writes 
that “The discourse of Left Hand can never become totalizing or totalitarian, for such a fate 
would require far more unity and stability than the text actually possesses” (91-2). So, the earlier 
novel’s incoherence is, paradoxically, constitutive of a unity connecting its narrative form, its 
world-building, and its thematic reflections on anarchism. 
Like The Left Hand of Darkness, The Dispossessed describes a bifurcated storyworld 
influenced by Cold War politics. The alternating settings for the novel are two planets: Anarres 
and Urras. Anarres was settled in the storyworld’s past by a group of anarchist revolutionaries 
from Urras. Urras is the larger and more prosperous planet, and the chapters that take place there 





“seems at first glance a fairly straightforward and unproblematical transposition and 
fictionalization of the contemporary division of our globe today between the so-called Free 
World (in her book, the wealthy planet Urras) and the socialist bloc (its barren and revolutionary 
satellite Anarres)” (“Of Islands” 8). He goes on to demonstrate that the novel’s reinscription of 
Cold War politics is in fact more complicated than this description allows, however, as the 
Anarres/Urras opposition is reconfigured by a much more directly referential opposition between 
the major nation-states on Urras: capitalist A-Io and state socialist Thu, both of which have 
centralized and coercive state apparatuses (“Of Islands” 8). The novel’s critique is therefore 
predicated on its multiple transpositions of Cold War politics onto the Anarres/Urras system. 
According to this reading, A-Io stands in for the capitalist West, Thu is an analog for the Soviet 
Union, and Benbili—the impoverished state where A-Io and Thu wage their proxy wars—
represents the Third World. Anarres thus becomes a third term that offers an escape from the 
flawed alternatives of capitalism and socialism.  
The primary science fictional conceit in The Dispossessed is the principle of simultaneity: 
the theory that time is an already-existent totality in which past, present, and future abide with 
each other in an eternal co-existence. Shevek illustrates this through the metaphor of a book. He 
explains to a group of listeners that “The book is all there, all at once, between its covers. But if 
you want to read the story and understand it, you must begin with the first page, and go forward, 
always in order. So the universe would be a very great book, and we would be very small 
readers” (222). Shevek frames the theory of simultaneity as an essential complement and 
counterpoint to sequential models of time, according to which time is a linear succession of 





sequency is a subjective human experience, and it does not correlate to the objective shape of 
time. Shevek says that, 
[Simultaneity is] an effort to strike a balance. You see, Sequency explains 
beautifully our sense of linear time, and the evidence of evolution. It includes 
creation, and mortality. But there it stops. It deals with all that changes, but it 
cannot explain why things also endure. It speaks only of the arrow of time—never 
the circle of time. (223) 
 
The subjective experience of time as a succession of moments, the progression of biological life 
from birth to death, and the processes of atrophy and decay that affect all matter are forceful 
demonstrations of sequential, linear time. Shevek points out, however, that “Time goes in cycles, 
as well as in a line” (223). The changing of seasons, the phases of the moon, and the rising and 
setting of the sun are all cyclical processes, though linear processes of change can occur within 
these cycles and the accumulation of cycles can itself become constitutive of a linear succession. 
These entanglements of linear and cyclical time lead Shevek to claim that “time has two aspects. 
There is the arrow, the running river, without which there is no change, no progress, or direction, 
or creation. And there is the circle or cycle, without which there is chaos, meaningless succession 
of instants, a world without clocks or seasons or promises” (224). Shevek understands that 
simultaneity, like sequency, only partially and imperfectly accounts for these two aspects of 
time. He seeks to solve this problem through the “General Temporal Theory,” which he intends 
to be a grand synthesis of sequency and simultaneity that accommodates linearity and cyclicality, 
change and stasis, novelty and repetition within a unified theory of time. 
 The concept of the promise, which Shevek references at the end of the quotation above, 
moves these theoretical reflections from the realm of physics to the realms of ethics and politics. 





time. As Daniel Jaeckle observes, “At the moment of promising, the future is in the present just 
as in the act of keeping the promise, the past is in the present” (81). To make a promise is to 
project an ethical commitment forward into an unforeseeable future, and to keep the promise is 
to return to the past moment of commitment and acknowledge its continued impingement on the 
present. The promise’s structural affirmation of the unity of past, present, and future is, for 
Shevek, the basis for ethical action. “To break a promise,” he says, “is to deny the reality of the 
past; therefore it is to deny the hope of a real future” (225). The Dispossessed explores the 
implications of this theory within two realms of human action that, it ultimately suggests, are in 
fact the same: the personal and the political.  
 Shevek’s partnership with Takver is the focal point for the novel’s investigation of the 
role of promises in interpersonal relationships. Odonianism, the novel’s anarchist philosophy, 
deconstructs and dismisses traditional values deemed “propertarian” by Odo, the movement’s 
founder. Monogamy seems to fall neatly into this category, and indeed, Odonianism jettisons the 
moralism and misogyny structuring sexual relationships on Urras. On Anarres, “No law, no 
limit, no penalty, no punishment, no disapproval applied to any sexual practice of any kind, 
except the rape of a child or woman” (245). Consequently, “there is no legal or moral sanction 
against infidelity” (246), and most Anarresti view monogamous life-partnerships with mild 
skepticism, regarding them as atavistic holdovers from their society’s propertarian, capitalist 
past. 
Odo, however, had chosen monogamy, and she made space for it within her body of 
thought. It is worth noting here that some of Le Guin’s critics, most famously Samuel Delany 





traditional values surrounding gender and sexuality. Katherine Cross argues that “Le Guin 
created a nominally egalitarian, gender-neutral society where homosexuality and polyamory 
were permitted, yet refused to explore that fascinating setting at any length” (1336). Regardless 
of how we appraise the novel’s treatment of monogamy, it is organized by the logic of the 
promise, which the novel frames as an ethical category distinct from the moral categories offered 
by organized religion, and which offers the connective tissue joining the novel’s theory of 
personal ethics to its theories of political praxis and historical time. Shevek, accordingly, views 
his promise to Takver as following logically from his understanding of time: 
Fulfillment, Shevek thought, is a function of time. The search for pleasure 
is circular, repetitive, atemporal. The variety seeking of the spectator, the thrill 
hunter, the sexually promiscuous, always ends in the same place […] It is not a 
journey and return, but a closed cycle, a locked room, a cell […] It is not until an 
act occurs within the landscape of the past and the future that it is a human act. 
Loyalty, which asserts the continuity of past and future, binding time into a 
whole, is the root of human strength; there is no good to be done without it. (334) 
 
According to this view, to renounce monogamy and life-partnership as tainted by the property 
form is to choose an “atemporal” succession of sexual relationships that will exist solely in the 
present, extending neither into the past nor the future. Monogamous partnership is based instead 
on the promise, on a commitment in the past that constrains the subject in the present and that 
extends indefinitely into the future.3 It involves a movement into the future that is guided by 
continual returns to the past through the act of abiding by and reaffirming the promise. To live as 
if time is only cyclical is to consign oneself to stagnant repetitions of the same; to live as if time 
 
3 Other passages in the novel frame monogamy as the form of relationship that best fulfills non-propertarian values 
such as giving and sharing. When a younger Shevek, earlier in the novel, is rebuffed by his friend, Gimar, he tells 
her “Life partnership is really against the Odonian ethic, I think” (50). She responds “Having’s wrong; sharing’s 






is only linear is to unmoor oneself from any responsibilities to a past that has vanished and a 
future that has not yet come to be. Le Guin suggests that these conceptions of time, each 
ostensibly the structural opposite of the other, lead to the same thing: a nihilistic undermining of 
any basis for ethical action. 
Shevek understands that a subject “who had this sense of responsibility about one thing 
was obliged to carry it through in all things” (333). This is where the personal becomes political. 
Le Guin wrote The Dispossessed with an acute awareness of what happens when the promise of 
revolution is broken. As noted above, A-Io’s main political rival is Thu, an authoritarian, 
socialist nation-state. Thu is an obvious analog for the Soviet Union, and just as there is a family 
resemblance between socialism and anarchism as real world political theories, Thuvian state-
socialism shares a genealogy with Odonianism. When Chifoilisk, a Thuvian agent, seeks to 
persuade Shevek to flee A-Io and give his theoretical work to the Thuvians, he appeals to this 
political common ground, telling Shevek “We’re products of the same great revolutionary 
movement of the eighth century—we’re socialists, like you” (135). Shevek rejects this 
identification, saying “But you are archists. The State of Thu is even more centralized than the 
State of A-Io. One power structure controls all, the government, administration, police, army, 
education, laws, trades, manufactures. And you have the money economy” (135). He goes on to 
frame this difference between authoritarian socialism and non-authoritarian anarchism in terms 
of the original revolutionary promise that spawned both traditions, telling Chifoilisk “You fear 
we might bring back the revolution, the old one, the real one, the revolution for justice which you 





It is worth recalling that Marx, himself, conceptualized socialism as a transitional stage 
between capitalism and communism—a dictatorship of the proletariat charged solely with its 
own dissolution. Shevek’s indictment of the Thuvian revolution as an abortive attempt to create 
an emancipated society is, of course, a critique of its real-world referent. Le Guin was not a 
Marxist, but she articulates here a standard Western Marxist critique of the Bolsheviks and of the 
Soviet Union—that the Russian Revolution was a moment of concrete utopian possibility that 
quickly became unmoored from its origins, with horrifying results. It was a journey without 
return.4 Jaeckle writes that the function of permanent revolution in Le Guin’s sense is not “to 
drive the system unceasingly to a better future but to keep the Promise first articulated by Odo 
alive. Improvement, therefore, is always a return to the founding principles of Anarres” (82). 
This anchoring to first principles constrains revolutionary action in the present and prevents 
actions inconsistent with those first principles. According to this logic, the Russian Revolution 
was lost the moment it was defended by violent action inconsistent with its goal of emancipation.  
The promise thus forges an integrity of action that unifies means and ends. As Shevek 
explains, “To say that a good end will follow from a bad means is just like saying that if I pull a 
rope on this pulley it will lift the weight on that one” (225). An argument late in the novel 
between two revolutionaries in A-Io puts this principle in terms of praxis. When one of the 
 
4 As China Miéville writes in October, “Fleetingly, there is a shift towards workers’ control of production and the 
rights of peasants to the land. Equal rights for men and women in work and in marriage, the right to divorce, 
maternity support. The decriminalization of homosexuality, 100 years ago. Moves towards national self-
determination. Free and universal education, the expansion of literacy […] And though those moments are snuffed 
out, reversed, become bleak jokes and memories all too soon, it might have been otherwise” (317). This history 
looms over many of the texts discussed in this project. Zamyatin was a Bolshevik before the revolution, but he 
quickly became critical of the state that emerged from it. This is reflected in We when I-330 says of the 
revolutionaries who founded OneState, “they were right, they were a thousand times right. They only made one 





characters insists that she will fight back if the police break up a planned demonstration, the 
other rebukes her: 
   “Join them, if you like their methods. Justice is not achieved by force!” 
   “And power isn’t achieved by passivity.” 
 “We are not seeking power. We are seeking the end of power” […] “The 
means are the end. Odo said it all her life. Only peace brings peace, only just acts 
bring justice.” (295) 
 
The promise, as an ethic for revolution, entails a radical alignment of means and ends maintained 
through continual returns to first principles. The obvious objection to this model is that it seems 
to preclude any possibility for newness and change, condemning any such revolution to a 
backward-looking preoccupation with the past. This is precisely what has happened to Anarres at 
the time of the narrative; it has become an insular society hostile to change, with bureaucracy, 
groupthink, and convention filling the void vacated by the state apparatus. As Shevek’s friend 
Bedap observes, “Kids learn to parrot Odo’s words as if they were laws—the ultimate 
blasphemy” (168). Odonianism has become a source of ossified traditions and conventions rather 
than a set of principles to return to so that they can inform new revolutionary processes in the 
present. As Jaeckle explains “the paradox and beauty of Le Guin’s conception is that, because 
circumstances are always changing, the return to founding principles always takes society to a 
new place” (82). When Shevek, Bedap, and a handful of likeminded Anarresti found the 
Syndicate of Initiative, they do so with the goal of renewing their society’s revolutionary 
promise, returning to its first principles so that Anarres can begin to change again. 
 This theory of revolution is also an explicit reflection on the recursive form of utopian 
discourse. The earlier chapters of this project have characterized utopian discourse as a mode of 





imagined. We see similar temporalities in Suvin’s work, when he dismisses cyclical models of 
time as regressive and argues instead for the political primacy of epic time, with its open-ended 
horizons and its validation of history’s indeterminacy. Jameson, in a similar spirit, 
conceptualizes literary utopianism as a struggle against its own permeation by an inherited 
political imaginary, the success of which is directly proportionate to the force with which the text 
negates the past that it depends upon. In The Dispossessed, these tensions simply dissipate. Time 
is both cyclical and linear, and the impingement of the past on every utopian vision is not 
something to bemoan or struggle against. As Shevek reflects late in The Dispossessed “The thing 
about working with time, instead of against it […] is that it is not wasted” (334). For Le Guin, 
any utopian praxis that is oriented unidirectionally toward the past or the future will find itself 
working against time. It will try to force time into a circle that perpetually leads back into an 
idealized past, or it will try to force time into a line that progresses unfettered by history into an 
idealized future. 
The Dispossessed, again, is less formally radical than some of Le Guin’s other novels. Its 
narrative form seeks to embody its theory of time, but it does this in relatively straightforward 
and conventional ways, with chapters that narrate Shevek’s experiences on Urras as an adult 
alternating with chapters that narrate his life on Anarres before his journey. The effect of this is a 
continual temporal oscillation that intertwines the past and the present. It also illustrates the 
function of the Odonian promise. We see Shevek’s repeated engagements with Odonian values 
as he grows up on Anarres and as he wrestles with how to apply them to his work, his 
relationships, and his politics. These narrative returns to the past frame Shevek’s experiences on 





ends as Shevek travels back to Anarres on a Hainish spaceship, having broadcasted his General 
Temporal Theory to all the known worlds, completing an arc of journey and return much like 
Genly’s in The Left Hand of Darkness. 
Tom Moylan has critiqued this narrative arc as absorbing the novel’s political 
contradictions into an overly neat synthesis in which nothing has in fact changed for the 
dispossessed peoples of Anarres and Urras. He writes that “despite the implied suggestion of a 
spiral of repetition with forward motion that breaks beyond a given circle, the structure of the 
novel goes in a compensating circle” (Demand 116). He points out, furthermore, that Shevek’s 
General Temporal Theory enables the invention of the ansible—a device that allows 
instantaneous communication between any two points in the universe—such that the novel 
concludes with a vision “based on information technology and the collapse of oppositions in a 
unified system” (Demand 116). This seems more a prefiguration of capitalist globalization than a 
utopian rupture of the status quo. Moylan’s Jamesonian critique of the novel ultimately insists 
that it “falls victim to the historical situation it opposes” and “ensures that the enclosure of life 
by the dominant system is preserved more than it is negated” (Demand 119). What Moylan finds 
missing from the novel’s narrative arc and conclusion is a rupture event of the sort that I discuss 
in Chapter One: a narrative hinge moment that allows the author, inevitably immersed in “the 
historical situation [she] opposes” to represent a dramatic shock to the system that will allow 
qualitative changes to occur. Le Guin’s recursive forms self-consciously forge continuities in 
time when, as Moylan and other theorists argue, utopian change is predicated on discontinuity.  
This line of critique leads directly back to the problem of utopian representation. The 





concluded the novel with a catastrophe that threw the alignments of power in the Anarres/Urras 
system into disarray, or if she had described a successful revolutionary rupture in A-Io that 
toppled the state apparatus and its capitalist allies, this would hardly have extricated the novel’s 
political imaginary from “the historical situation it opposes.” This, I think, is the application of 
Shevek’s observation quoted above about “working with time, instead of against it [so] that it is 
not wasted”; if all utopianism is recursive and trapped within history, then perhaps it should 
make use of history rather than struggling to escape it. 
 Always Coming Home is partly an effort to explore this tension by developing the 
recursive temporality of The Left Hand of Darkness and The Dispossessed while situating within 
it a decisive rupture event that separates time into a late capitalist pre-history and a utopian after-
history. It describes a future people, called the Kesh, living in northern California long after a 
period of ecological breakdown that effectively ended modern civilization. The book consists of 
a novella broken into parts and interspersed throughout the text alongside poems, songs, plays, 
drawings, and short narratives. These fragments are bracketed by intermittent commentaries by 
an anthropologist, a quasi-authorial figure, studying Kesh culture. Narrative perspective in 
Always Coming Home is, thus, very complicated. It is multivocal and communal, but its myriad 
voices are mediated by an overarching narrative authority that organizes and coordinates them 
such that they offer a vision of Kesh society. 
 This society is relatively egalitarian and peaceful, lacking private property and concepts 
of ownership. Lisa Garforth contrasts “[Kesh culture’s] ecocentric, relational and 
phenomenological conception of the lifeworld, and Western modernity’s rational, objective and 





opposition structuring the novels above, especially The Lathe of Heaven and The Left Hand of 
Darkness. Always Coming Home is another effort to represent an anarchist utopia while 
developing a narrative form that corresponds to anarchist social organization, one consisting of 
an intermingling of diverse aesthetic and discursive forms and a plurality of speakers. This 
structure is reminiscent of the Benjaminian constellation, expressed most fully in The Arcades 
Project and its amassing of voices that collectively articulate the historical moment. The 
complex relations that emerge out of the coordination of these voices mean that every individual 
voice contributes to the narrative process while that process remains irreducible to any of its 
constituent parts. The voices exist on a common discursive plane, even as their qualitative 
distinctness—their participation in different genres and mediums and their attribution to different 
speakers—reflects a culture that accommodates diversity of expression. Complicating the 
politics of this discursive egalitarianism is its mediation through the anthropologist. The 
anthropologist’s voice both enables and cancels the novel’s perspectival heterogeneity, 
continually re-containing this heterogeneity within a singular mediating subject. 
 The other effect of the constellation as narrative form is that it represents an unspecified 
mass of historical time in non-linear terms, meaning that it goes beyond theorizing simultaneity 
by seeking to represent it. Past, present, and future are so thoroughly entangled that they cannot 
be distinguished from each other, and the categories, as such, decline in importance. Garforth 
notes that “the spectre of eco-apocalypse” hovers over the novel (401), but the novel never 
narrates the collapse or situates it temporally in relation to any of its other events. This is in 
contrast to major climate fiction novels such as Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower (1993) 





specific about their chronology. When Le Guin’s anthropologist meets a Kesh man with interests 
and expertise that approximate those of an historian, she finds that “To him, it appears, 
chronology is an essentially artificial, almost an arbitrary arrangement of events—an alphabet as 
opposed to a sentence” (169). The man “doesn’t perceive time as a direction, let alone a 
progress, but as a landscape in which one may go any number of directions, or nowhere” (171). 
In moments like this, Always Coming Home seems to involve an entirely different operation on 
the line/circle dichotomy, one that neutralizes the opposition rather than synthesizing it. 
 As much as the novel’s formal radicalism seems to resist any codifiable schema, its 
temporality is in many respects consistent with the earlier novels. The social relations in the text 
are represented as reliant on and in conversation with the storyworld’s past, and these same 
relations are part of the author’s dialogue with real-world history. The novel’s title hearkens back 
to the role of homecoming in Shevek’s General Temporal Theory, and the story of Stone 
Telling—the most substantial of the text’s fragments—iterates the journey/return arc familiar 
from the earlier novels. The accumulation of fragments gradually aggregates into a vision of 
Kesh culture, but it does so as a result of the anthropologist’s archival project which interweaves 
the Kesh past with the present of its documentation—a project introduced by the anthropologist 
in an initial passage titled “Towards an Archaeology of the Future” (3). 
This archaeological project is analogous to the novel’s composition, and Le Guin nods to 
this in passages that treat the anthropologist as a quasi-authorial figure. The novel draws very 
directly on Native American cultures to articulate its vision of a utopian future, such that this, 
more than any other Le Guin novel, may be fairly critiqued for its nostalgic projection of the 





anthropologist’s assembly of knowledge about the Kesh evokes her discipline’s fraught colonial 
history. By imagining a future in which the indigenous peoples of North America seem to have 
outlasted their colonizers, Le Guin inverts imperial history in politically ambiguous ways.  
Regardless of how we appraise Always Coming Home, Le Guin’s rationale for her project 
is an important commentary on utopian discourse. She insisted a few years before the novel’s 
publication, 
I am not proposing a return to the Stone Age. My intent is not reactionary, nor 
even conservative, but simply subversive. It seems that the utopian imagination is 
trapped, like capitalism and industrialism and the human population, in a one-way 
future consisting only of growth […] Go backward. Turn and return. (“A Non-
Euclidean” 173) 
 
Le Guin’s comments here are clearly prescriptive. She says that “Turn and return” is what 
utopian discourse should do: it should counter capitalistic, growth- and progress-oriented 
tendencies as they make their perpetual incursions into the utopian imagination. Her comments 
are also descriptive insofar as they articulate a basic quality of all utopian discourse—that it 
involves a dialogue with the past, and that the utopian content it projects into the future is 
contingent on what has already existed. The strength of Le Guin’s project is that it apprehends 
the historical constraints on utopian discourse theorized negatively by Jameson, and it re-
theorizes them positively, finding in utopian discourse’s inevitable permeation by history a 
countermeasure against capitalist postmodernity’s unhinged charge into the future. 
Beyond Negativity 
Le Guin’s work is something of an outlier in this project, given that my argument is about 
utopian discourse in contemporary speculative fiction, and Le Guin is arguably not a 





placing them outside most periodizations of contemporary literature. This means that she wrote 
the novels above in a fundamentally different world than the one contextualizing the other works 
in this project. As noted above in connection to Moylan’s critique of The Dispossessed, Le 
Guin’s utopianism is based on acts of political praxis and aesthetic creation that forge 
continuities in historical time. More recent texts, especially those written after the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc, tend to predicate utopian change on catastrophic rifts in historical time. While the 
other texts in this project are often formally and thematically distinct from Le Guin’s novels, 
however, they also rely on recursive forms to articulate their utopian content. This content in The 
Road, for instance, is furnished through the father’s archaeological sifting of the storyworld’s 
pre-apocalyptic past, a process that allows him to rescue conceptual fragments that can be 
positively repurposed in the present. Le Guin’s project is useful because it is a uniquely self-
reflexive and explicit meditation on these dynamics that organize the later texts in subtler ways.  
Even so, there are undeniable differences between these approaches to representing time 
and utopian change. Le Guin’s injunction to “Go backward. Turn and return” (“A Non-
Euclidean” 173), is a reminder that the impulse of utopian discourse to move toward the new can 
lead it into troubling complicities with the social phenomena it opposes, situating it “like 
capitalism and industrialism and the human population, in a one-way future consisting only of 
growth” (“A Non-Euclidean” 173). Her ideal of utopian change conducted through pacifism and 
a revolutionary commitment to the past may understandably seem outmoded in the context of the 
twenty-first century and the condition that Mark Fisher describes as “‘capitalist realism’: the 
widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but 





Le Guin’s utopianism involves the recapitulation of already-existent social forms that, by 
definition, will be enclosed within ideology.  
This tension invites questions, however, about whether Fisher’s definition of capitalist 
realism, which is essentially a restatement of Jameson’s theories of ideological closure, is itself 
becoming outmoded as the twenty-first century progresses. The contradictions of late capitalism 
are currently splintering the ideological homogeneity posited by Fisher and Jameson, such that 
the totalizing world order they theorize seems increasingly precarious. It may be that Le Guin’s 
comparatively hopeful utopianism, formulated in the last major progressive period in American 
history, is acquiring renewed relevance as dreams of radical social transformation, such as the 





Jameson’s claim that the new cannot be imagined from within the epistemological limits 
imposed by history has become something of a truism in utopian theory and criticism. It is 
useful, however, to reconsider the idea that any utopianism that borrows its content from the past 
will invariably be compromised. Part of my argument in this dissertation is that to define utopian 
discourse in terms of its inability to produce a truly novel vision of the future is to conspire in 
limiting the use-value of utopian literature, theory, and criticism. It is obviously not helpful to 
overstate this use-value—no utopian text is likely to lead to the radical reorganization of 
society—but it is worthwhile to consider the implications of criticism that often seems 
preoccupied with documenting the inevitable failures of its objects of study.  
I have tried in each chapter to practice a relatively more positive and affirmational 
approach to utopian discourse; after all, there are a wide range of critiques to be leveled at the 
negative utopian principle that radical social betterment cannot be imagined or represented. It 
may be seen as an overly intellectualized and fatalistic cop-out that exports a lack of political 
imagination and energy on the Left into an abstract realm of ideological constraints that we, as 
individuals, can do little about. It offers little in the way of practical routes toward social 
betterment while characterizing efforts toward that goal as contained within the status quo.  
I frequently reference Tom Moylan’s work in this dissertation, and particularly his 
excellent book on dystopia, Scraps of the Untainted Sky, but his reading of The Dispossessed 





provides an accounting of the novel’s utopian impulses and the constellation of social ills that 
those impulses militate against. After recapping the novel’s framing of this opposition, he steps 
back to reveal that the very terms of the conflict are circumscribed by ideology, such that the 
novel’s efforts to imagine a radically better society are, ultimately, contained within conventional 
modes of thought and representation. The problem with Moylan’s reading certainly is not that it 
is wrong. Most of his critiques are fair, and they illuminate uneasy continuities between Le 
Guin’s utopian vision and the ideological formations it ostensibly critiques. There is certainly 
nothing to be gained by pretending that The Dispossessed is more radical than it is. 
The first third of Moylan’s chapter is devoted to recapitulating the novel’s utopian 
content, while the remaining two-thirds are spent exhaustively documenting its inadequacies. 
This is a strange allocation of space and focus in the context of a book that Moylan describes as a 
study of texts united by “the celebration of emancipatory ways of being as well as the very 
possibility of utopian longing itself” (Demand 12). What would it look like for utopian theory 
and criticism to emulate the literature by making hope their organizing structure of feeling? This 
certainly would not mean overlooking the flaws of The Dispossessed, but it might mean 
registering those flaws, considering them seriously, and then moving on to examining the text’s 
emancipatory impulses and the complex ways that it articulates them. This, in fact, is the tone of 
most of Moylan’s work, so while his reading of The Dispossessed represents what I consider to 
be counterproductive tendencies in the criticism, it is not representative of his body of work.  
This relatively more positive tone is also reflected in Jameson’s more recent work. In 
Archaeologies of the Future, after chapters that recapitulate the problematics of utopian 





a meditation on the impossible, on the unrealizable in its own right. This is very 
far from a liberal capitulation to the necessity of capitalism, however; it is quite 
the opposite, a rattling of the bars and an intense spiritual concentration and 
preparation for another stage which has not yet arrived. (232-3) 
 
Here, Jameson maintains the principle that utopian social organization cannot be imagined, but 
he reframes this principle in comparatively optimistic terms. Reading and writing utopian 
literature become exercises in readiness rather than acts that merely, as he has suggested 
elsewhere, “mak[e] us more aware of our mental and ideological imprisonment” (Archaeologies 
xiii). It is useful to consider this more positive turn in the context of recent conversations in 
literary studies about the horizons of ideology critique as a methodology. Elizabeth Anker, Rita 
Felski, and others have argued that the various schools and methods of ideology critique have 
revolutionized literary studies in profoundly positive ways, but that an overly narrow focus on 
the text’s positionality within fields of power can foreclose other, more affirmational, ways of 
reading it. Anker and Felski thus advocate “exploring new models and practices of reading that 
are less beholden to suspicion and skepticism, more willing to avow the creative, innovative, 
world-making aspects of literature and criticism” (20). In all of my chapters, I have tried to 
balance critique with affirmation, acknowledging the problematics of utopian representation 
while focusing on the strategies that texts use to navigate them. The texts in this project do not 
capitulate to ideology or pretend that they are free of it; they instead meditate self-referentially 
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